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1 Introduction 
Following Independence in 1947, India has made great efforts to foster industrialization 
with the aim of promoting economic development. Jawaharlal Nehru, its first prime 
minister, had great faith in the merits of a planned economy, which, he was persuaded, 
would be most effective and efficient to realize the four long-term objectives of 
industrial growth, full employment, the reduction of inequality and the establishment of 
social justice. Accordingly, the first Five-Year Plan commenced shortly after 
Independence in 1950/51, and it has been followed by a series of Five-Year Plans up to 
the very present.  
An examination of India’s macroeconomic performance since Independence reveals 
some interesting trends. For the first three decades, its GDP grew at an average rate of 
3 - 3.5 percent annually. This came to be known as the “Hindu rate of growth“, alluding 
to the cliché of acquiescence in a disappointing but not disastrous outcome, for the 
Hindu religion reputedly puts more emphasis on the hereafter. During the 1980s, the 
average annual growth rate was much higher, at around 5.5 percent. The Indian 
economy had a mini crisis in 1990-91, but otherwise grew rapidly during the 1990s, with 
growth now about 6 - 6.5 percent p.a.  
Knowledgeable scholars make the point that the transition to a high rate of growth 
occurred around the early 1980s, i.e. a full decade before the 1991 New Economic 
Policy (NEP) reforms.1 Among the factors, which are held responsible for this 
development, two stand out. First, in the course of the globalization process the Indian 
service sector has been experiencing a remarkable upswing. The rapid advancement 
of information and communication technologies (ICT) provides a great opportunity for 
the nearly legendary Indian software industry, its call centers and other ICT- or 
customer-related services. In fact, during the last two decades, the growth of GDP 
seems to have been driven mainly by the service sector (see Figure 1-1).  
                                                     
1) See, for instance, Chandrasekhar and Ghosh (2001), Williamson and Zagha (2002), De Long (2003) and 
Rodrik and Subramanian (2004). 
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Figure 1-1: Sectorala) Value Added in India: 1960 – 2002 (in bn. US-$, const. 1995 prices) 
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Source: World Development Indicators (World Bank); own calculations 
a) The industrial sector comprises manufacturing, mining & quarrying, construction, and electricity 
 
Second, it is argued that the reforms already started in the 1980s, and that the reform 
agenda of these early years differed substantially from the agenda of the 1990s. Rodrik 
and Subramanian (2004, p. 2 ff.) distinguish between the pro-business orientation of the 
1980s and the pro-market orientation of the 1990s. The former focuses on raising the 
profitability of the established companies. Measures such as removing price controls, 
reducing corporate taxes, and easing restrictions on capacity for established 
enterprises (all of which took place during the 1980s) tend to favor incumbents and 
producers. In contrast, pro-market reforms focus on removing impediments to the 
functioning of markets, they allow for increased competition, both from abroad and 
domestically. These measures favor entrants (and consumers) and did not take place 
on any significant scale until 1991. The cited authors see the shift towards a pro-business 
orientation as the initial trigger for the boom of the 1980s. While the policy change 
towards pro-market reforms added comparatively little to aggregate economic 
performance, it greatly affected the business environment of the manufacturing sector, 
which took a turn for the worse (see Figure 1-2). It is against this background that 
industrial sickness must be seen. 
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Figure 1-2: Annual Change of Gross Value Added – Manufacturing 
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In India, the term ‘sick’ units refers to economically unviable firms which are kept alive 
‘in the public interest’ by means of subsidies of various kinds. Since this practice is 
common, and large parts of the industrial sector are affected, this phenomenon is 
referred to as industrial sickness. To give some idea of the scale of the problem, in 1985 
there were already 120,000 sick units, of which only about 60 closed during that year 
(World Bank, 1989). Recognizing that scarce resources were locked up in unviable units 
on a great scale, the Government of India eventually enacted special legislation to 
tackle the problem, namely, the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 
1985. Apart from determining sickness, the main objectives of this act are to expedite 
the closure of unviable units and the revival of potentially viable units. Since the 
probability of successful recovery hinges on the timely detection of sickness, the law 
applies to the group of so-called ‘weak’ units (marginally viable units), too.  
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1.1 Motivation 
There are three good reasons to write a thesis on industrial sickness. Most importantly, it 
is a real problem in the Indian economic landscape. Second, it is associated with heavy 
economic losses. Third, thus far, the problem has not aroused the interest of academic 
researchers in the measure it deserves.  
The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) estimates the amount of outstanding credit locked up in 
sick units to have increased at the rate of 17.8 per cent per year during the 1982-1990 
period.2 More recently the total number of both sick and weak units declined by 20 
percent from March 1999 to March 2001, but it still stood at just over a quarter of a 
million (see Table 1-1).  
Table 1-1: Industrial sickness in India: number of sick/weak units 
  Large & medium enterprises Small-scale enterprises  
End absolute figures as % of total abs. figures as % of total total 
Dec. 1980 1,401 5.7 23,149 94.3 24,550 
Sep. 1992 2,427 1.0 233,441 99.0 235,868 
Mar. 1996 2,374 0.9 262,376 99.1 264,750 
Mar. 1997 2,368 1.0 235,032 99.0 237,400 
Mar. 1998 2,476 1.1 221,536 98.9 224,012 
Mar. 1999 2,792 0.9 306,221 99.1 309,013 
Mar. 2001 3,317 1.3 249,630 98.7 252,947 
Source: Report on Currency and Finance (RBI), various issues 
 
A closer look at the statistics for the period March 1999 to March 2001 reveals that 
indeed the extent of sickness, as measured by the number of units, declined in the 
small-scale industrial sector, but increased in the medium and large scale sector. More 
importantly, within the same period the amount of outstanding bank credit rose to Rs. 
25,775 crore,3 an increase of 23 percent in real terms (see Table 1-2). While, in March 
2001, the medium and large scale sector accounted for a meager 1.3 percent of total 
sick/weak units, its share in total bank credit outstanding to sick units amounted to 83 
percent, so regaining its level in 1980.  
 
                                                     
2)  All figures in this section are taken from the RBI’s ‘Report on Currency and Finance’, various issues. 
3)  Indian unit of measurement: 1 crore equals 10 million 
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Table 1-2: Industrial sickness in India: outstanding bank credit locked up in sick/weak 
units  
 Large & medium enterprises Small-scale enterprises Total 
 in Rs. Crore  in Rs. Crore  in Rs. Crore 
End 
current 
prices 
constant 
prices 
as % of 
total 
current 
prices 
constant 
prices 
as % of 
total 
current 
prices 
constant 
prices 
Dec. 1980 1,502 4,589 83.1 306 935 16.9 1,808 5,523 
Sep. 1992 9,241 10,117 73.4 3,346 3,663 26.6 12,587 13,780 
Mar. 1996 10,026 7,822 72.9 3,722 2,904 27.1 13,748 10,726 
Mar. 1997 10,178 7,455 73.8 3,609 2,644 26.2 13,787 10,099 
Mar. 1998 11,825 8,028 75.4 3,857 2,619 24.6 15,682 10,647 
Mar. 1999 15,150 9,905 77.8 4,313 2,820 22.2 19,463 12,725 
Mar. 2001 21,269 12,899 82.5 4,506 2,733 17.5 25,775 15,632 
Source: Report on Currency and Finance (RBI), various issues; own calculations 
 
Of the total number of sick units in the small-scale industrial sector, a mere 8.6 percent 
were identified as ‘potentially viable’ (as of the end of March 1998). One should not 
conclude, however, that the remaining 91.4 percent have since been liquidated: even 
though firms which are determined to be non-viable are subject to an obligatory 
winding-up ‘recommendation’, actual liquidation hardly ever takes place; and when it 
does so, only after years (or even decades) of delays. Similarly, even though the 
corresponding share of companies in the non small-scale industrial sector was as low as 
25 percent (as of the end of December 2000), this does not at all mean that the 
remaining firms were identified as viable, but only that, for most of them, viability studies 
have not yet been conducted.4 Also, it remains questionable whether a turnaround is in 
fact feasible even for those firms for which good chances for recovery have been 
attested. To understand why, one has to examine the investigation process that 
determines a firm’s viability. The former chairman of the Committee on Industrial 
Sickness and Corporate Restructuring, Omkar Goswami, notes that in many cases the 
bureaucrats in charge of the investigation process attest viability if the company’s debt 
service coverage ratio is not less than 1.33.5 Since the denominator, i.e. past and 
current debt plus interest thereon, is well-defined and fixed at the time of investigation, 
the bureaucrat would simply arrive at a level of current income that averages at least 
1.33 times the denominator and then constructs revenue and cost streams to generate 
the numerator (Goswami, 1996, p. 83).  
                                                     
4)  BIFR (2001) at www.bifr.nic.in as on February 15th and July 4th, 2001. For details see Table 6-1 in chapter 6 
of this thesis. 
5)  Technical expressions are defined in the Concepts-and-Definitions Appendix (chapter 8), table A-1. 
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In any event, whether it is because the investigation process is marked by substantial 
delays, or rehabilitation proposals are based on wildly optimistic assumptions 
concerning expected income streams, or, in general, winding-up recommendations do 
not result in actual liquidation, in India sick firms rarely ever die.  
Idle investments in sick units involve a waste of resources no economy can afford over a 
long period – certainly no developing country can do so. With a 1999 per capita GDP 
of 2,171.6 US-$ (purchasing power parities at constant 1995 prices), India ranks slightly 
above the Solomon Islands and Nicaragua (2,132.4 PPP US-$ and 2,105.7 PPP US-$) and 
just below Bolivia (2,174 PPP US-$).6 By comparison, Germany had a per capita GDP of 
23,328 US-$ in 1999 (PPP at constant 1995 prices).7  
India’s social indicators are far from impressive8, with 1999 adult illiteracy rates ranging 
between 32 percent for males and 56 percent for females.9 In 1999/2000, the infant 
mortality rate was 68 per thousand, the mortality rate for children younger than five 
years amounted to 94 per thousand, and 47 percent of the children under age five 
suffered from malnutrition. Considering that at the beginning of the 21st century only 31 
percent of the Indian population has access to improved sanitation facilities and 14 
percent have no access to protected drinking water sources, the unproductive and 
wasteful use of public funds is inexcusable. We conclude that industrial sickness is not 
only a real problem, but also must be regarded as an important obstacle to the whole 
process of economic development in India.  
1.2 Previous Research 
In light of the seriousness of the problem, academic research on industrial sickness is 
surprisingly thin. With some minor exceptions, it has been either institutional or 
descriptive in nature.10 Broadly speaking, the former starts by explaining how various 
policy measures and financial institutions helped to create the problem of sickness in 
the past and then proceed to explain the design of another set of policy measures 
undertaken and institutions founded to cure the problem.11 While we certainly 
appreciate the contributions of institutionalists and political economists, if the effects of 
                                                     
6)  Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators 2004.  
7) The figures for France (22,424 PPP US-$) and the UK (22,152 PPP US-$) may be of particular interest to the 
doctoral committee. 
8) Source for the following: World Bank: World Development Indicators 2004 
9)  Figures refer to adults aged 15 and older. 
10)  Some discussion of the respective literature will follow in the respective chapters 2 and 3.  
11)  For example, Gupta (1990), Biswasroy et al. (1990) and various contributions in Ramakant et al. (1993a, 
1993b). 
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institutionally imposed (dis)incentives on the operation of enterprises were really 
understood, as several thorough explanations and theories seem to suggest, then why 
has the problem of industrial sickness not been solved long ago?  
The descriptive category of papers provides a detailed picture of the development 
and dimensions of industrial sickness. In India, there seems to be no region and no 
industry that has not yet been the object of interest of these scholars.12 Any treatment 
of a problem should start by describing it; but this line of approach always runs the risk 
of losing itself in plain ‘bean-counting’. In fact, hardly any of the descriptive studies of 
industrial sickness offers points of reference other than chronological ones. A text on, 
say, the textile sector states that at the outset a certain number of units were unviable, 
and that 10 years later two or three times as many firms had fallen sick. But what is the 
relative weight of the sick firms in the aggregate sector? This is a much more relevant 
question.  
Third, there are a few econometric studies that attempt to explain the incidence of 
sickness. In this respect, the pioneering work is due to Altman (1968), who applied 
Multiple Discriminant Analysis (MDA) to distinguish between bankrupt and non-bankrupt 
firms prior to actual bankruptcy. In the context of industrial sickness, MDA seeks to 
derive linear or quadratic combinations of those characteristics that best discriminate 
between sick and non-sick units. The 1970s and early 1980s brought refinements of 
MDA-techniques (e.g. Gupta, 1983 and Bhattacharya, 1982), which were eventually 
superseded by multiple regression models in a qualitative response framework 
(Chattopadhyay, 1995; Anant et al., 1992). The relevant literature will be reviewed in 
chapter 5 when we present estimates of the probability that a firm falls sick.  
Finally, a note is needed on the theoretic foundations of the concept of a sick unit. In 
the industrial organization literature, the discussion of “barriers to exit” is clearly related 
to the Indian practice of maintaining unprofitable firms in operation by all means. Also, 
Kornai’s (1980) notion of the soft budget constraint has some relevance. In a more 
narrow sense, however, the only theoretical paper on industrial sickness of which I am 
aware is Pursell (1990), who adopts a macroeconomic partial equilibrium approach 
and shows that the spread of so-called ‘secondary’ sickness is driven by the massive 
subsidization of ‘primarily’ sick firms. The emergence of primary sickness, however, is not 
explained. In contrast to Pursell’s ‘domino-theory’, Wohlschlegel (2002) made a first 
attempt to develop a micro-economic theory of the sick firm - more on this below.  
                                                     
12)  Compare various contributions in Ramakant et al. (1993a, 1993b). 
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1.3 The Contribution of the Thesis 
Based on a panel of some 4,400 Indian manufacturing firms for the period 1988-1999, 
this thesis explores the dimensions and characteristics of industrial sickness and digs into 
the causes thereof. In doing so, the thesis deals with a peculiarity of Indian industrial 
policy. It therefore starts, in chapter 2, by briefly describing the basic features of Indian 
economic policy that seem to be vital for the emergence of industrial sickness. Chapter 
2 also outlines the law enacted to solve the sickness problem, the Sick Industrial (Special 
Provisions) Act, 1985.  
The economic environment for Indian manufacturing firms in the 1990s is characterized 
by the gradual withdrawal of barriers to entry, while discrete barriers to exit remained in 
force. The former concerns the dismantling of public sector product reservation policies, 
broad de-licensing measures, the abolition of discriminatory practices against large 
and/or foreign-owned firms and the liberalization of foreign trade policies. Against 
these achievements stand the yet unresolved barriers to exit of both labor and firms. To 
the extent that exit provisions may be applicable, they are generally considered as 
ineffective. This is especially true of Indian bankruptcy legislation, which apparently has 
not helped to settle the problem of sick firms. 
Chapter 3 discusses various concepts of sickness, explores the dimensions of sickness in 
a 12-year (unbalanced) panel of some 4,400 manufacturing firms and presents key 
characteristics of distressed firms. The main finding is that the spread of industrial 
sickness in the late 1990s is much more extensive than it used to be in pre-reform days. 
Furthermore, the prospects of sick firms seem to have deteriorated in qualitative terms 
as well, especially with respect to profitability ratios and capital productivity.  
Chapter 3 goes beyond previous research in three ways. First, although descriptive 
evidence is extensive when it comes to aggregate data, it is very sparse with regard to 
the situation of the individual firm. This deficiency is, of course, due to the limited 
availability of useful datasets, which has been (partially) overcome only recently. 
Second, the descriptive evidence presented in chapter 3 allows us to examine the 
spread of industrial sickness: 
• within industries over time 
• within states over time 
• industrywise across various age groups 
• industrywise across size classes  
• industrywise across types of ownership. 
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Furthermore, we take a look at the course of sickness at the level of the individual firm. 
This is a novelty in the descriptive analysis of industrial sickness, and the degree of detail 
provided here constitutes a clear improvement over earlier work. Third, and most 
importantly, we are able to depict the relative incidence of industrial sickness (within 
industries, states, etc.) and the characteristics of distress. In contrast, most other studies 
give mere numbers of sick firms or calculate average performance ratios, but do not 
furnish their argument with benchmarks (from sound firms within the same industry, 
state, etc.). In this study, the relevant population is a set of firms, both sick and sound, 
and not just a set of sick firms. 
We find decreasing failure rates in the early days of reforms, but erratic rises in industrial 
sickness from the mid 90s onwards. This finding raises two questions: (i) have the reforms 
ultimately failed to foster productive efficiency? or (ii) is increased sickness in the mid 
and late 90s just a reflection of the New Economic Policy and its attempt to harden 
budgets? Chapter 4 is dedicated to the first issue and chapter 5 is concerned with the 
latter.  
Accordingly, chapter 4 analyses productivity and efficiency in 10 separate Indian 
manufacturing industries. There is a rich body of literature exploring the effects of the 
New Economic Policy (NEP) reforms from the early 1990s on productivity in the Indian 
manufacturing sector.13 From an analytical point of view, our study does not add 
anything to the ongoing debate over its impact. The merits of our work rest rather on a 
very thorough specification of, for instance, the firm-level capital stock or the dynamic 
nature of productive efficiency scores. The distinguishing feature of our work is that it 
exploits the most recent data, allowing for changes in productivity over three important 
sub-periods, viz. pre-reform (1989-‘91), transition phase (1992-‘96), and post-reform 
(1997-‘99). It is reassuring that our results corroborate previous results on the general 
downturn of aggregate manufacturing performance after 1991. In contrast to other 
studies, however, our firm-level data set allows us to qualify these results. We calculate 
simple coefficients of variation of firm-specific productive efficiency scores and show 
that at the onset of reforms these were generally declining, but that after some turning 
point in the interim phase diverging performance levels are observable14.  
The main conclusion from Chapter 4 is that industrywise downturns in productivity and 
mean efficiency went with greater variation in firm performance. Diverging firm-wise 
                                                     
13) Less on efficiency, though – owing to the limited availability of appropriate (firm-level) datasets. 
14) An exception is the non-metallic mineral sector and the chemical sector for which sigma convergence 
and sigma divergence, respectively, hold throughout the entire 1989-1999 period. 
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efficiency scores combined with increasing failure rates lead to the supposition that NEP 
reforms have not been generally unsuccessful, but on the contrary, that economically 
viable firms have considerably benefited from the changes in policy.  
To the best of my knowledge, there are no papers on industrial sickness that are framed 
within a broader context of manufacturing productivity analyses, yet linking these issues 
seems an obvious step. However, the main purpose of the analysis in chapter 4 was to 
derive firm-specific, time-varying measures of productive efficiency to be employed in 
chapter 5. It is a worthwhile task in itself to document the production of this 
intermediate output. Therefore, the “side results” were collected into a separate 
chapter.  
The line of argument in the institutional economic-policy papers is that the barriers to 
profit-maximization in the days of central planning and the residue thereof in more 
recent years gave rise to the phenomenon of industrial sickness. To explore this 
hypothesis, one would need measures of the policy constraints that operated at the 
level of the individual firm. Alas, such data are broadly unavailable!  
We do, however, know something about the types of firms which would have been 
particularly bound by policy-imposed constraints and which types of firms would have 
benefited from special protection. The hypothesis to be tested is that preferential 
treatment irrespective of economic viability establishes systematic disincentives to 
perform well, and once these are withdrawn, then firms fall into sickness. We test this 
hypothesis by running a panel probit model in chapter 5, wherein observed health 
status in the late nineties is regressed against (i) dummy variables that capture the 
effect of the policy shock on formerly protected types of firms, (ii) pre-reform measures 
of budget softness, and (iii) pre-reform measures of economic distress. The latter have 
been constructed in chapter 4.  
The null hypothesis is rejected: public sector undertakings, firms located in backward 
regions, and firms that had been highly subsidized before the policy turnaround came 
into effect faced a considerably higher probability of finding themselves in a state of 
severe distress by the late nineties. Conversely, we found that formerly constrained firms, 
e.g. firms operating on a large scale or with substantial foreign investment, benefited 
from the reforms in terms of lower sickness probabilities thereafter. Does this prove that 
the reforms discriminate against the right set of firms? Not necessarily; for it might be the 
case that initially inefficient and highly assisted firms were already characterized by 
distinctive higher sickness probabilities prior to the policy reform.  
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The second part of chapter 5 takes up the effects of the latest reforms more directly. 
Here the analysis is restricted to the set of firms whose state of health actually changed 
in the 1990s (in one direction or the other). In other words, the sample consists only of 
firms which were non-sick at the beginning of the transition period but then registered 
as sick at least once until 1999, or vice versa. The simple question is: why do at-risk 
candidates eventually fall sick? Is it because they are not sufficiently nourished, i.e. a 
process of sustainable budget-hardening set in? Or do at-risk firms fall sick regardless of 
the level of assistance because formerly protected firms have become less efficient? 
What, then, determines efficiency at the firm level? Our results suggest that the trade-
off between budget hardening and sickness prevention (by means of soft loans and 
subsidies to loss-making firms) is not that severe. Instead, a persistently unequal 
distribution of (technical) capital imports and increased market competition were 
much more powerful determinants of sickness in the mid and later 90s.  
The analyses of chapter 5 contribute to ongoing research on this topic in several ways. 
First, there are hardly any econometric studies of the determinants of sickness. Those 
based on disaggregated firm level data suffer from various econometric weaknesses. 
We improve on such studies by addressing issues like unobservable firm effects, 
dynamics and potential endogeneity of the covariates, all of which have been largely 
ignored so far. Second, previous econometric work is confined to cross-section 
methods, whereas we have pursued a panel approach.15 To the extent that panel 
methods process information on individual behavior over time, they are clearly superior 
to cross section methods. But the main criticism is conceptual in nature: conventional 
regression approaches employ “explanatory” variables that describe the symptoms of 
sickness, but they do not catch the claimed causes thereof. For instance, Anant et al. 
(1995) find that sickness in the textile sector is predominantly driven by high ratios of 
both wages to net sales and interest payments to net sales. It is well documented that 
sick firms face relatively high labor costs and suffer from high interest obligations;16 
likewise, sales performance (and net sales in particular) is generally poor. But these are 
                                                     
15) Though Anant et al. (1992) have firm-level information for several years, they ignore the panel structure 
and estimate in pooled format.  
16) Whether they merely provide for interest in their accounts or whether they actually service their debt 
contracts is another question. 
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the very characteristics of sick firms, and the extra insight into the underlying causes 
thereof is not that great.17  
While chapter 5 concentrates more or less on reductions in barriers to entry, chapter 6 is 
more concerned with the remaining barriers to exit (of labor and firms). The starting 
point is the notion that the status of sickness entails great advantages to the incumbent 
management and the shareholders. The legal environment has long been made 
responsible for the poor performance of quite a substantial part of the Indian 
manufacturing sector. But no empirical study has yet evaluated if and how the revised 
sickness law itself may induce financially distressed firms to fall sick rather than 
encouraging timely reconstruction and rewarding good performance. We bring 
together data on the malfunctioning of the BFIR (the bureaucracy in charge of and 
executing the sickness law) and argue that it might pay firms to gamble in order to 
obtain the sickness status. Recently, Wohlschlegel (2002) set up a political economy 
framework, in which politicians follow non profit-maximizing goals and provide perverse 
performance incentives to businessmen. In particular, the number of workers (who are 
hard to fire) establishes an argument in the manager‘s choice of the capital structure. 
He then analyzes the relationship between these incentives, the choice of capital 
structure and the incidence of sickness. In chapter 6 we will test the consistency of his 
main hypotheses with our firm-level data set. Inference from single-equation estimation 
mostly supports the model. However, allowing the left hand-size variables (a particular 
choice of the capital structure and the sickness status) to be interdependent, we find a 
clear direction of causality between the respective variables viz. from the share of 
subsidized loans to sickness, but not vice versa. Endogenizing the provision of soft loans 
results in changing signs in the sickness part of the model and thereby contradicts the 
theoretically derived hypotheses.  
After some concluding remarks, which make up chapter 7, chapter 8 contains an 
elaborate Appendix. Appendix A (Concepts and Definitions) defines technical 
expressions and provides the details on income-expenditure and balance accounts for 
Indian manufacturing firms. Appendix B provides first the codes and boundaries for the 
qualitative variables of PROWESS, the main database for the empirical work of this 
thesis. Such lists were utterly missing and had to be reconstructed. Second, Appendix B 
contains cookbook-like notes on how to construct consistent output and input 
                                                     
17) Incidentally the cited study is co-authored by the great Omkar Goswami, the first chairman of the 
government-appointed Committee on Industrial Sickness and Corporate Restructuring. The seminal report 
had been published in 1993.  
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measures (labor and capital stock) from firms’ annual reports and lists the relevant 
deflators. I found it extremely annoying that most studies – and not only those in the 
Indian context – remain remarkably silent or vague on these technicalities, which take 
considerable time to research and produce. Hopefully, forthcoming empirical studies 
on the Indian manufacturing sector will not only benefit from the service character of 
Appendix B, but will also build upon it, improve it and, if they do, provide the relevant 
information.  
This study is inherently empirical in nature, and large parts of the evidence presented 
are based on a panel of Indian manufacturing firms. The remainder of this chapter will 
therefore introduce the dataset, present the sampling methods and lay out its basic 
features.  
1.4 The Firm-Level Dataset 
The main data source of this study is PROWESS, a highly comprehensive database of 
the Indian corporate sector constructed by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian 
Economy (CMIE). PROWESS provides information at the firm level. Although the general 
focus is on listed companies, the CMIE includes large unlisted companies having 
significant presence in their sectors in order to make the database more 
comprehensive. It is important to note that the collected data are in principle available 
to the public and their collection does not involve monetary payments to the firms. The 
companies covered account for more than 70 percent of the economic activity in the 
organized industrial sector in India. By most measures (e.g. gross value added, gross 
fixed asset formation and value of output), the database is broadly representative.18  
1.4.1 Sampling Design, Reliability and Content 
PROWESS covers the entire corporate sector, which is divided into manufacturing, 
services and infrastructure. From this we compiled a 12-year panel of manufacturing 
firms for the period 1988-1999. 1988 is the initial year in PROWESS, and by the time I 
compiled my dataset (February/March 2000 in Mumbai) the latest available data 
referred to 1999.19 The panel is unbalanced in a double sense. For one, there are no 
                                                     
18) Private communication from Mr. P.K. Surendran, analyst at the CMIE’s head office in Mumbai.  
19) The data were re-compiled between December 2001 and March 2002. By that time data from the year 
2000 would have been available, too. I decided to do without the 2000 records for reasons that I wish to set 
out in full. Compiling data is cumbersome work, and early in 2002 there were enough other things to do. The 
only reason for re-compiling the data was to check whether the selective early sample distorted the results. 
Selectivity was of the kind that only firms which had turned in their 1999 statements by February 2000 were 
included. In my view, the bias was immaterial to the research question, but unfortunately the ultimate proof 
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uniform years of entry and exit, and second, the panel has ‘holes’, i.e. some firms do 
not continuously report information. As it is not mandatory for the firms to send in their 
balance sheets and other details to the data collecting agency, however, a hole or 
even final exit from the sample does not mean that the firm has exited from the 
industry.  
The original CMIE manufacturing panel 1988-1999 includes 5,017 firms. We excluded 14 
firms because they did not report their location. 130 firms with missing year of 
incorporation were dropped, as were another 21 firms which reported some future year 
of foundation. 386 companies left the sample because they were not really engaged in 
manufacturing, but rather in primary articles, mining or some kind of electricity 
generation. Also we excluded joint ventures and cooperatives; the reason for doing so 
is that only 35 and three firms, respectively, belonged into these ownership types – too 
few to form a representative sub-group. We eventually ended up with 29,682 
observations on 4,428 companies. 
The database mainly consists of selected variables from balance sheet and income-
expenditure accounts of the years 1988-1999, while cash flow statements are available 
only from 1995 onwards and then only for listed companies.20  
As is common knowledge, drawing inference from company accounts is a bit delicate. 
Companies are indeed required to prepare statutorily audited annual accounts and to 
submit “true and fair” statements. But even if every firm adhered to the basic tenets of 
accounting practices, there would still remain much scope for ambiguity. In other 
words, there are several shades of “trueness and fairness”.21 Recognizing this problem, 
the CMIE has evolved a methodological framework under which information provided 
                                                                                                                                                           
would come only by direct comparison. So this is the result: The new dataset comprises more than twice as 
many firms; previously the number of firms amounted to somewhat less than 2000. Apart from the mere size 
effect (resulting in reduced standard errors), there were no substantial changes in the empirical results in 
chapters 3 and 6 and from a preliminary version of chapter 5. The whole exercise has been a great waste of 
time where finalizing the thesis is concerned, but the learning effects for later work will eventually outweigh 
this cost: be very careful with the data; but be highly aware of your own time resources as well. If you have 
good reason to believe that you are right, don’t run into the number-one female type of error (readily giving 
in, acknowledging that there is a point in the criticism), but switch to (male) ‘matter-of-fact-terminology’ and 
just claim your arguments to be true. Stand up to your  boss, who cannot appraise the effort it takes to 
compile data, and also to your husband, who would spend most of his 60-hour work week on compiling data 
with the help of a well-functioning back office. This strategy is mostly highly rewarding, though it might win few 
credits for style.  
20)  Table A-3 in in the Concepts-and-Defitions Appendix (chapter 8) presents the structure of income-
expenditure accounts for Indian manufacturing firms. Tables A-4 to A-7 sketch and detail the setup of 
balance accounts.  
21)  See Goswami (2001, chapter 5) for a discussion of the quality of financial and non-financial disclosures 
mandated by the Indian Company Act.  
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in individual accounts are reclassified to present a consistent and comparable set of 
statistics on the performance of enterprises.22 
Apart from accounting statements, PROWESS provides some quite useful basic 
background information such as industry affiliation, type of ownership, location, year of 
incorporation, and – for companies listed at the Mumbai stock exchange – equity 
holding patterns. It has to be said that PROWESS is not very user-friendly where the 
processing of qualitative variables is concerned. Some of them are coded, but there 
are no lists assigning codes to unambiguously defined contents! Instead, it remains for 
the researcher to match, for instance, six digit codes to office addresses – a not so easy 
task for non-Indians, since many addresses are incomplete (missing district, missing 
code) and quite a few managers, or whoever wrote down the address, have a poor 
command of orthography.23 On top of that, for several cities and districts, both the old 
and a new, “Indianized” name coexist, while some managers simply succumb to their 
preference for western-style abbreviations (most prominently: Madras versus Chennai, 
or just MGD – Madras Greater District). Eventually one and the same city may have 
several names, or rather it is the other way round: several names all refer to the same 
place. This makes it cumbersome to write a routine that would assign location codes to 
locations.  
With respect to industry affiliation, the job is similarly troublesome: a company-wise list of 
products manufactured is at hand, which then has to be classified under the correct 
industry code. Even though, in principle, a 12-digit code is assigned to each product, 
difficulties arise, once again, due to differences in spelling. Also, for some products 
there is no single unambiguously defined name, so that companies signify the same by 
different names (e.g. methanol vs. methyl alcohol). A last problem with product names 
is that the degree of detail provided in the product names varies across companies. To 
take an actual case, Bharat Pumps & Compressors manufactures “Pumps”, Kirloskar 
Bros. manufactures “Power driven pumps”, Shriram Honda Power Equipment 
manufactures “Pumping sets”, and Worthington Pump India manufactures “Vertical 
pumps” and “Horizontal pumps”.  
                                                     
22)  Reference may be taken to PROWESS’s three volume manual which explains some methodological issues 
as well as the composition and content of all variables in great detail.  
23)  For some places, derivatives of the original name are more or less straight forward. Variations of Gautam 
Budh Nagar, for example, include Gautam Budha Nagar, Gautam Baud Nagar, Gautam Budnagare and 
Gautham Bud Nagar. In other cases, it is harder to deal with poetic licence, as, for instance, is the case with 
Hooghly, or Hugli, respectively.  
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Other qualitative information, such as the number of factories a firm maintains or the 
number of products it manufactures, is wholly uncoded, or simply missing. An example 
of the latter is the lack of information on backwardness/non-backwardness of districts, 
which is an important variable in view of the existence of policies that provide various 
measures of assistance to firms in remote areas. Fortunately, an earlier version of 
PROWESS organized companies under a district classification system. This system 
classified companies into four broad regions (north, south, east, west), and within each 
region, companies were further classified into backward and non-backward districts. 
From that older PROWESS version we were able to derive a list of backward areas. 
Equipped with this list, we went through all 4,428 addresses, checked districts and 
assigned a backward dummy should the occasion arise.  
In short, the task of reconstructing codes was very time-consuming and annoying, and 
it is incomprehensible why the CMIE keeps back essential information on the contents 
of codes or even dispenses with a stringent classification system.24  
Yet, while coding might take (unreasonable) effort, in the end it is only a matter of 
processing available information. The most serious limitation of PROWESS refers to 
missing employment figures; all we have here is a company’s annual wage-bill. We 
generated rough employment figures by dividing a company’s total wage bill by the 
average sectoral wage, which again had to be calculated from Annual Survey of 
Industries (ASI) data (see Appendix B, Table B-5).  
1.4.2 Basic Features of the Sample 
Table 1-3 gives the sample distribution over time and industries. The CMIE classifies a 
company under an industry group if more than half of its sales are derived from 
products that fall into the respective industry. If a company produces a large number of 
goods and services from different groups such that none of the products account for 
more than half of the sales, then the company is listed as a diversified company 
(“miscellaneous”). A company’s industry affiliation has been obtained by matching its 
top product with a 12-digit code provided by PROWESS. This resulted in 90 industry 
groups at the 3 digit level and 18 industries at the two-digit level, respectively.25 We 
merged some of these industries to obtain a sufficient number of observations in each 
industry group. Eventually, we were left with eleven industrial sectors.  
                                                     
24)  With respect to the industrial sector and ownership types, tables B-1 to  B-3 in Appendix B assign codes to 
contents. A similar list which codes location and backwardness of some 283 districts is available upon request.  
25)  The complete list with respective boundaries is presented in tables B-1 (3 digit) and  B-2 (2 digit) in 
Appendix B.  
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Table1-3: Distribution of firms by industry (1988-1999)  
Industry 1988  1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994  
Food & 
Beverages  
51 (12.85) 107 (9.46) 109 (8.5) 136 (8.29) 162 (8.65) 204 (9.07) 295 (10.3) 
Textile & Leather 66 (16.62) 187 (16.53) 212 (16.54) 278 (16.94) 308 (16.45) 381 (16.95) 477 (16.66) 
Wood & Paper 15 (3.78) 50 (4.42) 55 (4.29) 74 (4.51) 79 (4.22) 90 (4) 117 (4.09) 
Chemicals 54 (13.6) 193 (17.06) 221 (17.24) 283 (17.25) 326 (17.41) 395 (17.57) 503 (17.56) 
Rubber & Plastic 29 (7.3) 73 (6.45) 77 (6.01) 110 (6.7) 121 (6.46) 165 (7.34) 216 (7.54) 
Non-metallic  
Mineral products 
32 (8.06) 78 (6.9) 86 (6.71) 110 (6.7) 125 (6.68) 140 (6.23) 172 (6.01) 
Basic metal &  
Metal products 
47 (11.84) 147 (13) 168 (13.1) 211 (12.86) 249 (13.3) 295 (13.12) 362 (12.64) 
Machinery &  
Machine tools 
54 (13.6) 155 (13.7) 189 (14.74) 226 (13.77) 259 (13.84) 283 (12.59) 335 (11.7) 
Electronics 11 (2.77) 55 (4.86) 67 (5.23) 92 (5.61) 104 (5.56) 139 (6.18) 205 (7.16) 
Transport Equip. 36 (9.07) 81 (7.16) 93 (7.25) 112 (6.83) 126 (6.73) 137 (6.09) 159 (5.55) 
Miscellaneous 2 (0.5) 5 (0.44) 5 (0.39) 9 (0.55) 13 (0.69) 19 (0.85) 23 (0.8) 
Total firms 397  1131  1282  1641  1872  2248  2864  
 
Industry 1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  Total a) 
Food & Beverages 355 (10.26) 372 (10.17) 367 (9.88) 365 (9.88) 358 (9.62) 2881 (9.71) 
Textile & Leather 595 (17.2) 625 (17.09) 636 (17.12) 635 (17.18) 610 (16.4) 5,010 (16.88) 
Wood & Paper 154 (4.45) 165 (4.51) 164 (4.42) 165 (4.46) 163 (4.38) 1,291 (4.35) 
Chemicals 620 (17.92) 649 (17.75) 659 (17.74) 650 (17.59) 654 (17.58) 5,207 (17.54) 
Rubber & Plastic 272 (7.86) 299 (8.18) 301 (8.1) 295 (7.98) 296 (7.96) 2,254 (7.59) 
Non-metallic 
mineral products 
201 (5.81) 205 (5.61) 202 (5.44) 198 (5.36) 205 (5.51) 1,754 (5.91) 
Basic metal & 
Metal products 
407 (11.76) 423 (11.57) 426 (11.47) 417 (11.28) 430 (11.56) 3,582 (12.07) 
Machinery &  
Machine tools 
382 (11.04) 398 (10.88) 404 (10.88) 406 (10.98) 400 (10.75) 3,491 (11.76) 
Electronics 267 (7.72) 302 (8.26) 324 (8.72) 342 (9.25) 386 (10.38) 2,294 (7.73) 
Transport Equip. 173 (5) 183 (5) 195 (5.25) 189 (5.11) 188 (5.05) 1,672 (5.63) 
Miscellaneous 34 (0.98) 36 (0.98) 36 (0.97) 34 (0.92) 30 (0.81) 246 (0.83) 
Total firms 3460  3657  3714  3696  3720   29,682 
Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations 
a) “total” abbreviates “total number of firm years throughout the period 1988-1999” 
 
Initial submission of annual accounts is very modest and then steadily increases in 
subsequent years until the second half of the nineties when the sample comprises 
about 3,700 firms. Apart from the first year (when the low number of observations seems 
to result in an unrepresentative sample), the composition of industry shares remains 
relatively stable over time, an exception being Electronics and to a lesser extent 
Machinery and Transport Equipment. While we observe shrinking shares for the latter, 
the opposite is true for the former. This development, of course, reflects the shift towards 
new technologies that has been taking place since the 1990s. The electronics sector 
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started with negligible initial weight and then gained increasing importance. In 1999 
more than 10 percent of the companies were in Electronics, most of them in computers. 
Even though the relative importance of the machinery sector decreased, it still belongs 
to the larger sectors, the largest being Chemicals, closely followed by Textiles & Leather. 
To be more precise, between 17 and 18 percent of the firms are affiliated with 
Chemicals in every, but the first (unrepresentative) year. Wood and Paper and 
Transport Equipment are the smallest sectors, to which approximately one out of twenty 
companies belongs. 
Table 1-4 gives the distribution of firms classified by industry across 19 major states 
(headquarters location) as recorded in the first year a firm would enter the sample. In 
the margins, we list absolute figures as well as percentage figures with respect to 
industry affiliation of firms across all states (bottom lines) and location across all  
Table 1-4: Distribution of firms by state and industry (on entering the sample)  
      INDUSTRY      
 
 
 
LOCATION 
1991 
share of 
national 
pop. 
Food 
& 
Bev. 
Text. 
& 
Leath. 
Wood 
& 
Paper 
Che-
mi-
cals 
Rub. 
& 
Plast. 
Non- 
met. 
min. 
prod. 
Basic 
metal 
& 
met. 
prod. 
Mach. 
& 
mach. 
tools 
Elec-
tro-
nics 
Trans. 
Equip 
Misc. All 
firms 
in % 
Delhi 1.11 30 46 18 33 19 20 36 33 62 32 3 332 7.5 
Andhra Pradesh 7.86 59 41 11 77 20 29 37 20 42 8 1 345 7.79 
Assam 2.65 2 0 4 4 1 2 2 0 0 0 0 15 0.34 
Bihar 10.21 1 0 0 3 2 2 14 3 0 2 0 27 0.61 
Gujarat 4.88 37 96 15 124 64 25 50 65 29 11 7 523 11.81 
Haryana 1.95 13 24 2 7 12 4 13 3 7 16 1 102 2.3 
Himachal Pr. n.a. 6 2 0 3 2 2 4 0 4 3 1 27 0.61 
Jammu & Kash. 0.91 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.02 
Karnataka 5.31 25 17 8 21 11 8 22 32 49 13 3 209 4.72 
Kerala 3.44 12 10 6 12 12 5 4 2 9 1 0 73 1.65 
Madhya Pradesh 7.82 30 16 3 17 12 7 18 16 6 4 2 131 2.96 
Maharashtraa) 9.33 79 174 74 295 114 72 164 157 130 45 11 1,315 29.7 
Nagaland n.a. 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0.02 
Orissa 3.74 5 1 4 1 3 11 13 3 0 0 0 41 0.93 
Punjabb) 2.40 17 35 10 18 1 0 19 12 5 11 0 128 2.89 
Rajasthan 5.20 15 46 0 19 8 11 13 5 7 3 1 128 2.89 
Tamil Naduc) 6.60 44 130 13 59 36 19 42 58 56 43 4 504 11.38 
Uttar Pradesh 16.44 32 35 16 29 12 9 12 13 14 9 3 184 4.16 
West-Bengal 8.04 34 68 14 52 20 19 48 44 22 16 5 342 7.72 
All states 97.88 441 741 199 774 349 245 512 466 442 217 42 4,428 100 
in %  9.96 16.73 4.49 17.48 7.88 5.53 11.56 10.52 9.98 4.9 0.95 100  
Source: Ötzler et al. (first column). All other data: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations 
a) includes Goa, b) includes Chandigarh, c) includes Pondicherry 
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industries (right margin).26 With 1,315 firms Maharashtra leads the list, followed by 
Gujarat (523 firms) and Tamil Nadu (504 firms). Firms from these three states constitute 
more than half of the sample (53 percent), while nearly every third sample firm is 
located in Maharashtra alone.  
The second column in Table 1-4 lists population shares of states in national population 
according to the 1991 census.27 Comparing these figures with data from the last 
column, we find that the heavy geographical bias towards West-coast states 
(Maharashtra and Gujarat) greatly exceeds these states’ shares in total population and 
the same applies to Tamil Nadu and Delhi. A look at Figure 1-3 reveals that firms in Delhi 
and Maharashtra are likewise over-represented relative to their weights in industrial 
output. The fact that the CMIE is based in Mumbai and that Delhi is the Union’s capital  
 
Figure 1-3: State-wise share in aggregate industrial outputa) (1997-1998) 
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Source: Annual Survey of Industries (Factory Sector); own calculations 
a) Value of products and by-products; * others include the states of Manipur, Meghalaya, Jammu & Kashmir, 
Nagaland and Tripura and the Union Territories Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Dadra & Nagar Haveli and 
Daman & Diu. 
                                                     
26)  The last column in Table 1-3 might deviate from the last line in Table 1-4 because the former is based on 
firm year observations while in the present context each firm only enters only once, viz. in its first sample year. 
Discrepancies are therefore due to different sample duration of firms.  
27) In India, the census is accomplished once in ten years 
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apparently leads on an over-representation of Maharashtra and Delhi in the sample. 
On the other hand, firms in Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh are under-represented 
relative to those states’ weights in total population and industrial output.  
A still closer look at the inner state distribution of districts reveals heavy clustering in just 
those seven cities where the CMIE maintains offices. This pattern is most obvious for 
West-Bengal where 88 percent of this state’s firms appearing in the CMIE’s sample are 
located in Kolkotta, as opposed to ten percent in other non-backward regions and 
merely two percent in remote areas.28  
Figure 1-4 depicts ‘real’ average firm age by industries for the sample period. Heavy 
industries appear in the upper panel and light industries in the lower. We define a firm’s 
age as the difference between calendar years and the year of incorporation, and then 
subtract (t – 1988) for t = 1989, …, 1999 from the year-and industrywise averages. The 
latter subtraction is advisable to avoid statistical artifacts of increasing average firm 
age with progressing time. 
For most industries, the average age profiles are downward sloping until the end of the 
transition phase (1995-1996) and the inter-sectoral variation in average firm age is 
continuously declining. A detailed (unreported) look into the data reveals that the CMIE 
included old (and large) companies early on when constructing the PROWESS 
database, whereas younger (and smaller) firms were brought in as the coverage of the 
database broadened in subsequent years. The year of incorporation pertains to the 
most recent incarnation of the company (point-in-time information given only once). 
For some firms that have been reorganized, the year of incarnation deviates from the 
year of foundation, which makes inference regarding the firm’s age imprecise. But this 
does not contribute to the downward slopes, because such firms do not leave and re-
enter the sample. Instead, the only thing that changes in their records is their year of 
incorporation, but the history of incorporation years is unavailable. Consistent with the 
evidence from Table 1-3, firms in the electronic sector are comparably young. The fact 
that average age is decreasing throughout the entire sample period is presumably due 
to persistent new business foundations in that sector. Average firm age in Food & 
Beverages, Textile & Leather as well as in the machinery and transport sector is relatively 
high in the beginning, but converges from the early 1990s onwards.  
                                                     
28) Further offices are maintained in Bangalore where 80 percent of Karnataka’s companies are located, 
Mumbai (67 percent, head-office), Chennai (65 percent), Hyderabad (54 percent), Ahmadabad (30 
percent) and Delhi.  
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Figure 1-4: Average ’real’ firm age by industry (1988-1999)a) 
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Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations 
a) Firm age is simply the difference between calendar years and the year of incorporation. To arive at ’real 
figures’ we subtract (t-1988) from the year- and industrywise weighted averages. 
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Table 1-5 presents the distribution of firms by type of ownership, which remained 
unchanged throughout the sample period. We distinguish public sector firms from 
privately held companies, and within the latter category, private Indian firms from 
foreign firms.29 The body of Table 1-5 gives proportions that sum up to 100 within each 
industry. The overwhelming majority of the sample comprises private indigenous firms;  
282 firms are in foreign (private) ownership and 165 companies make up the group of 
public sector firms. The highest share of public sector undertakings is found in Transport 
Equipment, a good reflection of the policy that reserved the production of strategically 
important infrastructure facilities for the public sector.30 In the early days of gradual 
reforms, foreign collaboration had been encouraged first in sectors where FDI would be 
most promising in helping to upgrade otherwise obsolete technology. Accordingly, the 
share of companies in private foreign ownership is highest in Machinery (13 percent), 
Electronics (9 percent) and Chemicals (9 percent). From 1991 onwards manufacturing 
firms were allowed to have up to 51 percent of their equity in foreign hands, with the 
exception of Beverages & Tobacco, Textile & Leather, or Wood & Paper. In line with this 
policy, we observe a well below-average penetration of foreign ownership in Textile &  
Table 1-5: Industrywise distribution of firms by ownership forma)  
 Type of ownership Total 
Industry public Priv. Indian Priv. for. obs. 
(firms) 
Food & Beverages 1.8 90.5 7.7 441 
Text. & Leather 3.2 95.0 1.8 741 
Wood & Paper 5.0 93.0 2.0 199 
Chemicals 4.7 86.3 9.0 774 
Rubber & Plastic 2.0 94.6 3.4 349 
Non-metallic 
Mineral Products 
2.5 91.4 6.1 245 
Basic Metal & 
Metal Products 
4.3 92.8 2.9 512 
Machinery 4.1 82.8 13.1 466 
Electronics 3.6 87.3 9.1 442 
Transport Equipment 6.9 86.2 6.9 217 
Miscellaneous 4.8 88.1 7.1 42 
All industries 3.7 89.9 6.4 4,428 
Total observations (firms) 165 3,981 282  
Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations 
a) The firms’ ownership status remained unchanged throughout the sample period. 
                                                     
29)  PROWESS also covers joint ventures and cooperatives. Since only 35 Joint ventures and not more than 
three cooperatives meet all our selection criteria, we drop them. The classification system (codes and 
contents) is given in table B-3 in Appendix B.  
30)  More on this in chapter 2 
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Leather and Wood & Paper.  
Finally, Table 1-6 gives the size distribution of firms for the period 1988-1999. In this thesis, 
size is defined by the boundaries governing the special provisions for small-scale 
industries (SSI) and large (monopolistic) firms as defined by the Monopolies and 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act (MRTP): if gross fixed assets do not exceed six million Rs. 
(before 1997), or 30 million Rs., respectively, (from 1997 onwards), the company is 
defined to be small. The boundaries for gross fixed assets investments are invariably 
expressed in nominal terms. In real terms, the ceiling almost tripled between 1990 and 
1997. A company is defined as large if its gross fixed assets exceed one billion Rs., or, 
alternatively, if it has a market share of at least 25 percent and employs gross fixed 
assets worth one million or more. The relevant market comprises all firms within the same 
3-digit industry class.31 On these criteria, 13 percent of the firm-year observations fall into 
the large size category, 7.3 percent into the small-scale sector and the remaining 
23,623 observations (79.6 percent) pertain to medium-sized firms. The effect of relaxed 
boundaries for gross fixed assets after 1996 is apparent. From 1997 onwards, the share of 
firms benefiting from the SSI-status increased by 10 percentage points. At the same 
time, the proportion of large companies rose as well, presumably because the market-
share part of the MRTP-definition gained in importance.  
Table 1-6: Distribution of firms by size class (1988 – 1999) 
Year Smalla) Medium Largeb) total obs. (firm years) 
1988 1.5 71.0 27.5 397 
1989 1.5 83.1 15.4 1,131 
1990 1.6 84.2 14.3 1,282 
1991 2.8 85.1 12.1 1,641 
1992 3.4 84.4 12.3 1,872 
1993 3.5 84.8 11.7 2,248 
1994 4.3 85.4 10.3 2,864 
1995 4.1 85.7 10.2 3,460 
1996 3.2 84.7 12.2 3,657 
1997 14.0 72.8 13.2 3,714 
1998 13.5 71.6 14.9 3,696 
1999 14.6 69.4 16.1 3,720 
total 7.3 79.6 13.1 29,682 
Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations 
a) Size is measured by the criteria for SSI and MRTP firms. Small firms: gfa < 6 million Rs. until 1996 and gfa< 30 
million Rs. since 1997. Large firms: gfa > 1 billion Rs. or gfa > 1 million Rs. and market share of at least 25 %. 
                                                     
31)  See table B-1 in Appendix B.  
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Table 1.7 in this chapter’s Appendix presents detailed evidence on the industrywise 
distribution of firms by size classes. Since publicly owned firms have been exempted 
from MRTP regulations, the high share of public sector undertakings in Transport 
Equipment goes along with a comparatively high share of large firms. To a somewhat 
lesser extent this argument also relates to the Wood & Paper industry. Furthermore, the 
share of large firms is comparably high in Non-metallic Mineral Products and in Basic 
Metal. On the other hand, the electronics sector comprises both a very high share of 
young and small firms, establishing once more a positive correlation between a firm’s 
age and size.  
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1.5 Appendix to chapter 1 
Table 1-7: Industrywise distribution of firms by size class (1988 – 1999) 
Industry size class 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Food small 0.0 1.9 0.9 2.9 3.1 4.9 5.1 5.4 1.3 11.2 12.6 12.3 
& med. 78.4 84.1 85.3 86.8 87.0 87.3 88.8 87.6 89.3 79.8 76.7 76.0 
Beverages large 21.6 14.0 13.8 10.3 9.9 7.8 6.1 7.0 9.4 9.0 10.7 11.7 
Textile small 1.5 0.0 0.9 1.4 2.6 3.7 4.8 3.5 2.2 9.0 8.4 10.8 
& med  81.8 90.4 89.6 89.9 87.3 86.9 86.8 87.9 86.9 78.6 76.9 71.8 
Leather large 16.7 9.6 9.4 8.6 10.1 9.5 8.4 8.6 10.9 12.4 14.8 17.4 
Wood small 0.0 0.0 1.8 2.7 1.3 1.1 0.0 2.6 2.4 12.8 10.9 12.9 
&  med.  80.0 82.0 81.8 83.8 86.1 88.9 87.2 87.0 84.9 72.0 72.7 67.5 
Paper large 20.0 18.0 16.4 13.5 12.7 10.0 12.8 10.4 12.7 15.2 16.4 19.6 
Che- small 1.9 1.0 0.9 3.5 5.2 4.3 4.4 3.4 2.9 14.6 13.7 12.8 
micals med. 72.2 83.4 84.6 83.4 81.3 83.0 83.9 85.2 84.1 70.9 70.5 69.4 
  large 25.9 15.5 14.5 13.1 13.5 12.7 11.7 11.5 12.9 14.6 15.9 17.7 
Rubber small 0.0 0.0 2.6 5.5 5.0 3.0 2.3 1.1 2.0 12.6 12.9 10.5 
& med. 86.2 84.9 83.1 82.7 80.2 84.2 87.0 89.7 87.3 76.4 73.2 75.0 
Plastic large 13.8 15.1 14.3 11.8 14.9 12.7 10.7 9.2 10.7 11.0 13.9 14.5 
Non-met. small 3.1 5.1 3.5 4.6 5.6 5.7 5.2 9.0 6.3 18.8 15.7 17.1 
Mineral med. 68.8 71.8 73.3 76.4 77.6 76.4 78.5 75.1 75.1 60.4 61.1 56.1 
Products large 28.1 23.1 23.3 19.1 16.8 17.9 16.3 15.9 18.5 20.8 23.2 26.8 
Basic small 0.0 0.7 0.6 1.0 0.8 1.4 1.7 2.0 1.4 8.7 8.4 8.8 
Metal med. 70.2 83.7 84.5 85.3 84.3 84.4 85.4 84.3 81.1 73.2 71.9 73.0 
& Prod. large 29.8 15.7 14.9 13.7 14.9 14.2 13.0 13.8 17.5 18.1 19.7 18.1 
Machinery small 3.7 2.6 2.7 3.1 4.6 1.8 4.2 3.7 2.5 15.4 14.5 17.0 
& Mach. med. 44.4 81.3 84.7 86.3 85.7 86.9 85.4 86.1 85.9 72.3 70.9 69.0 
Tools large 51.9 16.1 12.7 10.6 9.7 11.3 10.5 10.2 11.6 12.4 14.5 14.0 
Elec- small 9.1 1.8 1.5 4.4 2.9 7.9 9.3 9.0 10.6 31.2 29.8 35.5 
tronics med. 36.4 85.5 86.6 87.0 86.5 83.5 85.9 85.4 82.8 62.0 62.6 56.7 
  large 54.6 12.7 11.9 8.7 10.6 8.6 4.9 5.6 6.6 6.8 7.6 7.8 
Transport small 0.0 3.7 2.2 1.8 1.6 1.5 3.8 3.5 3.3 11.3 11.6 7.5 
Equip. med. 80.6 76.5 79.6 83.9 85.7 84.7 84.3 83.8 82.5 73.3 70.9 72.3 
& Parts large 19.4 19.8 18.3 14.3 12.7 13.9 12.0 12.7 14.2 15.4 17.5 20.2 
Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations 
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2 The Policy Background 
In this chapter, we highlight and analyze some of the basic features of post-war Indian 
economic policy that seem to be important for the genesis of industrial sickness.32 
According to the literature, the key factors responsible for the emergence of industrial 
sickness are:  
• the licensing system,  
• the promotion of priority sectors, such as small-scale or backward industries, on 
ideological grounds, 
• restrictions on foreign trade and foreign collaboration,  
• labor market rigidities, and  
• development financing.  
As the ultimate aim of subsequent chapters is to analyze the impact of reforms of these 
policies on productive efficiency and the (re-)emergence of industrial sickness, each of 
the above will be discussed in turn, with a sketch of the initial position and then the 
major changes brought about by the 1991 deregulation policies. 
It should be remarked that chapter 6 takes a different perspective and departs from 
the line that the Sick Industrial Companies Act enacted in 1987 provided incentives for 
firms to register as sick. So as not to overload that chapter with the policy background, 
the workings of the sickness law are sketched in the last section of the present chapter.  
2.1 Industrial Licensing33 
Originally, the license system had been established to direct the process of industrial 
growth. In a resource-scarce economy such as India, licensing served as an instrument 
for translating the broad priorities and targets of economic policy into concrete 
industrial capacities. Until 1991, entrepreneurial decisions had been guided and limited 
by this practice, the legal provisions in respect of which were outlined in the Industries 
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (IDRA for short). Unless a proper license was 
granted, it was not at the management’s own discretion to:  
• establish a new undertaking, nor to close down an established one, 
• manufacture a new article,  
                                                     
32)  Useful references include inter alia Ahluwalia (1985), Kuchhal (1989), Datt and Sundharam (1993) and 
Goswami (1996a). 
33)  Major reference: Sundriyal (1996) 
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• expand capacity,  
• change location,  
• import capital goods,  
• secure foreign collaboration,  
to name only the most important restrictions. While the choice of the production mix 
was generally restricted by a license system, the production of some articles was 
completely reserved for public sector undertakings. In particular, IDRA identified a list of 
industries considered important on strategic grounds that should be exclusively owned 
by the government (arms, atomic energy, railways etc.)34. Furthermore, some key or 
basic industries (e.g. coal, iron and steel) and infrastructure facilities (e.g. aircraft, ships 
and telephones) were subjected to the control of both the national and the state 
governments. The rationale behind such practice was grounded in the mistrust of 
private profit-maximization and the belief that only state-owned enterprises could 
reliably supply basic needs in these fields.  
Where the government did not maintain direct control, it retained at least final control. 
Regardless of industry affiliation, any firm had to reckon with government interference in 
such matters as a substantial fall in production, a marked deterioration in the quality of 
products, an ‘unjustifiable’ rise in the prices of products, or general mismanagement. 
The 1991 NEP virtually dismantled licensing. Only eight industries would remain on the list 
reserved for the public sector, and compulsory industrial licensing was abolished for all 
but 16 industries (see Table 2-3 and Table 2-4 in the Appendix to this chapter). These 
exemptions from licensing were, however, subject to certain locational restrictions; in 
particular, they come into effect only if the proposed project is located at least 25 km 
from the periphery of a city having a population of more than one million. Where 
licensing remained mandatory, its provisions have been relaxed. For example, so-called 
‘broad-bands’ had been defined, i.e. industries whose design and production facilities 
are similar. Units falling within a ‘broad-band’ were permitted to produce any item 
covered under the generic description of the industry, and not only a tightly specified 
product, as before.  
For de-licensed industries, managers are merely required to file an ‘industrial 
entrepreneurs memorandum’ on new projects and substantial expansions. Though the 
Government of India has been claiming that an acknowledgement could be obtained 
                                                     
34) Refer to Table 2-3 in the Appendix attached to this chapter. 
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almost immediately, available evidence shows that this may not always have been the 
case (Sundriyal, 1996, p. 50).  
2.2 Promotion of Priority Sectors: Small-Scale and Backward Industries35 
With the objective of encouraging the diffusion of entrepreneurship, promoting 
employment and improving the standard of living in backward regions, small scale 
industries (SSI for short) as well as companies located in remote areas benefit from 
preferential treatment in many respects.  
The definition of SSI firms varies as to whether the firm employs power or not: for 
industrial undertakings using power, a small scale firm may employ no more than 50 
persons. An undertaking that produces without power may employ no more than 100 
persons. Regardless of the number of persons employed, fixed capital investment (i.e. 
plant and machinery) may not exceed Rs. 500,000 (1960), Rs. 750,000 (1966), Rs. 
1,000,000 (1975), Rs. 2,000,000 (1980), Rs 3,500,000 (1985), Rs 6,000,000 (1990) and Rs. 
30,000,000 (1997) (Economic Survey, various years). However, the real ceiling rose 
substantially only after 1997 when it almost tripled.36 
SSI firms were exempted from the requirement to obtain an entry-license and were 
allowed to expand capacity at their own discretion. Other measures encompassed 
areas like infrastructural support, priority lending at concessional rates of interest and 
favorable repayment schemes, lower rates of duty or even full exemption from excise 
duty, technology up-gradation and export incentives. Furthermore, the government 
maintained preferential purchasing contracts and followed a policy of generous 
product reservation. The extent of small-scale product reservation rose steadily until by 
1991, the manufacturing of 836 items was exclusively reserved for small scale industrial 
undertakings.37  
Not surprisingly, these forms of favorable treatment of the small sector has led to 
widespread abuses of the system: “Small industries in India have because of 
government policy been encouraged to remain small, and when they grow, to split so 
that they remain within the definition of small scale units, as a result of which they enjoy 
special protection and incentives” (Rao, 1994, p. 9). The phenomenon of industrial 
sickness is especially wide-spread among small firms, and it is obscure why it is precisely 
                                                     
35)  Major refernce: Economic Survey (various years, online at http://www.indiabudget.nic.in/), chapter on 
‘small scale sector’. 
36) The real ceilings in constant 1993 Rs. amounted to 6.4 Mio. Rs. (1960), 6.3 Mio. Rs. (1966), 4.5 Mio. Rs. (1975), 
6.2 Mio. Rs. (1980), 7.2 Mio. Rs. (1985), 8.1 Mio. Rs. (1990) and 22 Mio. Rs. (1997).   
37)  1967: 180 items, 1977: over 500 items, 1980: 807 items.  
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the small scale sector that is exempt from the regulations of the Sick Industrial 
Companies (Special Provision) Act.38 The Economic Survey 1992-1993 estimates that 
between 30-40% of the registered small-scale units are ‘non-functional’. This may mean 
either that they fall short of minimum efficiency scales and in consequence are 
technologically non-viable, or that the units exist, but do not actually function. 
The liberalization process of the early 1990s had limited direct effects on the small-scale 
industrial sector. Despite de-licensing in general, it continues to be protected through 
the policy of reservation. Only if a non-SSI firm subscribes to an export obligation of at 
least 75 percent (since 1996: 50 percent), will it obtain a product license originally 
reserved for small firms.  
On the other hand, large firms suffered from manifold forms of discrimination. If private 
sector firms had a market share of 25% or more, they were automatically classified as 
‘dominant’. According to the definition in the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act (MRTP), 1970, a dominant firm was viewed as a monopoly if its gross fixed 
assets exceeded ten million Rupees. Beyond that, any private company was 
automatically classified as possessing monopoly power if its gross fixed assets exceeded 
one billion Rupees (since 1985).39  
With a view to controlling the power of such monopolies, their activities were subjected 
to further licensing. Government approval was required for:  
• substantial expansion of capacity,  
• diversification of existing activities,  
• merging or amalgamation with any other undertaking, or  
• takeover of the whole or parts of any other undertaking.  
 
Most revealingly, state monopolies were not considered harmful to the public interest, 
and accordingly the regulations of the MRTP did not apply to government 
undertakings. 
A first step towards reform was taken when the government declared that the 
provisions of the MRTP would not apply within 90 so-called ‘zero industry districts’, i.e. 
absolutely remote areas of the country. Since 1982, exemptions would also be granted 
if additional capacity of any good was meant exclusively for exports. The threshold 
                                                     
38)  See section 2.6 below. 
39)  Originally: 200,000,000 (1970 figure). 
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limits of assets in respect of MRTP companies and dominant undertakings were raised in 
1985. Eventually the government conceded that the interference in investment 
decisions of large companies had become harmful in its effect on industrial growth. 
Accordingly, the threshold limits were removed in 1991, and no particular prior approval 
is necessary anymore with regard to the establishment of a new undertaking, 
expansion, amalgamation or takeovers.  
2.3 Foreign Trade and Foreign Collaboration 
India’s post-Independence foreign trade policy was guided by massive trade 
protection in the course of an import substitution strategy.40 Import substitution policy 
was based upon the ‘infant industry’ argument, according to which infant industries 
can neither develop nor mature without protection from foreign competition. As further 
arguments, the need to conserve scarce foreign exchange often appears in the 
literature, as do the emotive appeal of self-reliance and Prebisch’s export pessimism 
(i.e. inelastic foreign demand for domestically produced goods). In order to provide 
protection to domestic industries, a complex system of import licensing was set up, 
supplemented by high tariff rates. Capital goods were divided into a restricted 
category and an Open General License (OGL) category, respectively. Although, in 
principle, items from the latter group could be imported without a license, several 
conditions had to be fulfilled, notably the “actual user condition”. This provision stated 
that OGL-imported goods had to be used by the importing firm itself and could not be 
sold within the next five years unless the industrial licensing authority approved the deal. 
Intermediate goods were divided into the banned, restricted and limited permissible 
categories plus an OGL category. The latter was likewise subject to the actual-user 
conditions. Furthermore, licenses for the import of capital goods or raw materials were 
granted only if the applying firm could successfully convince the bureaucrat that the 
respective item was ‘absolutely essential’ in production and ‘locally not available’. In 
practice the concept of ‘local availability’ was open to rather generous interpretation. 
At times, the mere advertisement for some good was taken as sufficient evidence that 
the item was locally available. The principles of essentiality and local availability gave 
enormous discretionary powers to the respective bureaucrats, and they conferred 
special advantages on, and provided particular disincentives to domestic producers in 
the import substituting industry, since neither cost nor quality mattered. Lastly, imports of 
                                                     
40)  Major references include Ahluwalia (1985, 1996) and, more recently, Chand and Sen (2002) and Das 
(2003a). 
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consumer goods were generally banned unless they were canalized through state 
import agencies.  
Designed systematically to dismantle the high-cost industrial sector that emerged from 
extreme inward-orientation and to make it globally competitive, the NEP trade reforms 
substantially reduced import duties and largely swept away quantitative import 
restrictions except for the consumer goods industries. To the extent import licensing was 
still in place it would be administered with less stringency (Pursell, 1992). Moreover, many 
formerly licensed items would be shifted to the OGL category. The 1991 trade reforms 
have been well documented (for instance in Joshi and Little, 1996).  
Table 2-1: Indicators of trade barriers in Indian manufacturing 
  1986-1990 1991-1995 1996-2000 
     
  Effective rate of protection (percent)a) 
Intermediate goods 149 88 40 
Capital goods 78 54 33 
Consumer goods 112 81 48 
All Industries 126 80 40 
     
  Import coverage ratio (percent) b) 
Intermediate goods 98 42 28 
Capital goods 77 20 8 
Consumer goods 88 46 33 
All Industries 92 38 25 
     
  Import penetration rates (percent) c) 
Intermediate goods 0.13 0.15 0.18 
Capital goods 0.12 0.12 0.19 
Consumer goods 0.04 0.04 0.10 
All Industries 0.11 0.12 0.16 
Source: Das (2003 b) 
a) The effective rate of protection is calculated as the difference between value added at domestic and at 
world prices, divided by value added at world prices. The appeal of this value-added based concept of 
protection is that it takes account of the level of protection on intermediate inputs as well as of the final 
product. It brings out the point that, if a good is exported without any export subsidy but the exporter must 
purchase protected domestically-produced intermediate inputs, the primary factors involved in the value-
added process are actually penalised compared to free trade; b) The import coverage ratio gives the share 
of an industry’s own imports that is subject to a particular non tariff barrier, or any one of a specified group of 
non tariff barriers; c) The import penetration is defined as the ratio of manufacturing imports to apparent 
consumption of manufactured goods (domestic production minus exports plus imports). 
 
In a recent study, Das (2003 b) calculates sundry measures of trade liberalization, 
namely the effective rate of protection (ERP), the import coverage ratio and import 
penetration rates, for the use-based classification (consumer goods, intermediate 
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goods and capital goods) under the different phases of trade reforms (see Table 2-1).41 
It is worth mentioning that these concepts have met with criticism as regards their 
theoretical foundations and their applications for empirical work.42 It is not a top priority 
of this section to enter into this discussion. However, it has to be kept in mind that there 
is a discussion of the informational value of these concepts – as is the case with any 
composed indicator designed to capture complex relations in just one figure.  
Keeping these remarks in mind, we conclude from Table 2-1 that trade liberalization has 
been the most extensive for the intermediate goods sector. Here, the effective rate of 
protection fell by 109 percentage points, equivalent to a reduction of 73 percent. In 
contrast, the effective rate of protection has been reduced by only 57-58 percent in 
the capital goods and consumer goods sectors. Although, in relative terms, domestic 
producers of capital and consumer goods have been deprived of protection to a 
lesser degree, they did not enjoy as much protection against foreign competition at the 
outset of the reforms. 
Both the 1991-1995 and the 1996-2000 periods saw drastic reductions in the percentage 
of intermediate goods subject to import licensing. The same holds true for the capital 
goods sector, though here attempts to free imports from non-tariff barriers had already 
started in the mid eighties. Accordingly, the capital goods industries turn out to be the 
most liberalized by the late nineties. For the consumer goods sector the withdrawal of 
non-tariff barriers has been slower than in the other sectors. By the late nineties, around 
33 percent of imports of this category were still subject to licensing.  
To assess the joint impact of lower tariffs and relaxed import controls on the 
competitiveness of manufacturing industries, Das also presents figures on import 
penetration rates (see lowest panel of Table 2-1). Surprisingly, the success in trade 
liberalization documented in the first two panels of Table 2-1 brings about hardly any 
measurable increases in import penetration, and then only with a considerable time lag 
(i.e. in the last phase). 
                                                     
41) These measures are defined in the footnotes of Table 2-1.  
42) Where the ERP is concerned, it is argued, for instance,  that in developing countries factor prices often fail 
to reflect opportunity costs, due to the presence of subsidies to inputs of capital and labor market 
imperfections (such as minimum wage legislation). In the presence of inappropirate factors costs, the net 
direction of resource pulls will be influenced by both the height of protection and the degree of divergence 
from a well-functioning market (see Krueger (2002)). 
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Evidence on the Effects of Trade Liberalization 
For a first appraisal of the effects of trade deregulation policies, we converted the use-
based measures into respective measures at the NIC-87 two-digit level and calculated 
pairwise correlation coefficients between changes in the ERP and the import coverage 
ratio, respectively, and concentration ratios in imports, exports and sales (see Table 2-2). 
In each case the respective degree of concentration is measured as the top ten 
percent firms’ share in imports (or exports, or sales, respectively) in total imports (or 
exports, or sales, respectively) of all firms belonging to the same two-digit industry.  
Preliminary bivariate evidence from Table 2-2 suggests that only a minor part of the 
Indian manufacturing sector has managed to take advantage of liberalized trade 
policies and, as a result, concentration measures of both sales and exports have 
ultimately increased. Similarly and contrary to expectations, the decline in both (2-digit) 
effective rates of protection and import coverage ratios has not induced the great 
majority of firms significantly to intensify their import activities; but if at all, then the 
relative position of the top ten percent of importing firms has been strengthened.  
Table 2-2: Effects of foreign trade liberalization: Bivariate correlation coefficients (1986-
2000)a) 
 Change in ERP Change in import coverage ratio 
   
Import concentration  -0.3620 (0.0493) -0.2625 (0.1611) 
Export concentration  -0.1639 (0.3868) -0.4793 (0.0074) 
Sales concentration  -0.4147 (0.0227) -0.3280 (0.0768) 
Source: Das (2003 b) and CMIE; own calculations; the CMIE sample has been matched with indicators from 
Das (2003b), which have been converted into respective measures at the NIC-87 two-digit level. 
a) Marginal significance level in parentheses 
While the anticipated positive effects of foreign trade liberalization on foreign trade 
participation do not seem to be borne out in practice, their stimulating effects on 
industry performance seem even more questionable. For the 1986-2000 period, the 
correlation between sectoral value added and sectoral import penetration rates turns 
out to be not only highly significant (p-Value: 0.012), but also negative, with a 
correlation coefficient of -0.4567 (see Figure 2-1). If the results from these preliminary 
bivariate exercises are confirmed by multivariate analyses, they imply that not only did 
reforms have relatively little effect on foreign trade participation, but that the effects 
also went into the wrong direction. This issue will be explored in section 5.2.  
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Figure 2-1: Correlation between (2-digit) sectoral value added growth and change in 
(2-digit) import penetration rates (1986 – 2000) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Das (2003 b) and CMIE; own calculations; the CMIE sample has been matched with indicators from 
Das (2003b), which have been converted into respective measures at the NIC-87 two-digit level. 
 
2.3.1 FDI Provisions 
Apart from import restrictions, another barrier to imports of modern technology had 
been set up by the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA), 1973. By definition, so-
called FERA companies held foreign equity of 40 percent or more. These FERA firms 
were subjected to the RBI’s supervision and had to seek its periodical approval. FERA-
firms were neither allowed to buy shares of other companies, nor to expand either 
capacity or output. To promote the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI), in 1991 
high priority sectors were specified in which automatic approval of FDI up to 51 percent 
of equity is given43. The list covers practically the entire manufacturing sector, excluding 
beverages, tobacco, textiles, leather and wood & paper. 
                                                     
43)  Up to 100 percent equity in wholly export-oriented units and up to 24 percent in industries reserved for the 
small scale sector.  
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Figure 2-2: Foreign Direct Investment: total FDI vs. FIPB-approved FDI (in million US-$)a 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
1991-92 1992-93 1993-94 1994-95 1995-96 1996-97 1997-98
total FDI
FIPB
 
Source: RBI, Report on Currency and Finance, Vol. 1 (various years) 
a) Until 1993-94 the share of FDI which comes through the FIPB route is not separately listed  
Firms engaged in these industries as well as firms aiming at foreign-equity participation 
of over 51 percent still had to seek approval by the Foreign Investment Promotion Board 
(FIPB). With respect to FDI, policy reform has been highly effective. Ahluwalia (1996, p. 
30) recalls a prominent example: when Pepsi-Cola entered the Indian market in 1990, it 
had filed its applications for five years. In 1992 it took only three months to grant 
approval to Coca-Cola. The upward trend in FDI can be seen from Figure 2-2, which 
also depicts the growing importance of the FIPB. In 1997 and 1998, eighty-six percent of 
total FDI has come through the FIPB-route. 
2.4 Labor Market Rigidities 
In India there are numerous labor laws on the books. Vakilno1.com, a Delhi-based 
internet portal offering legal advice to the business sector, lists by far the most entries in 
the labor law category.44 The mere number of labor-related laws may serve as a first 
indicator that labor issues assume overwhelming importance in India.45 For the small 
                                                     
44)  Other categories refer to similarly broadly defined topics, e.g. “banking”, “consumers” and 
“environment”. The “corporate law” section under www.vakilno1.com gives inter alia the text of the following 
laws: Company Act, 1956, The Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951, MRTP Act, Sick Industrial 
Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 and Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992.  
45)  Mathur (1994; pp. 101-104) provides a (non-exhaustive) list of 71 labour related laws and classifies them 
into 10 broad categories. 
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fraction of workers who find employment in the organized sector (estimates range 
between three and ten percent of the total working population), the terms of 
employment, including the social security system, are generally considered good – 
possibly too good. Several studies have pointed to the inflexibility of Indian labor 
legislation and have analyzed how its rigid interpretation encourages and manifests 
labor market imperfections.46 Most of them argue that the NEP have not brought about 
fundamental changes in this domain and consider labor matters as “the unresolved 
issue”.  
A significant obstacle to more flexibility in the labor market certainly is that major 
sections of the employees are inadequately insured against unemployment. Though 
the legislation requires severance or retrenchment payments on termination of 
employment, only a small minority of the working population is effectively covered, viz. 
workers in larger companies in the formal sector (ILO, World Labour Report 2000). In 
consequence, it remains extremely difficult to fire labor. “The problem from the 
employers’ point of view is not with prior notice for lay-offs, retrenchments, lock-outs or 
closures, but with prior permission from the government to implement any of the above 
managerial decisions” (Ratnam, 1995, p. 288). If attempts at closures and 
retrenchments are made, litigation may take decades. In public sector undertakings, 
where unpopular decisions can be countered by vote withdrawal, the management is 
supposedly especially reluctant to fire workers.  
Second, the practice of wage determination has been considered equally important 
for the emergence of industrial sickness; for increases in wages were not always linked 
to increases in productivity. For example, virtually all studies of industrial sickness refer to 
the fate composite textile mills suffered in the 1970s:47 strong union pressure contributed 
to steadily rising real wages, while at the same time measures to increase productivity 
were prevented by strict government controls on capacity and the types of machinery 
used in manufacturing. When sharp competition from the non-unionized power-loom 
sector arose, this was the end of most textile mills. 
Apart from these factors, which are widely agreed to have been damaging to the 
economy, Narayanan (1994) disputes that labor problems are the major cause of 
industrial sickness. He analyzed the determinants of sickness in 472 companies and, 
contrary to popular impression, found out that only in 52 cases did labor problems 
                                                     
46)  Reference may be taken to the various articles published in the compendiums edited by Deshpande and 
Rogers (1994), Raghavan et al. (1995) or Papola et al. (1993).  
47)  See, for example, Kumar (2001). 
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actually constitute the major cause. Still, he concludes that even if labor-related factors 
were not mainly responsible for the emergence of industrial sickness, it would be 
virtually impossible to solve the problem without imposing severe hardship on labor. It is 
precisely for this reason, he argues, that the process of restructuring is prolonged and 
industrial sickness is allowed to continue. Where social security systems are in an infant 
state and alternative job opportunities are very limited, it is hard to close companies 
and to solve the sickness problem in a rigorous manner. 
2.5 Development Finance Institutions 
Industrialization hinges upon the availability of adequate sources of finance: new 
industrial undertakings require funds to finance initial fixed capital expenditure and 
working capital needs. By the time of Independence, conventional sources of finance 
such as shares and debentures, commercial banks and indigenous bankers proved to 
be insufficient to meet the growing demand for capital funds.48 With the best of 
intentions to overcome such an obstacle to industrial development, the Indian 
government subsequently established various term lending institutions for various types 
of customers. A short list of the most important term lending institutions includes the 
Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFCI, established in 1948), the Industrial Credit 
and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI), and the Industrial Development Bank of 
India (IDBI, established in 1964). The Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI), 
a wholly-owned subsidiary of the IDBI, has been established as the principal institution 
for the promotion, financing and development of small scale industries. At the state 
level, it is assisted by the State Financial Corporations (SFCs). Financial assistance to 
exporters and importers is provided by the Export-Import Bank of India (Exim Bank), 
which has been set up to take over the operations of the international finance wing of 
the IDBI. Last but not least, the Industrial Investment Bank of India (IIBI), the successor of 
the former Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India (IRBI), looks after the special needs of 
sick units.  
These (and other) institutions have been set up for other reasons than short-term profit-
maximization. Rather, they were conceived in the role as catalysts to industrial 
development and accordingly are referred to as development finance institutions (DFIs 
for short). In fulfillment of their role, the DFIs run programs to promote balanced regional 
development, to develop priority sectors and to assist priority customers, because the 
                                                     
48)  Major references include Datt and Sundharam (1993), chapter 42, and essays in Rangarajan (1998) and 
Gupta (2001). 
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free market was regarded as unable “to optimally allocate resources over time, that is, 
for investment because of the ‘myoptic’ nature of markets” Rangarajan (1998). 
Accordingly, the 1969 nationalization of the 14 largest private banks was justified with 
the “need to control the commanding heights of the economy and to meet 
progressively the needs of development of the economy in conformity with national 
policy objectives”49. In 1979, the government mandated that 33 percent of all credit 
extended by banks should be reserved to certain priority sectors. In 1985 this ratio was 
increased to 40 percent of net loans, which is also the current ratio. The lending 
requirement involves agriculture (18 percentage point) and advances to “weaker 
sectors” (10 percentage points).50  
It is widely believed that the consequences of directed lending policies have been very 
damaging and that such policies became an obstacle to achieving the long-run 
objective of economic growth.51 Banks have been constrained in their ability to 
allocate credit freely and the lack of sufficient numbers of viable projects in the priority 
sector has led to poor quality loans. Some authors such as Goswami (1996a and 1996b) 
and Hanson (2001) go as far as to doubt the commitment to fundamental commercial 
principles in total, and argue that rather the principle of loan maximization was 
followed. They argue that very low lending quality and poor collection are the prime 
reason for the high share of non-performing assets (loans) in the Indian banking sector. 
According to these authors, the politics of priority sector lending (or loan-maximization, 
respectively) entailed diluted criteria for initial project appraisal and the broad absence 
of careful monitoring practices to evaluate current projects and the debtors’ 
entrepreneurial abilities. Where interest rates were subsidized and often negative in real 
terms and where the creditor would not credibly enforce loan repayment, firms would 
become excessively leveraged and increasingly exposed to the risk of default in bad 
states of business. Once these had actually plunged a firm into financial distress, 
additional loans were readily sanctioned with the hope that granting ever more 
finance would protect outstanding claims and could thereby ensure debt repayment 
at some point in the future. When it eventually became apparent that such efforts 
                                                     
49)  Preamble of the Banking Companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1969. 
50)  Accessed at www.rbi.org.in, Priority lending FAQ. Foreign banks which have been allowed to enter India 
in 1994 face a lower priority sector lending requirement of 32 percent; of which at least 10 percentage points 
are directed to the SSI sector and 12 percentage points must be export credit. 
51)  See, for instance, Bhattacharya and Urjit (2002, section II.7.2) on priority lending, Goswami (1996a, 1996b) 
and Hanson (2001). 
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would be in vain, the continuation of loose credit supply was all too often justified by an 
appeal to employment protection.  
Recognizing that the merits of development financing are ambivalent, if not doubtful, 
to its beneficiaries as well as to the suppliers of funds, a committee was established in 
1991 (known as the Narasimham Committee) to develop a strategy for overdue reforms 
in the financial system.52 From Figure 2-3 it is apparent, however, that the flow of 
financial assistance has not been cut down in general. True, from the mid-nineties 
onwards the small-scale industrial sector has experienced considerable reductions in 
financial support; but this is counterbalanced by the IIBI’s intensified effort to nurse sick 
units.  
Figure 2-3: Financial assistance disbursed by DFIs (Index numbers) a) 
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52)  The fate of many financial institutions would be another story worth telling. Substantial numbers of these 
dug their own grave by practices such as loan maximization and interest subsidization and eventually fell into 
sickness themselves. 
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2.6 The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA) 
The Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 (SICA henceforth) came 
into force in 1987. The law applies to both public and private companies which have 
been registered for at least five years, employ at least 50 workers and do not belong to 
the small scale or ancillary sector. Any such company is declared sick if its 
accumulated losses exceed its net worth position.  
2.6.1 Timing and Sequencing under SICA53 
When a company meets the sickness criteria, the law requires it to make reference to 
the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR for short) within 60 days.54 The 
BIFR exercises the jurisdiction and powers and discharges the functions and duties 
imposed under SICA. The BIFR has to determine within a period of another 60 days if the 
company in concern is indeed sick. If it does, it has to make an official declaration on 
the matter. It may appoint one or more special directors to safeguard the financial and 
other interests of the firm. If the presumption of sickness is verified, the BIFR has to decide 
whether or not it is in principle practicable to restore the company to economic viability 
via reconstruction. Where this is not the case, it might still be “in the public interest” to 
prevent winding-up. Also, at this stage the BIFR has to decide whether or not the 
company is able to recover “within reasonable time” (which translates into 7-10 years) 
without external expertise and without financial assistance. If the answer is negative, 
the BIFR appoints so-called Operating Agencies (OAs for short) and charges them to 
work out a scheme of suitable measures.55 A company may also set up an 
endogenously determined scheme.56 Either way, rehabilitation of the sick company 
may come about through one or more of the following: 
– Financial reconstruction 
– Dismissal of the old and establishment of a new, proper management 
– Amalgamation 
– (Partial) Sale or lease of any industrial undertaking owned by the company 
                                                     
53)  The precise wording of the sickness law can be found in Narayanan (1994), Appendix 2. For an evaluation 
of SICA’s effectiveness, compare Anant and Mitra (1998, p. 43 ff) and Goswami (2001, p. 20 ff.) and, of 
course, the expositions in section 6.1 of this Thesis. 
54)  Registration may also come through outsiders (typically banks). If they have sufficient reason to believe 
that any company meets the sickness criteria, they must make reference to the Board.  
55)  Possible OA-candidates include any public financial institution, state level institution or scheduled banks.  
56)  If the company does not comply with the provisions of the endogenously determined scheme or if it fails 
to revive but it is “in the public interest” that the company should recover, then, too, operating agencies will 
work out a plan.  
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– Adjustment of the labor force “in accordance with law.”57  
 
In working out a plan that specifies the necessary measures to fulfill the above aims, the 
operation agencies enjoys ample decision scope with regard to the reduction of both 
the shareholders’ and creditors’ rights. With regard to the latter group, section 22 
specifies: “... no suit for the recovery of money or for the enforcement of any security 
against the industrial company or of any guarantee in respect of any loans, or advance 
granted to the industrial company shall lie or be proceeded with further, except with 
the consent of the Board...” Also, the BIFR may declare any existing obligations and/or 
liabilities to be suspended for seven years at most and order “adaptations” with respect 
of any such postponed obligations and/or liabilities. In return, a sick company loses the 
right to dispose of its assets, except with the consent of the Board.  
Next, the draft plan needs to be approved – not merely by the BIFR, but also by 
representatives of the sick company (management and workers) and by shareholders 
and creditors, no matter how small their stake may be. Since a plan can only be 
sanctioned by unanimous consent, the process of revision is typically quite time-
consuming. The scheme all parties eventually agree on carefully prescribes the 
necessary measures to be taken, where in general financial assistance will play a key 
role. In this respect Article 19 of SICA specifies: “...the [rehabilitation] scheme may 
provide for financial assistance by way of loans, advances or guarantees or relieves or 
concessions or sacrifices from the Central Government, a State Government, any 
scheduled bank or other bank, a public financial institution or any institution or other 
authority [...] to the sick industrial company.” 
Sanctioning and actual implementation of the draft scheme then hinges on the 
consent of those persons or institutions, respectively, that are required to provide 
financial assistance. If no approval is received within 60 days, “it shall be deemed that 
consent has been given” (SICA, 19(2)). If any person or institution, respectively, explicitly 
refuses to provide financial assistance “the Board may adopt [...] other measures, 
including the winding up of the sick industrial company, as it may deem fit” (SICA, 
19(4)). If the BIFR actually recommends winding up, its responsibility with respect to the 
sick company comes to an end and the High Court takes over. Figure 2-4 depicts the 
timing and sequencing under SICA. 
                                                     
57)  Rationalization of labor has only been provided for since 1994.  
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Figure 2-4: Timing and sequencing under the sickness law 
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Source: Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985; own illustration 
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2.6.2 Provisions for Weak Companies 
Since the successful recovery of any sick unit hinges upon the timely detection of 
sickness, SICA also gives clear guidelines on how to proceed with potentially sick or 
‘weak’ companies. By definition, a company is regarded as weak if its accumulated 
losses have resulted in the erosion of 50 percent or more of its peak net worth during the 
immediately preceding four financial years. Within 60 days these companies, too, must 
submit a reference to the Board and hold a general meeting where the shareholders 
consider the causes for such erosion. The shareholders may fire the director, in which 
case he is not entitled to any compensation (no ‘golden handshake’). If the BIFR is of 
the opinion that a weak company is not able to recover ‘within a reasonable time’, it 
can direct operating agencies to write a report on this matter. The Board may publish a 
notice in the daily newspaper “for suggestions and objections, if any, [...] as to why the 
company should not be wound up” (SICA, 23A(3)). If the BIFR comes to the conclusion 
that the firm will most likely not become viable in future time, it will order winding-up.  
As compared to the provisions for sick companies, SICA proceeds in a remarkably rigid 
manner where weak companies are concerned. In particular, it has been repeatedly 
stressed that a weak company has to meet all its financial obligations while recovering, 
i.e. neither a suspension of debt repayment nor a deferral of liabilities will be granted, 
and, in particular, no financial assistance is available. Nor will outside expertise be 
available to work out a rehabilitation scheme. It may very well be the case, therefore, 
that managers of marginally viable firms anticipate the proceedings of SICA and 
change their capital structure so as to qualify for the proceedings for a sick firm instead 
of those for a weak firm. In this case, a strategic manager would rather realize negative 
net worth than allow for an erosion of net worth of 50 percent.  
2.6.3 Malfeasance Provisions 
So far SICA provides immense incentives for firms to register themselves as sick. The 
attractions of actively running the company into sickness are limited by the 
malfeasance proceedings outlined in section 24 of SICA. These provisions apply to both 
present and past directors, managers or leading staff. If it becomes apparent that any 
of these “has misapplied or retained, or become liable or accountable for any money 
or property of the sick industrial company; or has been guilty of any misfeasance, 
malfeasance or non-feasance or breach of trust in relation to the sick industrial 
company“, then this person is personally liable for the material damage and must 
repay the money or restore the property, respectively (SICA, 24(1)). Furthermore, this 
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person “or any firm of which such person is a partner or any company [...] of which such 
person is a director” will be denied financial assistance for ten years (SICA, 24(2)).  
2.7 Summary and Conclusion 
Four features of the industrial reforms in the last decade have helped gradually to 
dismantle the barriers to entry. First, a number of industries hitherto reserved exclusively 
to the public sector have been exposed to competition from private sector 
entrepreneurs. Similarly, broad de-licensing and the repeal of the MRTP act have 
reduced the barriers to entry into the industrial sector. Third, restrictions with respect to 
foreign collaboration have been diluted, so stimulating FDI. Fourth, foreign competition 
has been allowed to enter the formerly closed economy through the gradual removal 
of quantitative import restrictions and the reduction of tariffs. Yet while the barriers to 
entry have been removed to a large degree, the barriers to exit remained an 
unresolved issue in the late nineties. This applies to both exit provisions for labor, as well 
as exit provisions for firms.  
Although the respective sickness law claims to address the problem, the detection of 
sickness comes at a very late stage. When net worth has eroded, the probabilities for a 
successful turnaround are not that overwhelming anymore. Furthermore, the procedure 
under SICA/BIFR operates cumbersome and is time consuming. The (anti-) sickness law 
does not provide for sufficient flexibility to enforce reallocation of resources from 
unproductive and economically non-viable units to more vibrant sectors of the 
economy other than “by mutual consent” of all stakeholders. Until the firm is actually 
would up, the BIFR does not allow creditors to exercise any claims, it violates the 
absolute priority rule,58 and mostly leaves debtors (shareholders and incumbent 
management) in possession.  
 
                                                     
58) Senior creditors have to be settled in full before junior creditors are entertained at all. 
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2.8 Appendix to chapter 2 
 
Table 2-3: List of industries reserved for the public sector 
Industries Delicenced 
• Arms + ammunition and allied items of defence equipment; defence 
aircraft and warships  
after 1999 
• Atomic energy  
• Coal and lignite  in 1999 
• Mineral oils  in 1999 
• Mining of iron ore, manganese ore, chrome ore, gypsum, sulphur, gold 
and diamonds 
in 1994 
• Mining of copper, lead, zinc, tin, molybdenum and wolfram  in 1994 
• Minerals specified in the schedule to the Atomic Energy (Control of 
Production and Use) Order, 1953  
after 1999 
• Railway transport  
Source: Economic Survey. Government of India (various years) and Secretariat for Industrial Assistance (2004) 
 
 
Table 2-4: List of industries in respect of which industrial licensing is compulsory 
Industries Delicenced  
• Coal and lignite 1998-99 
• Petroleum (other than crude) and its distillation products 1998-99 
• Distillation and brewing of alcoholic drinks  
• Sugar 1998-99 
• Animal fats and oils 1997-98 
• Cigars and cigarettes of tobacco and manufactured tobacco 
substitutes 
1997-98 
• Asbestos and asbestos-based products 1997-98 
• Plywood, decorative veneers of all types and other woodbased 
products such as particle board, medium density fibre board and 
other block board  
1997-98 
• Chamois leather  1997-98 
• Tanned or dressed furskins 1997-98 
• Paper and newsprint except bagasse-based units 1997-98 
• Electronic aerospace and defense equipment; all types  
• Industr. explosives, incl. detonating fuse, safety fuse, gun powder, 
nitrocellulose+matches 
 
• Hazardous chemicals  
• Drugs and pharmaceuticals (according to drug policy)   
• Entertainment electronics (VCRs, color TVs, CD players, tape recorders) 1996-97 
Source: Economic Survey. Government of India (various years) and Secretariat for Industrial Assistance (2004) 
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3 Concepts, Dimensions and Characteristics of Industrial Sickness 
This chapter starts out with a thorough discussion of various concepts of industrial 
sickness. The relevant definition for this study, viz. the negative net worth criterion, is 
especially applicable in empirical work. Section 3.2 explores the spread of industrial 
sickness in our sample of some 4400 manufacturing firms for the 1988-1999 period. We 
explore the spatial and sectoral diffusion of sickness, describe its temporal evolution 
and present detailed patterns of sickness at the firm level. The dimension of sickness 
across types of ownership, age and size classes is also investigated. This section 
contributes to the descriptive evidence on industrial sickness in two ways. First, the level 
of detail is much greater. Second, and more importantly, it provides an account of the 
variation in the incidence of industrial sickness (within industries over time, within states, 
across various age cohorts, size classes and types of ownership). This is largely missing in 
other studies, which concern themselves with the mere numbers of sick firms, but 
without reference to the entire population. In this study, by contrast, the relevant 
population is a set of firms, both sick and sound, and not just a set of sick firms.  
Section 3.3 goes a step further and inquires into the reasons for sickness. Here we 
present summary statistics on some key variables such as profitability, single factor 
productivity measures, as well as the level and composition of debt. This is done 
separately for the group of sound and sick firms at two points in time (1990 and 1999), 
and tests of the significance of period-wise and group-wise differences are conducted. 
The purpose is to assemble the first stylized facts that bear upon, or reflect a company’s 
health status and thereby present the central issues to be taken up in the course of this 
study. Subsequent chapters will then explore the nature of and direction of, and 
direction of causality between, the characteristics of sick firms and status of sickness. 
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3.1 Alternative Concepts of Sickness and their Suitability for Applied Work 
Industrial sickness means different things to different people, depending on the stake 
they have in the affairs of a company. In consequence, there are numerous definitions 
of industrial sickness, some of which are rather vague, others are more clear-cut.59 
However it be defined, industrial sickness poses a tremendous problem to the Indian 
economy, and that is why a special law has been enacted, the Sick Industrial 
Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985.60 The official, legal definition of sickness is 
stated in SICA, chapter 1, section 3o: any company that has been registered for at 
least five years is regarded sick if its accumulated losses equal or exceed its net worth, 
i.e. its paid up capital plus its free reserves. Initially, the definition of sickness was 
narrower, viz. in addition to the above criteria, the company had to have generated 
negative pre-depreciation profits for two or more consecutive years, including the 
current year. Also, the law pertained only to companies which had been registered for 
at least seven years. The wider definition has been in force since 1994. SICA applies to 
both private and public sector companies, though quite interestingly the latter have 
been brought within the purview of the SICA only through the 1991 amendment act. 
Furthermore, the law applies only to firms which (i) employ more than 50 workers, (ii) do 
not involve ships and other vessels drawn by power and, (iii) do not meet the criteria for 
a small scale or ancillary industrial undertaking as defined in the Industries 
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1951.  
3.1.1 Problems with the SICA Definition 
Since there is a legal definition of sickness at hand, it naturally suggests itself as the basis 
for the empirical analysis. However, there are some practical problems with the SICA 
definition;61 in particular, the determination of accumulated losses poses some 
difficulties. The first wave of our company panel relates to the 1988 accounting period, 
but most sample firms report an earlier year of incorporation. For these companies, it is 
impossible to calculate accumulated losses. On the other hand, if the company was 
                                                     
59) See, for example, Gupta (1990, chapter 2), who presents and discusses eight different concepts of 
sickness.  
60) See section 2.6. 
61) Apart from practical problems, there are more fundamental problems with the legal definition of sickness 
which will not be discussed at this point. Most importantly, ever since its introduction, SICA’s definition has 
been criticized for primarily identifying terminally sick firms for which any reorganization or rehabilitation 
package would come too late. See ’Report of the Committee on Industrial Sickness’ (July 1995).  Second, 
SICA may mistakenly declare non-sick firms as sick if companies fudge accounts to get shelter under the BIFR 
(Soni, 1999, p. 4). We address this issue in chapter 6.  
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founded after 1987 (and if it actually belonged to the CMIE-sample right from the 
beginning!), five years must pass until SICA applies. In our dataset, only 18 companies, 
with 51 firm-year observations in total, satisfy the legal definition (see Table 3-1).  
Apart from the problem mentioned above, the absence of information on employment 
in PROWESS is also crucial; a company must employ a minimum of 50 workers in order 
for SICA to apply. Similarly, SICA does not apply to small scale or ancillary industries, and 
the definitions of these hinge not only on employment numbers, but also on a 
company’s technology (power-driven or not). This kind of information is missing in our 
data set.62  
3.1.2 Alternative Definitions of Sickness 
The broad objective of SICA - as incorporated in its preamble - is to tackle the problem 
of industrial sickness with regard to the crucial sectors where public money is locked up. 
Ever since its introduction, SICA’s definition has been criticized for primarily identifying 
terminally sick firms for which any reorganization or rehabilitation package would come 
too late.63 SICA recognizes that timely detection of sick and potentially sick industrial 
companies is essential, and defines an ‘early warning indicator’ accordingly. Section 23 
of SICA identifies a company to be potentially sick or ‘weak’ whenever its accumulated 
losses have resulted in erosion of 50 percent or more of its peak net worth during the 
immediately preceding four financial years. Erratic declines in net worth are observable 
and therefore we could apply the weakness-definition instead of the sickness-definition. 
However, a non-weak firm might be sick if it experienced a more gradual slowdown in 
net worth. Technically this concept is awkward to handle because complete records 
from the four immediately preceding years need to be known, but our panel has holes. 
Also we would have to exclude all firms that entered the sample after 1995 (since four 
years of survey participation have to elapse until we could make a statement on a 
firm’s ‘weakness’-status). In other words, this concept is too restrictive to permit the 
exploitation of available data. It should be noted that for small scale industrial units, the 
official sickness criterion is an extended version of this weakness concept: if an SSI firm is 
weak in the above sense and if in addition principal or interest in respect of any of its 
borrow accounts has remained overdue for a period exceeding two and a half years, it 
is considered as sick. 
                                                     
62) Since we know the names and addresses of the companies, all of these problems could in principle be 
overcome – yet at tremendous search costs.  
63) See ‘Report of the Committee on Industrial Sickness’ (July 1995). 
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Table 3- 1: Evolution of profits and net worth for the sample firms that satisfy the SICA 
definitiona) 
 
 
 
 
Firm 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
Profit 
 
 
 
Acc. 
profit 
 
 
 
Net 
worthb) 
 
 
 
Legal-
ly sick 
 
 
 
 
Weak 
Two 
consec. 
years of 
profit 
<0 
 
 
Net-
worth 
<0 
 
Cur-
rent 
ratio c) 
<1 
Current 
ratio<1 and 
worsening 
debt-eq. 
-ratio 
1 1992 0 0 0.94       
 1993 0 0 16.28       
 1994 3.36 3.36 16.66       
 1995 2.7 6.06 16.84       
 1996 8.85 14.91 19.76 no no no no yes No 
 1997 8.62 23.53 23.81 no no no no no No 
 1998 2.43 25.96 21.29 no no no no yes Yes 
 1999 13.68 39.64 54.76 no no no no no No 
2 1994 0.95 0.95 5.05       
 1995 3.73 4.68 14.85       
 1996 0.65 5.33 14.88       
 1997 -8.58 -3.25 6.18       
 1998 -11.67 -14.92 -5.68 yes yes yes yes yes Yes 
 1999 -7.72 -22.64 -13.48 yes yes yes yes yes Yes 
3 1994 0 0 0       
 1995 6.08 6.08 17.33       
 1996 10.35 16.43 25.19       
 1997 14.7 31.13 34.42       
 1998 20.29 51.42 47.39 no no no no no no 
 1999 22.76 74.18 71.14 no no no no no no 
4 1992 0.02 0.02 0.23       
 1994 0.08 0.1 0.2       
 1995 0.26 0.36 2.93       
 1996 -0.04 0.32 2.82 no n.a. no no no n.a. 
 1997 0.02 0.34 2.87 no no no no no n.a. 
 1998 0.02 0.36 2.95 no no no no no n.a. 
 1999 0.14 0.5 3.1 no no no no no n.a. 
5 1992 1.93 1.93 13.26       
 1993 4.51 6.44 19.69       
 1994 6.78 13.22 23.25       
 1995 8.15 21.37 27.48       
 1996 7.99 29.36 31.15 no no no no yes yes 
 1997 10.91 40.27 37.09 no no no no yes no 
 1998 14.67 54.94 50.39 no no no no no no 
 1999 13.92 68.86 60.73 no no no no no no 
6 1995 0 0 0       
 1996 0 0 7.71       
 1997 0 0 8.71       
 1998 0.47 0.47 8.92       
 1999 0.42 0.89 9.21 no no no no no no 
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Table 3- 1: continued 
 
 
 
 
Firm 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
Profit 
 
 
 
Acc. 
profit 
 
 
 
Net 
worthb) 
 
 
 
Legal-
ly sick 
 
 
 
 
Weak 
Two 
consec. 
years of 
profit 
<0 
 
 
Net-
worth 
<0 
 
Cur-
rent 
ratio c) 
<1 
Current 
ratio<1 and 
worsening 
debt-eq. 
-ratio 
7 1995 0 0 1.03       
 1996 0.03 0.03 3.74       
 1997 -0.59 -0.56 3.09       
 1998 -0.15 -0.71 2.87       
 1999 -0.06 -0.77 2.75 no no yes no no n.a. 
8 1992 0.01 0.01 0.46       
 1993 6.41 6.42 19.74       
 1994 4.16 10.58 23.6       
 1995 5.18 15.76 24.96       
 1996 4.23 19.99 29.25 no no no no no no 
 1997 4.24 24.23 33.9 no no no no no no 
 1998 5.33 29.56 33.37 no no no no no no 
 1999 -13.43 16.13 7.84 no yes no no yes yes 
9 1995 0.01 0.01 1.1       
 1996 0.13 0.14 5.36       
 1997 -0.06 0.08 5.24       
 1998 0.23 0.31 5.11       
 1999 0.57 0.88 5.28 no no no no no no 
10 1993 0 0 -0.06       
 1995 1.47 1.47 43.68       
 1996 7.49 8.96 47.88       
 1997 3.57 12.53 49.94 no n.a. no no no no 
 1998 9.27 21.8 50.16 no no no no no no 
 1999 2.27 24.07 48.35 no no no no no no 
11 1995 -0.06 -0.06 2.09       
 1996 0.06 0 4.65       
 1998 0.1 0.1 4.71       
 1999 0.06 0.16 4.73 no n.a. no no no no 
12 1989 0.22 0.22 0.27       
 1990 1.39 1.61 4.78       
 1991 2.73 4.34 6.56       
 1992 2.9 7.24 9.97       
 1993 1.47 8.71 25.44 no no no no no no 
 1994 6.99 15.7 37.69 no no no no no no 
 1995 8.36 24.06 41.34 no no no no no no 
 1996 9.36 33.42 38.75 no no no no no no 
 1997 -16.92 16.5 33.44 no no no no no no 
 1998 -4.41 12.09 22.73 no no yes no no no 
 1999 -26.13 -14.04 -7.96 yes yes yes yes yes yes 
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Table 3- 1: continued 
 
 
 
 
Firm 
 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
 
 
Profit 
 
 
 
Acc. 
profit 
 
 
 
Net 
worthb) 
 
 
 
Legal-
ly sick 
 
 
 
 
Weak 
Two 
consec. 
years of 
profit 
<0 
 
 
Net-
worth 
<0 
 
Cur-
rent 
ratio c) 
<1 
Current 
ratio<1 and 
worsening 
debt-eq. 
-ratio 
13 1993 0 0 0       
 1994 0.13 0.13 5.81       
 1995 3.49 3.62 8.66       
 1996 1.57 5.19 10.41       
 1997 0.91 6.1 11 no no no no no no 
 1998 1.11 7.21 11.86 no no no no no no 
14 1994 0 0 22.42       
 1995 4.85 4.85 48.77       
 1996 5.87 10.72 48.53       
 1997 5.57 16.29 48.76       
 1998 5.01 21.3 46.72 no no no no no no 
 1999 -4.27 17.03 39.05 no no no no no no 
15 1994 1.1 1.1 3.39       
 1995 1.07 2.17 4.11       
 1996 2.43 4.6 9.72       
 1997 2.2 6.8 11.5       
 1998 1.8 8.6 12.48 no no no no no n.a. 
 1999 3.74 12.34 14.93 no no no no no n.a. 
16 1994 0.79 0.79 2.25       
 1995 0.67 1.46 5.38       
 1996 2.38 3.84 11.08       
 1997 0.1 3.94 11.22       
 1998 -1.84 2.1 8.94 no no no no no no 
 1999 -13.92 -11.82 -5.51 yes yes yes yes yes yes 
17 1990 -0.13 -0.13 4.17       
 1991 2.31 2.18 5.77       
 1992 4.53 6.71 8.83       
 1993 3.23 9.94 10.06       
 1994 2.15 12.09 10.23 no no no no no no 
 1995 2.97 15.06 12.56 no no no no no no 
 1996 0.83 15.89 12.62 no no no no no no 
 1997 -1.51 14.38 10.3 no no no no no no 
 1998 -5.04 9.34 4.47 no yes yes no yes yes 
 1999 -0.49 8.85 3.15 no yes yes no yes yes 
18 1992 0.21 0.21 0.06       
 1993 0.19 0.4 1.41       
 1995 8.59 8.99 12       
 1996 -1.71 7.28 9.47 no n.a. no no no no 
 1997 0.86 8.14 9.48 no no no no no no 
 1998 -0.5 7.64 18.3 no no no no no no 
Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations;  
a) Figures in Rs. crore, where 1 crore = 10 million; n.a. means “not available”; b) Net worth = paid up capital 
plus free reserves; c) Current ratio = current assets /(current liabilities + provisions) ; see glossary in Appendix A, 
Table A-1.  
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Second, we may apply the ‘two successive years of negative profits’-criterion to 
companies that are registered for at least five years. Various financial institutions 
employ this definition, although not as the one and only indicator. After all, an 
economically viable firm might face temporary distress, yet flow items from the profit & 
loss account do not reveal information on the history of its performance. This 
shortcoming suggests that one should rather rely on stock information from balance 
sheets.  
Where the sum of total paid up capital and free reserves has turned negative, poor 
performance is certainly more than a transitory phenomenon. Our third, alternative 
definition of sickness therefore refers to firms older than four years which report a 
negative net worth position, i.e. total debt (plus specific reserves) exceeds total 
liabilities.64 The negative net worth criterion could in principle conflict with the legal 
sickness definition if accumulated profits outweighed the net worth deficit. In this case, 
the negative net worth criteria would mark the firm as sick, while the legal sickness 
definition would mark it as sound. The reverse case, i.e. accumulated losses that 
outweigh a positive net worth statement, will hardly be encountered in reality, since a 
company’s net worth reflects the history of its profitability.65  
A fourth definition of sickness suggests itself from the provisions of the Industries 
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (IDRA for short), which devotes a whole 
chapter to the ‘Reconstruction or Liquidation’ of industrial undertakings. Reconstruction 
is recommended if a company is not in a position to meet its current liabilities out of its 
current assets66 (chapter 18 FD-1a of IDRA), but ‘public interest’ rules out winding it up. 
As under SICA, reconstruction under IDRA goes along with provisions of financial 
assistance, suspension of legal proceedings, existing contracts and outstanding 
obligations (Chapter III-AB, section 18 FB). In fact, the obviously similar tenor of the 
relevant chapters in both laws gives rise to the question of why a new law with a whole 
new bureaucracy had to be established. 
Of course, the caveat with respect to short-term versus long-term distress applies even 
more to this concept. The Reserve Bank of India therefore proposes a fifth definition, 
according to which any company registered for at least five years shall be deemed 
                                                     
64) See the (stylized) schemes on balance accounts in the Concepts-and-Definitions Appendix (chapter 8), 
Tables A-4 and A-5.  
65) Meanwhile the BIFR itself indicates a company as revived as soon as its net worth becomes positive, but 
the official SICA definition has not changed. 
66) In other words, the current ratio is below unity.  
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sick if its current ratio (of current assets to current liabilities and provisions) is less than 
one and if, in addition, its debt-equity ratio is worsening.67  
In Table 3-1 we depicted the evolution of profits and net worth for all sample firms to 
which the original legal definition of sickness is applicable. The last five columns indicate 
the companies’ health status according to the five different definitions discussed 
above. The definitions of ‘legally sick’ and ‘legally weak’ conflict with each other in 
three out of 51 cases, while ‘legally sick’ and ‘negative net worth’ never conflict. In six 
cases, we can verify temporary distress for firms which are healthy in the legal sense.  
Table 3- 2: Share of sick firms: various definitions of sickness 
  Definition of Sickness  
 
 
 
Year 
 
Potentially 
sick or 
‘weak‘ 
Two consec. 
years of 
negative 
profits 
 
 
Negative net 
worth 
 
 
Current 
ratio < 1 
Current 
ratio<1 and 
worsening 
debt-eq.-
ratio 
1992 9.1 8.3 12.8 15.2 10.0 
1993 13.8 9.2 11.7 16.8 11.6 
1994 13.0 8.9 9.4 15.8 10.7 
1995 12.0 7.5 8.4 14.8 10.5 
1996 12.6 8.8 8.4 16.4 12.4 
1997 16.6 13.4 10.7 20.3 15.8 
1998 19.3 18.3 13.3 24.5 20.3 
1999 23.2 22.4 15.9 28.4 24.2 
Total cases of sickness       
1992-99 2,255 2,921 2,849 4,940 3,312 
Total cases of sickness       
1992-99 (in percent) 16.8 13.0 11.3 19.6 15.3 
Total no. of firm-year      
observations 1992-99      
(sick and sound) 13,460 22,505 25,231 25,231 21,619 
Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations 
 
Table 3-2 reports the (year-wise) share of sick firms in our dataset according to the 
various definitions of sickness outlined above. This study will be based on the third 
sickness concept, i.e. a firm that has been registered for at least five years is regarded 
sick if its net worth is negative. In focusing only on current, but not on past realizations, it 
makes the most of the available data, i.e. it exploits information from the most firm-year 
observations, while at the same time turning out to be the most restrictive in nature: no 
other concept implies a lower share of ‘sick’ in total observations. Second, we argue 
                                                     
67) For general definitions of failure (i.e. not specifically in the Indian context), Karels and Prakash (1987, p. 
576) present tables with diverse definitions. See also the study of Laitinen and Laitinen (2000).  
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that the ‘negative net worth’-criterion comes closest in spirit to the original legal 
definition. After all, if a company realizes a negative net worth, economic distress will 
be more than a temporary phenomenon. A third justification for our choice comes 
through the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR for short), the top 
restructuring body of sick companies. Though SICA defines sickness otherwise, the BIFR 
considers a company as successfully revived if its net worth position has turned positive.  
A problem common to all the above definitions arises from their backward view. Putting 
the focus on future earning potentials rather than on historical book values would 
certainly give a more accurate image of a firm’s health status. However, whether 
potentials are actually realized involves extensive collection of data, so this concept is 
cumbersome to handle. As none of the above definitions follows this approach, we 
opted for the second-best concept.  
3.2 Dimension of Sickness  
Having defined sickness for the purpose of this study, we proceed to some descriptive 
statistics on its dimensions in our company panel. To start with, we present patterns of 
sickness for those companies that meet our criterion at least once. In Table 3-3 we 
record the number of firms experiencing s (= 1,2, …,12) years of sickness, classifying firms 
by the number of years they appeared in the sample.68 In total, we have 3,447 firm-
years of sickness for the 987 firms that ever fell sick.69 This means that 11.6 percent of the 
total 29,682 firm-years in the sample fall under ‘sick’ and 22 percent of the sample firms 
experienced sickness in the 1988-1999 period. Exactly one third of these latter firms (33.7 
percent) experienced just one period in sickness; another third (34.7 percent) did so for 
at least four (not necessarily subsequent) periods. 191 firms, i.e. approximately every fifth 
firm of the 987, remained sick throughout its whole period in the sample (sum of 
elements on the main diagonal). However, it is generally not true that a sick unit in one 
period remained sick in the next, as is evident from the complete ‘sickness’-spells (see 
table 3-14 in this chapter’s Appendix). Nor do companies that suffer one or more years 
of sickness always do so in their last appearance in the sample. In other words, a sick 
firm, in general, does not exit. Some may recover, permanently, or temporarily. If a firm 
                                                     
68) Whereas “gross” duration is calculated simply as a firm’s last sample year minus its first year, “net” duration 
takes into account that the panel has holes.  
69) The number of firm-year observations is arrived at by summing over the product of “years in sickness” and 
“number of firms experiencing the said years in sickness”, i.e. (1·333 + 2·195 + … 11·37),  as set out in the row 
labeled “Total sick”. 
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indeed leaves the sample, we cannot tell whether it is because of sickness or for other 
reasons.  
Table 3- 3: Patterns of sickness (by firms that ever fell sick) 
years 
in 
sample 
    
 
Number of years in sickness 
    
Total 
sick 
 
Sick 
Firms 
Sick 
obser- 
vations 
(net) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 firms (in %)a) (in %)a) 
1 15 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 15 6.8 6.8 
2 13 18 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 31 12.0 9.5 
3 29 4 11 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 44 14.1 7.5 
4 34 15 4 18 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 71 17.5 9.1 
5 43 22 12 3 17 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 97 16.6 7.5 
6 49 26 14 10 6 12 -- -- -- -- -- -- 117 21.2 8.6 
7 35 24 16 8 4 4 6 -- -- -- -- -- 97 26.7 9.8 
8 22 19 7 6 5 6 2 14 -- -- -- -- 81 29.7 13.4 
9 18 18 11 11 5 3 4 5 17 -- -- -- 92 30.2 14.4 
10 20 18 13 7 4 2 1 7 8 26 -- -- 106 42.1 21.8 
11 44 21 23 10 12 12 16 7 6 5 37 -- 193 28.4 13.5 
12 11 10 6 2 3 1 1 2 3 4 0 0 43 19.1 6.2 
Total 
sick  
 
333 
 
195 
 
117 
 
75 
 
56 
 
40 
 
30 
 
35 
 
34 
 
35 
 
37 
 
0 
 
987 
 
22.3 
 
11.6 
In % 33.7 19.8 11.9 7.6 5.7 4.1 3.0 3.5 3.4 3.5 3.7 0 100   
Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations 
a) in relation to all firms which are classified by the same number of net years in the survey 
The analysis is further complicated by the existence of gaps. In 886 cases a period of 
sickness is followed by a missing record; in 422 cases, a missing record is preceded by a 
period of soundness (refers to firms that ever fell sick, see Table 3-4).  
Table 3-4: Sample characteristics by health status 
 Sample  
  Firms that ever fell sick Firms that never fell sick total 
number of firms 987 3,441 4,428 
number of observations 7,534 22,148 29,682 
Median no. of observations 8 6 6 
Maximum no. of observations 12 12 12 
Number of miss. records at (t+1)    
When the firm is sick in t 886 0 886 
When the firm is sound in t 422 4,092 4,514 
Number of firms with gaps 282 606 888 
Number of gap “observations“ 494 967 1,461 
Median no. of gaps 1 1 1 
Maximum no. of gaps 8 7 8 
Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations 
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282 firms (29 percent) of the firms that ever fell sick had at least one gap in their record, 
as compared to 606 firms (18 percent) of the firms that remained sound throughout the 
sample period. The mean numbers of gaps is higher for potentially sick firms. 
Table 3-5 reports the health status before and after the gap for firms that ever fell sick. A 
simple −χ2  test for homogeneity rejects the null-hypothesis, meaning that observed 
health status in (t+1) is not independent of observed health status in (t-1). Though gaps 
in the records of potentially sick firms do not necessarily ‘conceal’ a period of sickness, 
this is more likely than the other situation, i.e. that a period of soundness was not 
recorded. There is no way to get indicative evidence on whether gaps in the spells of 
sound firms involved periods of soundness or sickness.  
Table3-5: Gap-analysis for firms that ever fell sicka) 
 Health status in t+1  
Health status in (t-1) Sound Sick missing record Total 
Sound 85 45 49 179 
Sick 17 94 31 142 
missing record 29 51 93 173 
Total 131 190 173 494 
Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations 
a)  “t”  refers to year in which a gap occurred. The above table details the evidence from Table 3-14 in this 
chapter’s Appendix. 
 
Next, we examine the industry-wise distribution of sick firms over time. In Table 3-6 the 
lower lines refer to the share of sick units in the respective industry in a given year.70 
Absolute numbers are also listed (upper lines), in order to show the incidence across 
branches.  
Going by absolute figures, the evidence in Table 3-6 matches the sectoral affiliation of 
cases registered with the BFIR remarkably well.71 Over the entire period, the most cases 
of sickness are found in Textiles & Leather, followed by Basic Metals & Metal Products, 
Chemicals, Machinery, Food & Beverages and Non-Metallic Mineral Products. Both 
data confirm that there were comparatively few cases of sickness in Rubber & Plastic 
and Electronics. The value of Table 3-6 in relation to what other researchers have 
already established (i.e. counted), is that it depicts the relative incidence of industrial 
sickness within industries.  
                                                     
70) The total number of firms in each industry in a given period has been reported in Table 1-3.  
71) See this chapter’s Appendix, table 3-15. 
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Table 3-6: Incidence of sickness by industry: 1988 – 1999 (number of firms) 
 
 
Industry 
 
 
1988 
 
 
1989 
 
 
1990 
 
 
1991 
 
 
1992 
 
 
1993 
 
 
1994 
 
 
1995 
 
 
1996 
 
 
1997 
 
 
1998 
 
 
1999 
Total 
sick 
obs. 
Food & 5 8 8 12 10 15 12 22 24 38 55 72 281 
Beverages 9.8 7.48 7.34 8.82 6.17 7.35 4.07 6.2 6.45 10.35 15.07 20.11  
Textile & 9 39 49 55 58 56 53 50 57 79 96 130 731 
Leather 13.64 20.86 23.11 19.78 18.83 14.7 11.11 8.4 9.12 12.42 15.12 21.31  
Wood & 2 9 8 12 13 12 12 12 13 18 22 19 152 
Paper 13.33 18 14.55 16.22 16.46 13.33 10.26 7.79 7.88 10.98 13.33 11.66  
Chemicals 3 19 22 27 29 35 42 41 44 58 77 88 485 
 5.56 9.84 9.95 9.54 8.9 8.86 8.35 6.61 6.78 8.8 11.85 13.46  
Rubber & 1 9 9 11 14 20 17 12 12 19 31 37 192 
Plastic 3.45 12.33 11.69 10 11.57 12.12 7.87 4.41 4.01 6.31 10.51 12.5  
Non-met. 5 13 18 24 23 26 27 27 25 24 29 38 279 
Min. Prod. 15.63 16.67 20.93 21.82 18.4 18.57 15.7 13.43 12.2 11.88 14.65 18.54  
Metal 2 19 21 24 28 32 42 52 48 66 72 89 495 
 4.26 12.93 12.5 11.37 11.24 10.85 11.6 12.78 11.35 15.49 17.27 20.7  
Machin- 3 16 23 32 29 28 27 31 29 38 42 55 353 
Ery 5.56 10.32 12.17 14.16 11.2 9.89 8.06 8.12 7.29 9.41 10.34 13.75  
Electro- 2 5 8 10 8 12 11 17 27 27 39 35 201 
Nics 18.18 9.09 11.94 10.87 7.69 8.63 5.37 6.37 8.94 8.33 11.4 9.07  
Transp. 3 14 14 21 25 24 24 23 26 25 24 25 248 
Equip. 8.33 17.28 15.05 18.75 19.84 17.52 15.09 13.29 14.21 12.82 12.7 13.3  
Miscel. 0 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 6 6 4 30 
 0 20 20 22.22 15.38 10.53 8.7 5.88 5.56 16.67 17.65 13.33  
All Indu- 35 152 181 230 239 262 269 289 307 398 493 592 3447 
Stries 8.82 13.44 14.12 14.02 12.77 11.65 9.39 8.35 8.39 10.72 13.34 15.91  
Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations 
a) Homogeneity tests across industries are rejected in every period except for the first one; Homogeneity tests 
across time are not rejected for Wood & Paper, Non-netallic Minerals, Electronics, Transport and the 
Miscellaneous category.  
 
Chi-square tests for homogeneity confirm that there are significant differences in the 
incidence of sickness across industries in every year except for the first 
(unrepresentative) one. Homogeneity tests also reject the null hypothesis that the 
incidence of sickness is invariant over time in Food & Beverages, Textiles & Leather, 
Chemicals, Rubber & Plastics, Metals and Machinery. The last line of Table 3-6 (i.e. share 
of sick companies across all industries) suggests that one should partition the 1989-1999 
period into three distinct phases: The first phase (1989-1991) is characterized by 
relatively constant rates around 14 percent. After 1991, the share of sick firms declined 
steadily until 1995-96, when there followed a strong revival. By 1999, nearly 16 percent of 
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the sample firms were classified as sick, ranging from some 21 percent in the textile & 
leather sector to nine percent in Electronics.  
Table 3-7: Incidence of sickness by state: 1988-1999 (number of firms)a),b) 
 
State 
 
1988 
 
1989 
 
1990 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
Total 
sick obs. 
Delhi 3 7 9 12 13 14 16 22 21 24 32 48 221 
 8.57 10 10.98 12 11.93 9.52 8.29 8.98 8.33 9.27 11.9 16.11  
Andhra 2 12 15 21 21 23 22 25 22 28 42 55 288 
Pradesh 11.11 21.05 24.59 23.08 18.26 15.13 9.95 9.26 7.53 9.72 14.79 18.84  
Assam 0 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 3 4 3 4 24 
 0 33.33 40 20 14.29 12.5 18.18 16.67 25 36.36 27.27 36.36  
Bihar 0 2 2 4 4 3 3 2 2 3 2 6 33 
  20 18.18 33.33 26.67 18.75 15.79 9.52 8.33 12.5 9.09 25  
Gujarat 1 12 15 23 21 22 23 24 29 30 47 55 302 
 3.23 12.24 13.39 15.23 11.67 9.91 7.69 5.88 6.4 6.79 11.19 13.06  
Haryana 0 3 2 3 3 3 5 6 6 11 13 19 74 
 0 9.09 6.67 7.89 7.69 6.82 7.69 6.98 6.74 11.83 14.61 21.11  
Himachal 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 3 4 4 5 4 28 
Pradesh 0 0 14.29 14.29 18.18 13.33 11.11 12.5 16 17.39 22.73 20  
Karnataka 2 13 14 17 14 14 15 14 16 24 25 34 202 
 10 23.64 20.9 19.54 14.29 12.28 11.11 9.33 10.39 13.87 13.97 18.48  
Kerala 0 4 2 3 3 5 7 5 6 5 8 9 57 
 0 18.18 9.09 10 9.09 13.89 15.56 8.93 9.23 7.04 11.94 14.75  
Madhya 2 1 2 2 1 4 4 5 7 8 17 23 76 
Pradesh 20 2.94 6.45 4.55 2.17 6.15 4.26 4.42 5.83 7.08 15.74 23.71  
Maharash- 12 48 51 56 63 69 72 74 78 101 127 146 897 
trac) 9.68 13.48 12.53 11.2 10.7 9.76 8.13 7.15 7.23 9.32 11.5 12.67  
Nagaland 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 
  100  100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100  
Orissa 1 3 4 4 5 6 4 6 7 5 6 8 59 
 50 21.43 33.33 21.05 23.81 30 14.29 18.18 19.44 14.29 16.67 22.22  
Punjab d) 0 1 1 2 3 3 4 5 9 8 11 13 60 
 0 2.86 3.03 4.17 5.26 4.55 4.88 4.95 7.69 6.84 9.73 12.5  
Rajasthan 3 2 2 6 8 7 9 10 14 18 20 16 115 
 20 6.06 5.41 12.24 14.81 10.45 9.89 8.93 11.86 16.22 18.52 16.16  
Tamil 5 7 12 19 21 24 25 25 25 46 56 67 332 
Nadu e) 10.87 5.11 7.45 9 9.13 9.16 7.81 6.85 6.46 10.8 13.4 16.18  
Uttar 1 12 15 20 21 24 22 22 23 32 31 25 248 
Pradesh 4.55 22.22 22.73 25 23.86 22.43 16.3 13.33 13.94 19.28 20.13 20.33  
West 3 23 32 35 34 37 33 38 34 46 47 59 421 
Bengal 7.5 20.18 23.19 20.83 18.99 18.69 15 14.45 12.73 16.67 16.15 20.14  
All  35 152 181 230 239 262 269 289 307 398 493 592 3447 
States 8.82 13.44 14.12 14.02 12.77 11.65 9.39 8.35 8.39 10.72 13.34 15.91  
Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations 
a) Homogeneity tests across states are rejected in every year except for the first (unrepresentative) one; 
Homogeneity tests across time are rejected for Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Haryana and Karnataka (both at 
the 10%-significance level), Madhya Pradesh, Maharastra and Tamil Nadu. b) Apply the rule of three to get the 
total number of firms in states in a given year; c) includes Goa, d) includes Chandigarh, e) includes Pondicherry 
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Except for Textile & Leather, the industries most severely affected were Metals (20.7 
percent) and Food & Beverages (20.1 percent). However, and in contrast to Textile & 
Leather, Metals experienced distinctly above-average rates only in more recent years. 
Sickness rates for food manufacturers were among the lowest throughout the first two 
phases. Throughout the entire period, we observe comparatively constant and low 
sickness rates for chemicals and – not surprisingly - for electronics.  
Table 3-7 presents the incidence of sickness by state. In absolute terms, most sick units 
were located in Maharashtra, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu and Gujarat. In relative terms, 
Gujarat and Maharashtran firms were doing fine, as were Delhi-based firms. Here, the 
share of sick firms in total firms was below average in all but one (early) year. In Tamil 
Nadu, the rates were also way below average in the pre-reform phase, approached 
the average in the middle phase and eventually surpassed it in the last. The states 
where the incidence of industrial sickness was most widespread were Karnataka, 
Andhra Pradesh and, to an even greater extent, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh. Here 
rates amounted to 20 percent or more for most years.  
Table 3-8 sets out the risk of sickness by age class. According to the definition used in 
this study, a firm is at risk to fall sick only if it has been registered for at least five years. 
We computed hazard rates and find that these are (almost) uniformly increasing with 
the firm’s age. This finding is very different from the corresponding evidence in 
industrialized countries, where (financial) vulnerability is highest in the group of young 
firms. But note, first, that the Indian data are from firms in the formal industry only and, 
second, that the year of incorporation pertains to the most recent incarnation of the 
company, which might differ from the year of foundation. 
Table 3-8: Hazard rates for sickness by age class 
Firm age no.of sick firm years hazard rate 95% confidence interval 
5 to 7 years 204 2.84 2.48 3.26 
8 to 10 years 357 5.87 5.29 6.51 
11 to 15 years 686 11.44 10.61 12.32 
16 to 20 years 569 15.70 14.46 17.04 
21 to 30 years 566 13.05 12.02 14.17 
31 to 50 years 569 13.89 12.80 15.08 
> 50 years 496 19.91 18.23 21.74 
total 3,447 7.91 7.65 8.18 
Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations 
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Table 3-9 shows that public sector undertakings face an extraordinarily high risk of 
sickness: nearly every other firm-year observation qualifies for sickness. The risk of public 
sector undertakings falling sick varies significantly across industries. The prospects of 
public sector undertakings in Textile & Leather (failure rate of 87 percent) and Transport 
Equipment (62 percent) seem especially poor, if not desperate. By virtue of pure 
numbers, it is of course the group of privately owned Indian companies that constitute 
the majority of the BIFR’s “customers”: out of the 987 firms which ever fell sick, 837 
companies were privately owned by Indians (untabulated result). 
Table 3-9: Industrywise incidence of sickness by form of ownershipa), b) 
  Form of ownership  Total sick 
Industry public private Indian private foreign.  observations 
Food & Beverages 12 246 23 281 
 21.8 9.6 8.5   
Textile & Leather 195 535 1 731 
 87.1 11.4 1.0   
Wood & Paper 31 121 0 152 
 32.6 10.4 0.0   
Chemicals 140 332 13 485 
 44.0 7.8 2.2   
Rubber & Plastic 28 153 11 192 
 41.8 7.3 11.8   
Non-metallic Mineral Products 24 235 20 279 
 43.6 14.9 17.2   
Basic Metals & Metal Products 55 424 16 495 
 27.8 13.1 11.3   
Machinery & Machine Tools  92 230 31 353 
 52.0 8.4 5.5   
Electronics  33 155 13 201 
 24.3 8.0 6.3   
Transport Equipment 93 137 18 248 
 61.6 9.8 15.4   
Miscellaneous  10 20 0 30 
 76.9 9.5 0.0   
All industries  713 2,588 146 3,447 
 47.9 10.0 6.4   
Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations 
a) Homogeneity tests across industries and across form of ownership are always rejected. b) Apply the rule of 
three to get the total number of firms in an industry with given form of ownership.  
 
Evidence from Tables 3-10 and 3-11 supports the view that industrial sickness is primarily 
a risk for the SSI sector and for medium-sized companies. Rates for large firms were 
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distinctively lower in all industries except for Chemicals, where the incidence of sickness 
does not differ across size class (see Table 3.10). Within the SSI sector, failure rates of 20 
percent or more are found in Metals, Machinery and Transport equipment, whereas 
small firms in Electronics and Rubber & Plastics do comparatively well. From Table 3-11 
we find, however, that the incidence of sickness in the SSI sector does not change 
significantly across time (nor does it for large firms), which supports the notion that the 
1991 reforms did not really cut the special claims of the SSI sector.  
Table 3-10: Industrywise incidence of sickness by size classa), b) 
  Size classc)  
Industry small Medium large  
Food & Beverages 18 256 7 281 
 9.4 10.6 2.5   
Textile & Leather 35 651 45 731 
 13.3 15.6 7.8   
Wood & Paper 10 133 9 152 
 13.7 12.9 4.8   
Chemicals 42 374 69 485 
 11.1 9.1 9.4   
Rubber & Plastic 7 169 16 192 
 5.0 9.2 5.8   
Non-metallic Mineral Products 15 226 38 279 
 8.7 18.4 10.7   
Basic Metals & Metal Products 29 406 60 495 
 20.7 14.2 10.3   
Machinery & Machine Tools  54 275 24 353 
 20.6 9.9 5.4   
Electronics  35 160 6 201 
 8.0 9.5 3.4   
Transport Equipment 22 204 22 248 
 25.3 15.4 8.5   
Miscellaneous  3 27 0 30 
 11.1 13.4 0.0   
All industries  270 2,881 296 3,447 
 12.4 12.2 7.6   
Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations 
a) Homogeneity tests across industries are rejected for each size class; Homogeneity across size class are 
rejected for all industries except for Chemicals b) Apply the rule of three to get the total number of firms in an 
industry for each size class.; c) Size is measured by the criteria for SSI and MRTP firms. Small firms: gfa < 6 million 
Rs. until 1996 and gfa< 30 million Rs. since 1997. Large firms: gfa > 1 billion Rs. or gfa > 1 million Rs. and market 
share of at least 25 %. 
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Possibly, the temporal patterns of sickness would turn significant if the analysis was 
based on the official (less demanding) sickness criteria applying to small-scale units.72 If 
so, this would also drive up the overall sickness rate of some 12 percent in the SSI sector. 
Table 3-11: Incidence of sickness by size class: 1988 – 1999 (number of firms)a), b), c) 
 
Size 
Class 
 
 
1988 
 
 
1989 
 
 
1990 
 
 
1991 
 
 
1992 
 
 
1993 
 
 
1994 
 
 
1995 
 
 
1996 
 
 
1997 
 
 
1998 
 
 
1999 
Total 
sick 
obs. 
Small 0 1 2 7 8 9 11 9 14 62 74 73 270 
 0.0 5.9 10.0 15.2 12.7 11.5 9.0 6.3 12.1 11.9 14.8 13.4   
Medium 30 135 166 208 215 231 235 255 267 300 378 461 2,881 
 10.6 14.4 15.4 14.9 13.6 12.1 9.6 8.6 8.6 11.1 14.3 17.9   
Large 5 16 13 15 16 22 23 25 26 36 41 58 296 
 4.6 9.2 7.1 7.6 7.0 8.4 7.8 7.1 5.8 7.4 7.4 9.7   
All size 
classes 35 152 181 230 239 262 269 289 307 398 493 592 3,447 
 8.8 13.4 14.1 14.0 12.8 11.7 9.4 8.4 8.4 10.7 13.3 15.9   
Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations 
a) Homogeneity across size classes are not rejected in the first two sample years and in the years 1993-1995; 
Homogeneity tests across time are rejected for medium-sized firms only. b) Apply the rule of three to get the 
total number of firms in each size class in each year. c) Size is measured by the criteria for SSI and MRTP firms. 
Small firms: gfa < 6 million Rs. until 1996 and gfa< 30 million Rs. since 1997. Large firms: gfa > 1 billion Rs. or gfa > 
1 million Rs. and market share of at least 25 %. 
 
3.3 Characteristics of Distress 
Having explored the phenomenon of sickness across time and region, by industry, age 
of establishment, size and ownership-types, we now go a step further and present 
summary statistics on certain key variables that influence, or reflect, a firm’s health 
status. We compare the group of sound and sick firms with respect to:  
• a simple profitability measure,  
• single factor productivity ratios for capital and labor, and 
• measures of financial distress. 
While it will be the object of subsequent chapters to determine the direction of 
causality, we confine ourselves to purely descriptive statistics at this stage. Table 3-12 
and Table 3-13 present industry-wise unweighted averages for both ‘sound’ and ‘sick’ 
                                                     
72) Firms operating on a small scale are declared sick if, compared to their peak values in the immediately 
preceding four financial years, their net worth drops 50 percent or more and if they fall behind in payment of 
principal or interest in respect of any of their creditors for a period exceeding two and a half years.  
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units in 1990 and 1999, respectively.73 1990 is the last year before vast deregulation 
measures under the NEP were implemented, and 1999 is simply the last sample year. 
The last columns in each ‘box’ display results of Bonferroni multiple comparison tests of 
the null hypothesis that, within the same period, differences in the means of the two sets 
of firms, viz. sound and sick firms, are not statistically different from zero. Similarly, the last 
rows display results of Bonferroni multiple comparison tests of the null that, within each 
group, differences over time are not statistically different from zero.  
3.3.1 Profitability 
Profitability is measured by the ratio of gross profits to gross fixed assets and is an 
indicator of health. From Table 3-12 we see that mean sectoral profitability ratios 
decreased over the 1990-1999 period, especially among sound firms, suggesting that 
sickness had gained in importance, not only in quantitative, but also in qualitative 
terms. In fact, within the group of sick firms, mean profitability turned negative in 1999 
for Rubber & Plastic, Non-Metallic Mineral Products and Metals, while for Textiles and 
Leather, mean profitability was negative in 1990 as well. The same applies to 
Chemicals, Machinery and Transport. In contrast to Textiles & Leather, however, these 
deteriorations in average profitability ratios do not turn out to be statistically significant. 
Mean profitability ratios within the group of sound firms deteriorated in some sectors as 
well, while improvements in others were statistically insignificant. Comparing the two 
subgroups, sound firms were significantly more profitable in at least one period. Since 
sick firms are characterized by persistent loss-making, this is at least encouraging where 
our definition of sickness is concerned.  
3.3.2 Single Factor Productivity Measures 
Single factor productivity measures are defined as the quantity of output that can be 
produced with a unit of factor input. Capital and labor productivity ratios are 
calculated as the ratio of gross value added to gross capital stock and labor, 
respectively, where all value figures are given at constant 1988 prices.74  
                                                     
73) Unweighted averages, ∑
=
⋅ N
1i
ii )y/x()N/1( , are interpreted in terms of, e.g., profitability pertaining to the 
“average” fictitious firm i within some group of firms at time t. In contrast, weighted averages, ∑∑
==
N
1i
i
N
1i
i y/x  give 
the share of, e.g., aggregate profitability falling on the i-th firm. 
74) For the derivation of firm-specific capital stock and labor inputs, see Appendix B (chapter 8). 
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Table 3- 12: Characteristics of distress: profitability and single factor productivity 
measures 
  
PROFITABILITY 
 LABOR PRODUCTIVITY 
CAPITAL 
PRODUCTIVITY 
Industry Year Sound  sick sig. sound  sick sig. Sound  sick sig. 
Food & 1990 0.41 0.05  3.44 2.63   0.55 0.16   
Beverages 1999 0.18 -0.10 * 5.40 2.52 * 0.34 0.15 * 
sig.a)  *   *     *     
Leather & 1990 0.31 -0.03 * 3.42 1.52 * 0.42 0.36   
Textiles 1999 0.52 -0.26  4.20 1.42 * 0.56 0.17   
sig.   *  *       *   
Wood & 1990 0.29 0.19  3.48 2.29 * 0.31 0.26   
Paper 1999 0.12 0.02  3.26 1.65 * 0.21 0.06 * 
sig.  * *        * *   
Chemicals 1990 0.35 -0.01 * 5.12 3.44 * 0.55 0.21 * 
 1999 0.66 -0.11  5.92 2.75 * 0.43 0.14 * 
sig.     *     *     
Rubber & 1990 0.28 0.07 * 4.17 1.58 * 0.43 0.26   
Plastic 1999 0.17 -0.18 * 7.23 3.38 * 0.44 0.26   
sig.  * *  *           
Non-metallic 1990 0.62 0.05  4.37 2.31 * 0.71 0.12   
Min. products 1999 0.32 -0.11 * 6.02 3.92 ** 0.51 2.42 * 
sig.  ** *  *           
Metal 1990 0.34 0.08 * 3.85 2.29 * 0.39 0.24 * 
 1999 0.19 -0.08 * 5.33 2.17 * 0.30 0.13 * 
sig.  * *  *     * *   
Machinery 1990 0.45 -0.04 * 2.83 1.66 * 0.65 0.33 * 
 1999 0.21 -0.21 * 4.34 1.76 * 0.50 0.25 * 
sig.  *   *     *     
Electronics 1990 0.48 0.11 * 3.75 2.17 ** 0.69 0.61   
 1999 0.52 0.86  7.08 2.55 * 1.46 0.27 * 
sig.     *     *     
Transport 1990 0.33 -0.84 * 2.83 1.12 * 0.45 0.28 * 
 1999 0.22 -0.29 * 3.85 1.35 * 0.60 0.23   
sig.  *   *           
Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations; a) * (**) indicates significance at the 5% (10%)-level 
 
With respect to labor productivity, Table 3-12 reveals that this index increased over the 
1990-1999 period only for the group of sound firms, these changes being statistically 
significant in all industries. Labor productivity in sound firms exceeds that in sick firms in 
both periods, and these differences are statistically significant at the 10% level or better 
in all but one branch (Food & Beverages in 1990).  
In contrast, capital productivity tended to decline over time, not only for the group of 
sick firms, but also for sound firms, the differences being frequently significant at 
conventional levels. The only notable exception is sound firms in Electronics, which 
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realized an increase in capital productivity over the 1990 – 1999 period. Finally, sick firms 
are generally characterized by a lower level of capital productivity than sound firms in 
the same industry, the differences being often statistically significant.75  
Admittedly, single factor productivity ratios are very rudimentary in nature, and it 
remains open how the sector-wise evidence in Table 3-12 will require revision in the light 
of more sophisticated productivity measures. Preliminary evidence from this chapter 
suggests, however, that the new economic policy worked in favor of greater dispersion 
in productivity.  
3.3.3 Measures of Financial Distress 
Table 3-13 presents industry-wise evidence on the capital and debt structure, 
respectively.76 The former is simply measured as the share of total borrowings in total 
liabilities, while the latter is given by the share of debt owed to the government and 
development finance institutions in total borrowings. 
We find that the overall indebtedness of sick firms far exceeds that of sound units. The 
differences are necessarily significant for all industries in both periods because our 
definition of sickness implies that the total of long- and short-term debt plus specific 
reserves exceed total liabilities in sick units. Thus, the mean values of the ratio of total 
(long-term) borrowings to total liabilities are significantly higher for sick firms ‘by 
definition’. Important is the finding that sound firms are much more homogenous with 
respect to leverage – not only within the same industrial sector (not reported here), but 
also across industries. While mean borrowing-to-liability ratios decreased between 1990 
and 1999 for sound firms, the corresponding changes are statistically insignificant for 
sick firms. For the latter, financial distress was particularly severe in Leather & Textiles and 
Transport in both years. Virtually all studies of the determinants of industrial sickness point 
to an inadequate supply of term loans and high debt-service charges, so causing 
working capital shortages.77 In this context, section 2.1.5 has discussed the prominent 
role of development financing in India’s industrialization strategy and examines the 
common view that DFIs are required to assist sick units and supply them with various soft 
loans, and thereby promote their rehabilitation. Table 3-13 supports this notion, in that 
                                                     
75) Further evidence (not reported here) reveals that the group of sound firms exhibits much greater 
dispersion with regard to both productivity measures. 
76) Readers unfamiliar with accounting terminology may find it helpful to refer to the balance sheet scheme 
in Table A-5 of the Concepts-and-Definitions Appendix (chapter 8). 
77) See, for example, Singh and Bhatia (1993), Mohapatra (1993), Gupta (1990), Chattopadhyay (1995), 
Girdhari and Joshi (1993). 
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sick firms in general do rely more on these sources of funds. The differences between 
the two subgroups are statistically significant for all sectors but Wood & Paper, Textiles & 
Leather and Rubber and Plastic (see the last column of Table 3-13). While Textile & 
Leather firms in general exhibit the highest borrowings-to-liability ratios, trends in the 
composition of liabilities vary between the two subgroups of sound and sick firms: the 
former reduced the share of loans obtained from DFIs and the government within the 
observed 10-year period, whereas the latter subgroup increased its share by three 
percentage points. In contrast, sick firms in Transport, Machinery and Non-metallic 
Mineral Products relied less on government and DFI funds in 1999 than in 1990.  
Table 3- 13: Characteristics of distress: debt ratios 
  
 
BORROWINGS/LIABILITIES 
SHARE OF DFI+GOVT. DEBT 
IN TOTAL  DEBT 
Industry Year sound  Sick sig.  sound  sick sig. 
Food & 1990 0.40 0.75 * 0.21 0.30  
Beverages 1999 0.38 0.95 * 0.24 0.35 * 
sig.a)        
Leather & 1990 0.46 1.45 * 0.36 0.30  
Textiles 1999 0.43 2.30 * 0.29 0.33  
sig.     * *  
Wood & 1990 0.44 1.10 * 0.39 0.36  
Paper 1999 0.38 1.01 * 0.36 0.36  
sig.  *      
Chemicals 1990 0.44 0.97 * 0.26 0.47 * 
 1999 0.34 1.38 * 0.27 0.38 * 
sig.  *      
Rubber & 1990 0.46 0.97 * 0.29 0.23  
Plastic 1999 0.38 1.00 * 0.30 0.31  
sig.  *      
Non-metallic 1990 0.48 1.01 * 0.41 0.63 * 
min. products 1999 0.37 1.22 * 0.29 0.47 * 
sig.  *   * **  
Metal 1990 0.43 0.79 * 0.26 0.38 * 
 1999 0.38 1.39 * 0.29 0.32  
sig.  *      
Machinery 1990 0.32 1.05 * 0.24 0.39 * 
 1999 0.30 1.29 * 0.22 0.25  
sig.      *  
Electronics 1990 0.36 1.02 * 0.21 0.48 * 
 1999 0.22 1.77 * 0.19 0.28 ** 
sig.  *      
Transport 1990 0.41 1.91 * 0.30 0.54 * 
 1999 0.33 2.47 * 0.27 0.35  
sig.  *    **  
Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations 
a) * (**) indicates significance at the 5% (10%)-level 
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Although sick firms are found to be relatively more generously supplied with DFI and 
government funds, the remedial merits of this intervention must be questioned. Where 
the share of soft loans changed significantly over the 1991-1999 period, the sectoral 
share of sick firms changed as well – and in the same direction: greater (less) reliance 
on government and DFI loans in 1999 corresponds to higher (lower) sickness rates. This 
finding supports Hanson (2001) and Goswami (1996), who argue that development 
financing was a cause of, rather than a remedial measure for, the sickness problem.  
3.4 Summary and Conclusion  
The 1989-1999 period is marked by three distinct phases of industrial sickness. The early 
years are characterized by relatively constant sickness rates around 14 percent. After 
1991, the rate declined steadily until 1995 or 1996, whereupon there followed a strong 
revival. By 1999, nearly 16 percent of the sample firms had met the sickness criterion. 
From the analysis of profitability ratios and borrowings-to-liability ratios, moreover, we 
found that the prospects of sick manufacturing firms deteriorated in qualitative terms as 
well. The sectoral evidence pointed to the rather unhealthy state of the textile & leather 
industries, in both absolute and relative terms and throughout the entire period. 
Furthermore, the risk of sickness is found to be increasing in the firm’s age, decreasing in 
its size and disastrously high for public sector undertakings.  
Preliminary evidence from this chapter also suggests that the new economic policy has 
worked in favor of greater divergence in single factor productivity levels of labor, while 
single factor capital productivity levels declined for both sound and sick firms. When (for 
the group of sound firms) labor productivity is rising and at the same time capital 
productivity is falling, this points at rising levels of capital intensity. Possibly sound firms 
were able to sustain economic viability by substituting labor by capital input. 
Admittedly, single factor productivity ratios are rudimentary in nature and it remains 
open how the sector-wise findings in Table 3-13 respond to more sophisticated 
productivity measures. We will take up this issue in the next two chapters, where we 
analyze productivity in greater detail and establish a link between the new 
environment after the 1991 economic reforms and the changes in productive 
efficiency that followed. 
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3.5 Appendix to Chapter 3  
Table 3-14: Detailed pattern of sickness (by firm)a) 
   88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99    88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 
1 / 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 4 / 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X X 
   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X -- X X X 
   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X -- X 
   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X    0 0 0 X X X X 0 0 0 0 0 
   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X    0 -- 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X X 
   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X    0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- X X X X 
   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X    X -- -- X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X    X X X 0 0 X 0 0 0 -- 0 0 
   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X    X X X X -- -- -- -- -- -- 0 0 
   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -- X 5 / 12 X X X 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 X 
   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -- 0 X    X X X X -- -- -- -- -- -- -- X 
   0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X    X X X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   0 -- 0 0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- X    X X X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   0 -- -- -- -- 0 0 0 0 -- 0 X 6 / 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X X X X 
   0 -- 0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 X -- 0    0 0 0 -- 0 0 X X X X X X 
   0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0    X 0 0 -- 0 X X 0 X X X 0 
   0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    X X -- X X X X 0 0 0 0 0 
   X -- -- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 / 12 0 0 0 0 X X X X X -- X X 
2 / 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X    0 -- X X X X X 0 0 0 X X 
   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X    X -- -- -- -- -- X X X X X X 
   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X    X -- X X X X X X 0 0 0 0 
   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X    X X X X -- X X X 0 0 0 0 
   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X    X X X X X X X 0 0 0 0 0 
   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X -- X 8 / 12 0 0 0 X X X X X X X X 0 
   0 0 X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    0 0 -- 0 X X X X X X X X 
   0 -- 0 0 0 0 0 0 -- 0 X X    X X X X X X X X 0 0 0 0 
   0 -- 0 0 0 0 0 -- 0 X -- X 9 / 12 0 0 0 X X X X X X X X X 
   0 -- -- -- -- X X 0 0 0 0 0    X X X X X X X 0 0 X -- X 
   X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X    X X X X X X X X X 0 0 0 
   X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    X X X X X X X X X 0 0 0 
   X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 / 12 0 X X X X X X X X -- X X 
   X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    0 X X X X X X X X X X 0 
   X X -- -- -- -- -- -- -- 0 0 0    X 0 0 X X X X X X X X X 
3 / 12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X    X 0 0 X X X X X X X X X 
   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X -- X X    X X -- X X -- X X X X X X 
   0 0 0 0 0 X X X 0 0 0 0    X X X X X X X X X X 0 0 
   0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 0 -- X X X 11 / 12 X X X X X X X X X X -- X 
   0 0 X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    X X X X X X X X X X -- X 
   0 -- 0 0 0 -- 0 0 -- X X X                
   0 -- 0 0 0 -- X X -- -- -- X                
   0 -- -- -- -- -- 0 0 0 X X X                
   0 X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0                
   X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X                
   X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0                
 
–  69  – 
  
   88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99    88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 
1 / 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X -- 1 / 11  X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X --     X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
   0 0 0 0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 X --     X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X     X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X     X 0 0 0 -- -- -- 0 0 0 0 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 2 / 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X -- 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X    0 X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -- 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -- X X 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X -- X 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X -- X 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X 0 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -- -- X X 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X     0 0 0 0 0 0 -- 0 0 X X 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -- X     0 0 0 0 0 0 -- 0 X -- X 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -- X     0 0 0 0 0 X X 0 0 0 0 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -- X     0 0 0 0 -- 0 X 0 -- -- X 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -- 0 X     0 0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 0 X X 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -- -- -- X     0 0 0 -- 0 0 -- 0 0 X X 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0     0 0 0 X X 0 0 0 0 -- 0 
    0 0 0 0 0 -- -- -- 0 0 X     0 0 -- -- 0 0 0 0 0 X X 
    0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0     0 -- 0 X X 0 0  0 0 0 
    0 0 0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 0 X     X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 
    0 0 0 0 -- -- 0 0 -- -- X     X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
    0 0 0 0 -- -- -- -- 0 0 X     X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
    0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0     X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 -- 0 0 
    0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0     X X 0 0 0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 
    0 0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 0 0 X     X X 0 -- -- -- -- -- -- 0 0 
    0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 / 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X -- 
    0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0    0 -- 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X -- 
    0 0 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- X     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X 
    0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X 
    0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X 
    0 -- 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X 
    0 -- 0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 0 X     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X 
    0 -- -- -- 0 0 0 0 -- 0 X     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X 
    0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X 
    0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X 
    X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X 
    X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X 
    X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X 
 
–  70  – 
  
   88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99    88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 
3 / 11  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X 6 / 11  X X X X X -- -- -- -- -- X 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X 7 / 11 0 0 0 0 X X X X X X X -- 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X     0 0 0 0 X X X X X X X 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X -- X X     0 0 0 0 X X X X X X X 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X -- X X     0 0 X X X X X X 0 0 X 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X 0 X     0 X X X X X X 0 X -- 0 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 -- X X -- X     0 X X X X X X X 0 0 0 
    0 -- 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X     X 0 0 0 0 X X X X X X 
    0 -- 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X     X X 0 0 0 X X 0 X X X 
    0 -- X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0     X X X X X 0 X 0 0 0 X 
    0 X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X     X X X X X -- -- X X -- 0 
    0 X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0     X X X X X X 0 0 0 0 X 
    X -- -- -- X X -- -- 0 0 0     X X X X X X X 0 0 0 0 
    X -- X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0     X X X X X X X 0 0 0 0 
    X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0     X X X X X X X 0 0 0 0 
    X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 / 11  0 0 0 X X X X X X X X 
    X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0     0 X X X X X -- X X X 0 
    X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0     0 X X X X X X X X 0 0 
4 / 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X X --     0 X X X X X X X X 0 0 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X X     X X X -- X X X X -- -- X 
    0 0 0 0 0 X X X X 0 0     X X X X 0 X X 0 0 X X 
    0 0 0 0 -- -- -- X X X X     X X X X -- -- -- X X X X 
    0 0 -- -- -- X X X X 0 0     X X X X X -- X X X 0 0 
    0 X -- -- -- -- -- -- X X X     X X X X X X X 0 0 0 X 
    X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X     X X X X X X X -- -- -- X 
    X X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0     X X X X X X X X 0 0 0 
    X X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 / 11 0 X X -- X X X X X X X -- 
5 / 11  0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X X X     0 0 X X X X X X X X X 
    0 0 0 0 0 X X X X X 0     0 X X -- X X X X X X X 
    0 0 0 X X X X X 0 0 0     0 X X X X X X X -- X X 
    0 -- -- -- -- -- X X X X X     X -- X X X -- X X X X X 
    0 X X X 0 0 0 0 X -- X     X X X -- -- X X X X X X 
    X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X     X X X X 0 0 X X X X X 
    X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X     X X X X X X -- X -- X X 
    X X 0 X X 0 0 0 0 0 X     X X X X X X X 0 0 X X 
    X X X 0 0 0 0 -- -- X X     X X X X X X X 0 0 X X 
    X X X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0     X X X X X X X X X 0 0 
    X X X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 / 11  0 X X X X X X X X X X 
    X X X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0     0 X X X X X X X X X X 
    X X X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0     0 X X X X X X X X X X 
    X X X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0     X 0 X X X X X X X X X 
    X X X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0     X -- X X X X X X X X X 
6 / 11 0 0 -- -- -- X X X X X X --     X -- X X X X X X X X X 
    0 0 0 0 0 X X X X X X     X -- X X X X X X X X X 
    0 0 0 0 0 X X X X X X     X X X X -- X X X X X X 
    0 0 0 0 0 X X X X X X     X X X X X -- X X X X X 
    0 0 0 0 X 0 X X X X X     X X X X X X -- X X X X 
    0 0 0 0 X X -- X X X X     X X X X X X X -- X X X 
    0 0 X 0 X X X X X 0 0     X X X X X X X -- X X X 
    0 X X X X X X 0 0 0 0     X X X X X X X X X -- X 
    X X X X X X 0 0 0 0 0     X X X X X X X X X -- X 
    X X X X X X 0 0 0 0 0     X X X X X X X X X -- X 
    X X X X X X 0 0 0 0 0                
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   88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99    88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 
11 / 11  X X X X X X X X X X X 2 / 10 X 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -- -- 
    X X X X X X X X X X X     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X -- 
    X X X X X X X X X X X     0 0 0 -- 0 0 0 X -- X -- 
    X X X X X X X X X X X     0 0 -- 0 0 -- 0 0 X X -- 
    X X X X X X X X X X X      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X 
    X X X X X X X X X X X      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X 
    X X X X X X X X X X X      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X 
    X X X X X X X X X X X      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X -- X 
    X X X X X X X X X X X      0 0 0 -- 0 0 -- 0 X X 
    X X X X X X X X X X X      0 0 0 -- -- -- -- 0 X X 
    X X X X X X X X X X X      X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 
    X X X X X X X X X X X      X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
    X X X X X X X X X X X      X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
    X X X X X X X X X X X      X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
    X X X X X X X X X X X      X X -- 0 0 0 -- 0 0 0 
    X X X X X X X X X X X 3 / 10  0 X -- -- -- -- -- -- X X -- 
    X X X X X X X X X X X      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X 
    X X X X X X X X X X X      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X 
    X X X X X X X X X X X      0 0 0 0 X X X 0 0 0 
    X X X X X X X X X X X      0 0 -- X X X 0 0 0 0 
    X X X X X X X X X X X      X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
    X X X X X X X X X X X      X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
    X X X X X X X X X X X 4 / 10  0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X X -- 
    X X X X X X X X X X X     0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X X -- 
    X X X X X X X X X X X     0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X X -- 
    X X X X X X X X X X X     0 0 0 0 X X -- -- X X -- 
    X X X X X X X X X X X     0 0 X X 0 X X 0 0 0 -- 
    X X X X X X X X X X X     X X X -- -- -- X 0 0 0 -- 
    X X X X X X X X X X X      0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X X 
    X X X X X X X X X X X      X X X -- 0 0 0 0 X 0 
    X X X X X X X X X X X      X X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 
    X X X X X X X X X X X 5 / 10 X X X X X 0 -- -- 0 0 -- -- 
    X X X X X X X X X X X     0 0 0 X 0 0 X X X X -- 
    X X X X X X X X X X X      0 0 0 X -- X X -- X X 
    X X X X X X X X X X X      0 X -- -- -- -- X X X X 
1 / 10  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X --      X X X X X 0 0 0 0 0 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X --      X X X X X 0 0 0 0 0 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X -- 6 / 10   X X X X X X 0 0 0 0 
    0 0 0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 X -- 7 / 10  0 0 X X -- X X X X X -- 
     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X      0 X X X X X -- X X 0 
     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 8 / 10 X -- X X X X X X 0 X -- -- 
     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X     0 0 X X X X X X X X -- 
     0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0     X X X X X 0 0 X X X -- 
     0 0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 0 X     X X X X X X X X 0 0 -- 
     0 0 0 -- -- -- -- -- 0 X      0 0 X X X X X X X X 
     0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0      X X X X 0 X -- X X X 
     0 0 X 0 0 -- -- 0 0 0      X X X X X X -- X X 0 
     0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0      X X X X X X X X 0 0 
     X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 / 10  0 X X X X X X X X X -- 
     X 0 0 0 0 0 -- -- 0 0     0 X X X X X X X X X -- 
     X 0 -- -- -- 0 0 0 0 0     X 0 X X X X X X X X -- 
                   X X X X -- X X X X X -- 
                   X X X X X X X X X 0 -- 
 
–  72  – 
  
   88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99    88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 
9 / 10   X X X X X -- X X X X 2 / 9    X X -- -- 0 0 0 0 0 
     X X X X X X X X X 0       X X -- -- 0 0 -- -- 0 
10 / 10  X X X X X X X X X X -- 3 / 9  0 0 0 0 X 0 X -- X -- -- 
    X X X X X X X X X X --       0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X 
    X X X X X X X X X X --       0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X 
    X X X X X X X X X X --       0 0 0 0 0 0 X X X 
    X X X X X X X X X X --       0 0 0 0 0 X -- X X 
    X X X X X X X X X X --       0 0 0 0 0 X -- X X 
    X X X X X X X X X X --       0 0 0 0 -- -- X X X 
    X X X X X X X X X X --       0 0 -- 0 0 0 X X X 
    X X X X X X X X X X --       0 0 X -- X 0 X 0 0 
     X X X X X X X X X X       0 X 0 0 0 0 0 X X 
     X X X X X X X X X X       0 X X X 0 0 0 0 0 
     X X X X X X X X X X       X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 
     X X X X X X X X X X       X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 
     X X X X X X X X X X       X X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 / 9  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X -- -- 4 / 9    0 0 0 0 0 X X X X 
      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X       0 0 0 0 0 X X X X 
      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X       0 0 0 0 0 X X X X 
      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X       0 0 X 0 0 0 X X X 
      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X       0 0 X X X X 0 0 0 
      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X       0 X 0 0 0 0 X X X 
      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X       X X X X 0 0 0 0 0 
      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X       X X X X 0 0 0 0 0 
      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X       X X X X 0 0 0 0 0 
      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -- X       X X X X 0 0 0 0 0 
      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -- X       X X X X 0 -- 0 0 0 
      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -- X 5 / 9  X X X X 0 0 0 X -- -- -- 
      0 0 0 0 0 0 -- -- X       0 0 0 0 X X X X X 
      0 0 0 0 -- -- -- -- X       0 X X X X X 0 0 0 
      0 0 0 0 X 0 -- 0 0       X X X X -- -- -- -- X 
      0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 0 X       X X X X X 0 0 0 0 
      0 0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0       X X X X X 0 0 0 0 
      0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 / 9   0 X 0 -- X X X X X -- 
      X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0       0 0 0 X X X X X X 
      X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0       0 0 X X -- X X X X 
      X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0       0 0 X X X X X -- X 
2 / 9  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X -- --       X X X X X X 0 0 0 
    0 0 0 0 0 0 X -- X -- --       X X X X X X 0 0 0 
     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X -- 7 / 9   0 0 X X X X X X X -- 
      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X       X 0 0 X X X X X X 
      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X       X X -- -- X X X X X 
      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X 8 / 9    0 X X X X X X X X 
      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X X       X X X X X 0 X X X 
      0 0 0 0 0 0 X X 0       X X X X X X -- X X 
      0 0 0 0 -- 0 0 X X       X X X X X X -- X X 
      0 0 -- 0 0 X X 0 0       X X X X X X X -- X 
      0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 9 / 9   X X X X X X X X X -- 
      0 X X 0 0 0 0 0 0       X X X X X X X X X 
      X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X       X X X X X X X X X 
      X X 0 0 0 0 0 0 0       X X X X X X X X X 
      X X 0 0 0 0 -- 0 0       X X X X X X X X X 
      X X 0 -- -- 0 0 0 0       X X X X X X X X X 
 
–  73  – 
  
   88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99    88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 
9 / 9    X X X X X X X X X 4 / 8    0 0 0 0 X X X X -- 
      X X X X X X X X X       X X X X 0 0 0 0 -- 
      X X X X X X X X X        0 0 X X X X -- 0 
      X X X X X X X X X        0 -- 0 X X X -- X 
      X X X X X X X X X 5 / 8     0 0 0 X X X X X 
      X X X X X X X X X        0 0 0 X X X X X 
1 / 8  0 -- 0 X -- 0 0 0 -- -- --        0 0 X -- X X X X 
     0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X -- --        0 X 0 X X -- X X 
     0 0 0 0 0 0 -- X -- -- 6 / 8    0 0 X X X X X X -- 
      0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X --       X X X X X 0 0 X -- 
       0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X        X X -- X X -- X X 
       0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X        X X X X -- X -- X 
       0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 7 / 8    X X X -- X X X X -- 
       0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X        X X X -- X X X X 
       0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X        X X X X X 0 X X 
       0 0 0 0 0 0 0 X 8 / 8   X X X X X X X X -- -- 
       0 0 0 0 0 0 -- X       X X X X X X X X -- 
       0 0 0 0 0 0 -- X       X X X X X X X X -- 
       0 0 0 0 0 -- 0 X        X X X X X X X X 
       0 0 0 0 0 -- -- X        X X X X X X X X 
       0 0 0 0 0 -- -- X        X X X X X X X X 
       0 0 0 0 0 X 0 0        X X X X X X X X 
       0 0 0 0 -- 0 0 X        X X X X X X X X 
       0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0 1 / 7    0 0 0 0 0 0 X -- -- 
       0 0 0 0 X 0 0 0        0 0 0 0 0 0 X -- 
       0 0 -- 0 0 0 0 X        0 0 0 0 0 0 X -- 
       0 0 -- -- -- -- -- X         0 0 0 0 0 0 X 
       0 -- 0 0 0 0 0 X         0 0 0 0 0 0 X 
       0 X 0 0 0 0 0 0         0 0 0 0 0 0 X 
       0 X -- 0 0 0 0 0         0 0 0 0 0 0 X 
2 / 8   X X -- -- 0 0 0 0 -- --         0 0 0 0 0 0 X 
      0 0 0 0 0 0 X X --         0 0 0 0 0 0 X 
       0 0 0 0 0 0 X X         0 0 0 0 0 0 X 
       0 0 0 0 0 0 X X         0 0 0 0 0 0 X 
       0 0 0 0 0 0 X X         0 0 0 0 0 0 X 
       0 0 0 0 0 0 X X         0 0 0 0 0 0 X 
       0 0 0 0 0 -- X X         0 0 0 0 0 0 X 
       0 0 0 0 0 X -- X         0 0 0 0 0 0 X 
       0 0 0 0 0 X -- X         0 0 0 0 0 -- X 
       0 0 0 0 -- 0 X X         0 0 0 0 0 -- X 
       0 0 X 0 X 0 0 0         0 0 0 0 0 -- X 
       0 0 X X 0 0 0 0         0 0 0 X 0 -- 0 
       0 -- 0 0 0 -- X X         0 0 0 -- -- -- X 
       0 X X 0 0 0 0 0         0 X 0 0 0 0 0 
       X X 0 0 0 0 0 0         0 X 0 0 0 0 0 
       X X -- 0 0 0 0 0         X 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       X X -- -- -- 0 0 0         X 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3 / 8     0 0 0 0 0 X X X         X 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       0 0 0 0 -- X X X         X 0 0 0 0 0 0 
       0 0 0 0 X X X 0         X 0 0 0 -- -- 0 
       0 0 -- -- -- X X X         X 0 0 -- 0 0 0 
       0 X 0 0 0 X -- X         X 0 -- -- 0 0 0 
                       X 0 -- -- -- 0 0 
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   88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99    88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 
2 / 7    0 0 -- 0 0 X X -- -- 6 / 7     0 X X X X X X -- 
       0 0 0 0 0 X X --        X X X -- X X X -- 
       0 0 0 0 0 X X --         0 X X X X X X 
       0 0 0 0 -- X X --         X 0 X X X X X 
       0 0 0 X 0 0 X --         X X X X X X 0 
       X 0 0 0 0 0 X -- 7 / 7      X X X X X X X 
        0 0 0 0 0 X X         X X X X X X X 
        0 0 0 0 0 X X 1 / 6    0 0 0 0 0 X -- -- -- 
        0 0 0 0 0 X X        0 0 0 0 0 X -- -- 
        0 0 0 0 0 X X        0 0 0 X -- 0 -- -- 
        0 0 0 0 0 X X        0 0 -- 0 0 X -- -- 
        0 0 0 0 0 X X         0 0 0 0 0 X -- 
        0 0 0 0 0 X X         0 0 0 0 0 X -- 
        0 0 0 0 0 X X         0 0 0 0 0 X -- 
        0 0 0 0 0 X X         0 0 0 0 0 X -- 
        0 0 0 0 0 X X         0 0 0 0 0 X -- 
        0 0 0 0 0 X X         0 0 0 0 0 X -- 
        0 0 0 0 0 X X         0 0 0 0 0 X -- 
        0 0 0 -- 0 X X         0 0 0 0 0 X -- 
        0 0 -- 0 -- X X         0 0 0 0 0 X -- 
        X X 0 0 0 0 0         0 0 0 -- 0 X -- 
        X X -- 0 0 0 0         0 0 -- 0 0 X -- 
3 / 7   X X X 0 0 0 0 -- -- --          0 0 0 0 0 X 
      0 0 X 0 0 X X -- --          0 0 0 0 0 X 
       X 0 0 0 0 X X --          0 0 0 0 0 X 
        0 0 0 0 X X X          0 0 0 0 0 X 
        0 0 0 0 X X X          0 0 0 0 0 X 
        0 0 0 0 X X X          0 0 0 0 0 X 
        0 0 0 0 X X X          0 0 0 0 0 X 
        0 0 0 0 X X X          0 0 0 0 0 X 
        0 0 0 0 X X X          0 0 0 0 0 X 
        0 0 0 0 X X X          0 0 0 0 0 X 
        0 0 0 -- X X X          0 0 0 0 0 X 
        0 0 0 X -- X X          0 0 0 0 0 X 
        0 0 0 X X X 0          0 0 0 0 0 X 
        0 X -- -- -- X X          0 0 0 0 0 X 
        X X 0 0 -- -- X          0 0 0 0 0 X 
4 / 7     0 0 0 X X X X --          0 0 0 0 0 X 
       0 0 0 X X X X --          0 0 0 0 0 X 
        0 0 0 X X X X          0 0 0 0 0 X 
        0 0 0 X X X X          0 0 0 0 0 X 
        0 0 0 X X X X          0 0 0 0 0 X 
        0 0 -- X X X X          0 0 0 0 -- X 
        X X X X 0 0 0          0 0 0 0 -- X 
5 / 7     X -- X 0 X X X --          0 0 0 0 -- X 
        0 0 X X X X X          0 0 0 -- 0 X 
        0 X X -- X X X          0 0 0 -- -- X 
        X X -- -- X X X          0 0 0 -- -- X 
        X X X -- -- X X          0 0 0 -- -- X 
        X X X X 0 -- X          0 0 0 -- -- X 
        X X X X X 0 0          0 0 0 X 0 0 
                        0 0 -- -- -- X 
 
–  75  – 
  
   88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99    88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 
1 / 6       0 0 X 0 0 0 4 / 6      0 0 X X X X -- 
         0 0 X 0 0 0         0 0 X X X X -- 
         0 X 0 0 -- 0         X X 0 0 X X -- 
         0 X -- 0 0 0          0 0 X X X X 
         X 0 0 0 0 0          0 0 X X X X 
         X 0 0 0 0 0          0 0 X X X X 
         X 0 0 0 0 0          0 0 X X X X 
         X 0 0 0 0 0          X X 0 -- X X 
         X 0 0 0 0 0          X X -- -- X X 
         X 0 0 0 0 0 5 / 6      X X X -- X X -- 
         X 0 0 0 0 0          0 X X X X X 
         X 0 0 0 -- 0          X X X X -- X 
         X -- 0 0 0 0 6 / 6      X X X X X X -- 
2 / 6    0 0 0 -- X X -- -- --         X X X X X X -- 
        0 0 0 0 X X --          X X X X X X 
        0 0 0 0 X X --          X X X X X X 
        X 0 0 X 0 0 --          X X X X X X 
        X X 0 0 0 0 --          X X X X X X 
        X X -- 0 0 0 --          X X X X X X 
         0 0 0 0 X X          X X X X X X 
         0 0 0 0 X X 1 / 5      0 0 0 0 X -- -- 
         0 0 0 0 X X         0 0 0 0 X -- -- 
         0 0 0 0 X X          0 0 0 0 X -- 
         0 0 0 0 X X          0 0 0 0 X -- 
         0 0 0 0 X X          0 0 0 0 X -- 
         0 0 0 0 X X          0 0 0 0 X -- 
         0 0 0 0 X X          0 0 0 0 X -- 
         0 0 0 0 X X          0 0 0 0 X -- 
         0 0 0 0 X X          0 0 -- 0 X -- 
         0 0 0 0 X X          0 X 0 0 0 -- 
         0 0 0 0 X X          X 0 0 0 0 -- 
         0 0 0 -- X X           0 0 0 0 X 
         0 0 0 -- X X           0 0 0 0 X 
         0 0 0 X -- X           0 0 0 0 X 
         0 0 0 X X 0           0 0 0 0 X 
         0 0 0 X X 0           0 0 0 0 X 
         0 0 X -- -- X           0 0 0 0 X 
         X X 0 0 0 0           0 0 0 0 X 
         X X 0 -- -- 0           0 0 0 0 X 
3 / 6      0 0 0 X X X --           0 0 0 0 X 
        0 0 0 X X X --           0 0 0 0 X 
        0 -- 0 X X X --           0 0 0 0 X 
         0 0 0 X X X           0 0 0 0 X 
         0 0 0 X X X           0 0 0 0 X 
         0 0 0 X X X           0 0 0 0 X 
         0 0 0 X X X           0 0 0 -- X 
         0 0 0 X X X           0 0 0 -- X 
         0 0 0 X X X           0 0 0 X 0 
         0 0 0 X X X           0 0 -- 0 X 
         0 0 0 X X X           0 0 -- -- X 
         0 0 -- X X X           0 0 X -- 0 
         X 0 0 0 X X           0 X 0 -- 0 
                         X 0 0 0 0 
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   88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99    88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 
1 / 5        X 0 0 0 0 1 / 4         0 0 0 X 
          X 0 -- 0 0            0 0 0 X 
          X 0 -- 0 0            0 0 0 X 
          X -- 0 -- 0            0 0 0 X 
2 / 5       0 0 0 X X --            0 0 0 X 
         0 0 0 X X --            0 0 0 X 
         0 0 0 X X --            0 0 0 X 
          0 0 0 X X            0 0 0 X 
          0 0 0 X X            0 0 0 X 
          0 0 0 X X            0 0 -- X 
          0 0 0 X X            0 0 -- X 
          0 0 0 X X            0 0 -- X 
          0 0 0 X X            0 -- 0 X 
          0 0 0 X X            X 0 0 0 
          0 0 0 X X            X 0 0 0 
          0 0 -- X X            X 0 -- 0 
          0 0 X -- X 2 / 4        0 0 X X -- 
          0 0 X -- X           X 0 0 X -- 
          X 0 0 0 X           X X 0 0 -- 
          X 0 0 -- X           X X 0 0 -- 
          X X -- 0 0            0 0 X X 
3 / 5     0 0 X X X -- -- --            0 0 X X 
        0 0 X X X -- --            0 0 X X 
        0 0 X X X -- --            0 X -- X 
          0 0 X X X            X X 0 0 
          0 0 X X X 3 / 4        0 X X X  
          0 0 X X X            0 X X X 
          0 0 X X X 4 / 4      X X X X -- -- -- 
          X X X 0 0          X X X X -- -- 
4 / 5        X X X -- X           X X X X -- 
          X X X -- X           X X X X -- 
          X X X -- X           X X X X -- 
          X X -- X X           X X X X -- 
          X X -- X X           X X X X -- 
5 / 5       X X X X X --            X X X X 
         X X X X X --            X X X X 
          X X X X X            X X X X 
          X X X X X            X X X X 
          X X X X X            X X X X 
          X X X X X 1 / 3        0 0 X -- -- 
          X X X X X           0 0 X -- -- 
          X X X X X           0 0 X -- -- 
          X X X X X            0 0 X -- 
          X X X X X            0 0 X -- 
          X X X X X            X 0 0 -- 
1 / 4        0 0 0 X --             0 0 X 
          0 0 0 X --             0 0 X 
          0 0 0 X --             0 0 X 
          0 0 0 X --             0 0 X 
          0 X 0 0 --             0 0 X 
           0 0 0 X             0 0 X 
           0 0 0 X             0 X 0 
           0 0 0 X             0 X 0 
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   88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99    88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 
1 / 3          0 X 0 1 / 1          X -- -- 
            X 0 0               X 
            X 0 0               X 
            X 0 0               X 
            X 0 0               X 
2 / 3         0 X X --               X 
            0 X X               X 
            0 X X               X 
3 / 3        X X X -- --               X 
           X X X --               X 
            X X X               X 
            X X X               X 
            X X X               X 
            X X X               X 
            X X X               X 
            X X X                
            X X X                
            X X X                
            X X X                
1 / 2         0 X -- --                
            0 X --                
            0 X --                
            0 X --                
             0 X                
             0 X                
             X 0                
             0 X                
             X 0                
             0 X                
             X 0                
             0 X                
             X 0                
2 / 2          X X --                
            X X --                
            X X --                
            X X --                
            X X --                
            X X --                
             X X                
             X X                
             X X                
             X X                
             X X                
             X X                
             X X                
             X X                
             X X                
             X X                
             X X                
             X X                
a) 0: sound; X: sick; -- missing record; 1/12 means one period of sickness in twelve gross sample years. 
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Table 3-15: Number of cases registered with the BFIR: by year and industrya) 
Industry 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total 
Food & Beverages 38 15 11 15 8 12 15 15 13 32 51 35 260 
Textile & Leather 60 43 23 26 37 32 20 21 12 38 65 63 440 
Wood & Paper 36 26 8 9 10 13 8 5 3 11 19 13 161 
Chemicals 32 18 19 23 23 17 18 8 14 29 55 42 298 
Rubber & Plastic 2 2 6 1 3 0 3 2 4 6 0 7 36 
Non-Metallic 
Mineral Products 
14 16 18 9 11 7 19 1 3 13 28 24 163 
Basic Metal & Metal 
Products 
50 28 36 32 31 18 34 11 12 25 50 55 382 
Machinery 43 23 13 13 14 9 22 8 8 14 49 41 257 
Electronics 8 6 3 5 7 13 11 10 8 15 2 6 94 
Transport  
Equipment 
7 12 6 2 4 1 2 0 0 1 2 2 39 
Miscellaneous 8 13 8 20 29 30 41 34 20 49 49 125 426 
Total 298 202 151 155 177 152 193 115 97 233 370 413 2556 
 
Source: BIFR (2001) at http://www.bifr.nic.in/vsbifr/status.htm as on September 1st, 2001 
a) Original industries are more disaggregated and have been reclassified according to the 2-digit NIC 
(compare Tables 1-6 and 1-7 in the Appendix attached to chapter 1) 
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4 Manufacturing Productivity and Efficiency in the 1990s  
When we explored the distributions of sick companies across time (chapter 3, Table 3-
6), we argued that the entire period 1989-1999 can be partitioned into three distinct 
phases: the pre-reform years 1989-1991 were characterized by relatively high and 
constant failure rates. Following liberalization of the NEP (transition period) the share of 
sick firms within each industry decreased until 1995 or 1996, and rose again thereafter.  
If the incidence of sickness solely mirrored economic distress (as opposed to financial 
distress), one should find an inverse relationship between changes in sectoral 
productivity and the incidence of sickness prevailing within individual industries. This is 
the first question to be addressed, in the form of some multi factor productivity analyses 
of the 10 categories of manufacturing industries.78 In comparison to the single factor 
productivity analyses of the last chapter, this approach takes account of the efficiency 
of the combined factor input. Only then it is possible to disentangle the effects of 
technical change from a mere reallocation of factor inputs on the firm’s productivity.  
We start with some growth accounting exercises and then move on to more 
sophisticated econometric approaches to the measurement of productivity and 
efficiency. Technicalities such as the construction of the output measure and firm-
specific inputs of both capital and labor are relegated to Appendix B in chapter 8.  
Compared to other recent productivity studies of the Indian manufacturing sector, the 
distinguishing feature of our work is that it exploits very recent data and allows for 
variation in productivity over the three sub-periods identified in chapter 3, viz. pre-
reform (1989-‘91), transition phase (1992-‘96), and post-reform (1997-‘99). Our data set 
allows us to calculate coefficients of variation of firm-specific, productive efficiency 
scores. We show that at the outset of the reforms, these were generally declining, but 
that after some turning point in the interim phase, performance levels begin to diverge. 
In this chapter, the analysis remains strictly factual, in that changes in productivity are 
investigated but not explained. 
                                                     
78) The miscellaneous category has been left out. 
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4.1 Review of the Empirical Literature 
In India, most productivity studies of the manufacturing sector relate to the pre-
liberalization period or to the years immediately after 1991, when the reforms in Indian 
industry were in the initial stage; but very few studies explore productivity in the later 
nineties. Those studies that do make use of more recent data generally come to the 
conclusion that productivity in the nineties was no higher than in the eighties. These 
findings are quite robust to the level of data aggregation (firm-level data versus 
aggregate data from the Annual Accounts or the A.S.I.) and to the (econometric) 
methods employed. Findings to the contrary are rare. In this connection, two recent 
studies by Unel (2003) and by Tata Services Limited (2003) found TFP growth in Indian 
manufacturing to have risen after the 1991 reforms when compared to the pre-reform 
period. Goldar (2004) subsequently demonstrated, however, that these findings are 
rather attributable to methodological shortcomings. 
The ICICI carried out a study of the manufacturing firms it provides with financial 
assistance and found an average TFP growth rate of 2.1 percent per annum for the 
period 1987/88-1991/92 (ICICI, 1994). Trivedi et al. (2000) estimate somewhat higher 
average annual TFP growth rates for the pre-reform manufacturing sector (3.6 percent), 
but their sample period starts in 1980/81. For the entire period 1980/81 to 1997/98, their 
study yields quite low productivity growth rates, averaging around 1 percent per 
annum. Another study that applies the original growth accounting approach is Singh 
(2001). Using annual data from National Accounts Statistics and the A.S.I., he computes 
the Solow-residual for 10 industries within the manufacturing sector. His results confirm 
that for all industries, the TFP indices between 1989 and 1991 exceed those in the years 
immediately after 1991. Moreover, he finds that the immediate years before the vast 
deregulation measures of the NEP came into effect were generally associated with 
local peaks in the indices of TFP. Srivastava (2000) confirms these findings using 
disaggregated data on about 3,000 companies. His econometric estimates of 
productivity growth and technical efficiency in Indian manufacturing for the period 
1980/82-1996/97 reveal a significant decline in the rate of productivity growth in the 
1990s as compared to the 1980s.  
The estimates of Balakrishnan et al. (2000) not only exhibit a decline in productivity after 
1991, but average annual growth in TFP (TFPG) in fact turns negative (-1 percent). TFPG 
estimates are obtained residually as the difference between the growth rate of output 
and a weighted average of the growth rates of factor inputs, where the weights are 
the corresponding input shares in total output. Like Srivastava’s study, these findings are 
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based on company data (PROWESS) of some 2,300 firms, but the sample consists only 
of firms engaged in Machinery, Textiles, Chemicals and Transport Equipment for the 
accounting years 1988/89-1997/98. Their measure of TFP growth is derived from the 
econometric estimation of a production function. Unfortunately, they only report results 
for the pooled sample, and fail to give estimates of industry-wise TFP growth. Sectoral 
productivity growth rates for the period 1986-1993 are provided by Krishna and Mitra 
(1998), who estimate annual productivity growth rates of 3 percent for electrical 
machinery, 5 percent for non-electrical machinery, and 6 percent for Electronics. 
Finally, Kathuria’s analysis (2002) adopts a more flexible framework, as proposed by 
Cornwell et al. (1990), and calculates time-varying, firm-specific productive efficiency 
measures. The average changes in productive efficiency between 1990 and 1996 he 
presents are of uncertain impact, however, as he omits standard errors or any other 
measure that reflects the statistical reliability of the results.79 His choice of sectoral 
disaggregation is also unusual, which makes it hard to draw comparisons with other 
studies. Recalculation of performance measures for the standard sectoral classification 
is impossible, since there is no information on the number of firms within sub-sectors. 
To sum up, the empirical literature has documented broad evidence of declining 
productivity trends in Indian manufacturing in the 1990s. This finding holds across 
different data sets (ASI, RBI), as well as different levels of disaggregation (industry and 
firm level). Furthermore, the estimates are quite robust to the use of alternative methods 
for measuring productivity.  
4.2 The Growth Accounting Approach to Productivity Measurement 
Before proceeding to the econometric estimation of Total Factor Productivity Growth 
(TFPG), we start with the traditional growth accounting approach (Solow, 1957), which 
gives easy-to-derive benchmark estimates.80 The growth accounting approach 
attributes any output growth which cannot be explained by the mere growth of 
physical inputs to growth in productivity.  
The analysis starts from a standard neoclassical production function at the firm level  
(4.1)  )t;L,K(FY ititit = , 
                                                     
79)  He finds that 14 sectors experienced a gain and ten sectors a loss in productive efficiency, see Kathuria, 
2002, table 1, p. 700. 
80)  The growth accounting approach is outlined, for instance, in Diewert and Nakamura, (1998), chapter 2 
and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), chapter 10.4.  
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where the explicit appearance of time (t) as an argument catches all forms of 
technical change which result in changes in production with unchanged levels of 
inputs of capital, itK , and labor, itL . By assumption, )(F ⋅  is strictly increasing in all 
inputs, twice continuously differentiable and exhibits constant returns to scale (CRS). 
The assumption of CRS, coupled with Euler's Theorem, implies  
it
it
it
it
it LL
FK
K
FY ⋅∂
∂+⋅∂
∂= ,  
or, 
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Y
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K
F
it
it
itit
it
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=⋅∂
∂+⋅∂
∂
: 
the elasticities of output with respect to factor inputs sum up to one under CRS.  
Solow focuses on the case of Hicks-neutral technical change, which involves a simple 
renumbering of the isoquant map, so that the production function may be written as 
(4.2)  )L,K(fAY itititit ⋅= . 
The multiplicative factor itA  is an index of the level of technology at time t, or, 
equivalently, of Total Factor Productivity. Total differentiation with respect to time yields 
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where dots denote time derivatives, i.e. instantaneous rates of change of the 
respective variable. Dividing (4.3) by itY  we obtain the rate of growth of output: 
(4.4)  
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Finally, the second term on the right hand-side is multiplied by itit K/K  and the last 
expression is multiplied by itit L/L . Rearranging the resulting equation we arrive at 
(4.5)   
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it
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it
it
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it
it
it
it
it
it
it
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L
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Y
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K
Y
K
K
Y
Y
Y
A
A &&&& ⋅⋅∂
∂−⋅⋅∂
∂−= . 
Under the additional assumption of competitive input markets, factor inputs are paid 
their marginal products. In this case, the growth rate of labor is simply weighted by 
labor’s share in value added at time t, its , and the growth rate of capital is weighted 
by capital’s share in value added, (1- its ): 
(4.6)   
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&&&& ⋅−⋅−−=≡ ,  
For empirical purposes the continuous-time formula in equation (4.6) has to be modified 
when applied in discrete time. Törnqvist (1936) measures the growth rate between two 
points in time, t-1 and t, by logarithmic differences:  
(4.7) )LlnL(lns)KlnK(ln)s1(YlnYlnTFPG 1t,iitit1t,iitit1t,iitit −−− −⋅−−⋅−−−≡ ,  
where )ss(5.0s it1t,iit +≡ − .  
In the empirical analysis that follows, the output measure is value added, in keeping 
with the above exposition. As material inputs can also be used inefficiently, gross output 
in principle serves as a better measure of the output variable. However, when annual 
report data are used, the high correlation across plants between gross output and 
materials violates the assumption of prior choice of inputs and renders the production 
function’s coefficients unstable and frequently unsatisfactory (Caves et al., 1992). The 
use of value added as the output measure rests on the assumption of separability 
between materials and labor and capital input. Appendix B (chapter 8) deals with the 
technicalities of the construction of the output measures; appropriate measures of 
labor and capital inputs are also constructed from balance sheet data.  
We obtain sectoral measures of TFPG by weighting the individual firm-specific growth 
rates by their average output shares in the aggregate output of sector j:  
ijtη 


 +⋅≡
−
−
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1t,j
1t,ij
Y
Y
Y
Y
2
1
 ,  
where the aggregate output of sector j is ∑≡
=
jtN
1i
ijtjt YY . 
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Hence, the rate of growth of TFP in industry j at time t is 
(4.8) =jtTFPG  
)}.LlnL(lns)KlnK)(lns1{()YlnY(ln 1t,ijijtijt1t,ijijtijt
N
1i
ijt1t,ijijt
N
1i
ijt
jtjt
−−=−=
−+−−∑ ⋅η−−∑η  
Finally, aggregating over the 10 distinct sectors in the economy we arrive at an 
economy-wide measure of total factor productivity growth: 
(4.9)  =tTFPG  
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 is the average share of sector j in the output of the (industrial) 
economy, ∑=
=
10
1j
jtt YY . jts  denotes labor’s average share in value added of sector j, 
∑=
=
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1i
itjt KK , and ∑= =
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itjt LL . 
4.2.1 Growth Accounting: Results 
Table 4-1 reports average annual sectoral TFP growth for the three periods in question.  
Table 4-1: Average annual sectoral TFP growth for selected subperiods 
Industry 1989-1991 1992-1996 1997-1999 
Food & Beverages 0.063 0.027 -0.029 
Textile & Leather 0.061 -0.027 -0.078 
Wood & Paper 0.191 0.024 -0.161 
Chemicals -0.012 0.033 -0.012 
Rubber & Plastic 0.025 0.130 -0.105 
Non-metallic mineral products 0.149 0.018 -0.046 
Basic metal & metal products 0.015 0.039 -0.069 
Machinery -0.014 0.034 0.025 
Electronics 0.047 0.039 0.056 
Transport Equipment 0.047 0.093 -0.074 
Total industry 0.025 0.051 -0.030 
Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations 
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We noted above that if industrial sickness was purely a reflection of economic distress, 
then productivity should be increasing in the first half of the nineties and decreasing in 
the second half. For aggregate manufacturing this holds true (see last line in Table 4-1). 
Throughout the entire 1989-1999 period, such an inverse relationship between sickness 
rates and productivity changes is observable in Chemicals, Rubber & Plastics, Metals, 
Machinery and Transport Equipment.  
Although sectoral TFP in the remaining industries decreased sharply in the third sub-
period,81 which perfectly matches the high sickness rates in the late nineties, the 
transition period is also characterized by a decline in both productivity and sickness 
rates. For firms in Textiles & Leather, average TFP actually decreases (-2.7 percent 
annually). Even if one takes account of the deficiencies of the growth accounting 
approach (see below), the evidence in Table 4-1 suggests that factors other than a 
mere decline in productivity were at work in afflicting large parts of manufacturing with 
industrial sickness.  
4.2.2 Limitations of Growth Accounting 
The growth accounting approach to productivity measurement enjoys great popularity 
among empirical researchers; but it is not without its weaknesses. First, and most 
importantly, the growth accounting approach is often rejected on the grounds of its 
unrealistic assumptions: constant returns to scale and competitive markets, with 
production factors being paid their marginal products. Second, with firm-level data, 
there is another technical problem, which biases the estimates upwards. While, at the 
aggregate level, the share of labor (capital) in gross value added is invariably positive, 
for highly unprofitable firms the absolute value of (negative) pbdit82 might outweigh the 
(positive) sum of lease rent and wages, turning gross value added – and hence the 
factor share - negative. A mechanical application of the growth accounting 
framework to such firms would yield nonsensical results, i.e., the growth rate of labor 
would not be subtracted from the growth rate of output, but rather added to it. For this 
reason, firms with negative gross value added have been removed from the sample. 
This shortcoming could, in principle, be remedied by applying the regression approach 
to growth accounting. Here, the common point of departure is to estimate a (Cobb-
Douglas) production function of the form  
(4.10) ititLitKit uLlnKlnYln +β+β= . 
                                                     
81)  The only exception relates to Electronics. 
82) pbdit abbreviates profit before depreciation, interest and tax. See the glossary in Appendix A (Table A-1). 
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In the logarithmic CD-specification the resulting coefficients Kβˆ  and Lβˆ  correspond to 
the constant output elasticities with which the growth rates of capital and labor are 
weighted. As before, itTFPG is then calculated as the difference between the growth 
rate of output and the weighted sum of the growth rates of capital and labor input,  
),LlnL(lnˆ)KlnK(lnˆ)YlnY(ln)uˆlnuˆ(lnTFPG sititLsititKsititsititit −−−− −β−−β−−=−=
(s<t) where βˆ  is the estimated parameter vector of the underlying production function 
rather than observed factor shares. 
We did not follow this route, but rather stuck to Solow’s original accounting approach. 
When interpreting the results (Table 4-1) it has to be kept in mind, therefore, that the 
technical requirements of the growth accounting approach with firm level data lead to 
a sample selection problem, which arises from an overrepresentation of more 
successful firms.  
4.3 Econometric Approaches to Productivity and Productive Efficiency 
In the following, the common point of departure is the standard panel setting 
(4.11) it
'
itit uxy +β+α= ,  
where log value added, ity , is explained in terms of log inputs of capital and labor, 
and a time trend, the coefficient on which represents technological progress. This is a 
very popular and easy-to-handle setup, and is employed in many of the above-cited 
papers. The explanatory variables are captured in itx . For now and the following, 
underlined small letters denote vectors and underlined capital letters denote matrices.  
The main interest here is in the trend coefficient, so we estimate an error component 
model. If, in the relevant 3-5 year periods (viz. 1989-91, 1992-96 and 1997-99), the 
behavior of firms within industries was uniform, then pooled OLS estimation would yield 
consistent estimates of β . The underlying assumptions are, however, very strong: 
independently and identically distributed errors, itu , with mean zero and constant 
variance for all firms at any point in time rule out serial correlation or any kind of 
correlation across firms, and itu  is homoscedastic by assumption. Pooled OLS-results for 
the three sub-periods are given in Table 4-2 and will be discussed in relation to the more 
plausible fixed-effects results (see section 4.3.3 below). 
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As an alternative, we apply the covariance model, which is the starting point for 
efficiency measurement in the stochastic frontier approach. Technically, estimation of 
the two models is almost identical, and for that reason they are often not properly 
distinguished form each other. But the kind of inference that can be derived from the 
two respective models is different.83  
4.3.1 Inference from the Error Component Model 
In the error component model, firm heterogeneity enters through the composed error, 
which is partitioned into an unobservable, time-invariant, firm-specific effect, iµ , and a 
remainder white noise disturbance, itv 84,  
(4.12)  itiit vu +µ= . 
We can think of the iµ  as the unobservable entrepreneurial or managerial skills of the 
firm’s executives. In the fixed-effects specification, these are assumed to be fixed and 
uncorrelated across firms. In contrast to the white noise error term, itv , however, these 
fixed effects may be correlated with the vector of explanatory variables.  
In matrix form, (4.11) combined with (4.12) may be written as 
(4.13)  vZXιy NT +µ+β+α= µ . 
In eq. (4.13)  
)yyy,yyyy(y NT1NT221T11211
' KKKK=   
and  
)vvvvvvv(v NT1NT221T11211
' KKKK=   
are ]1TN[ ×⋅ -column vectors, α  is the scalar constant, NTι  is a column vector of ones 
of dimension ]1TN[ ×⋅ , µ  is the ]1N[ ×  column vector of fixed effects (one for each 
firm) and µZ  is a ]NTN[ ×⋅  selector matrix of ones and zeros, or simply the matrix of 
firm dummies: TNIZ ι⊗=µ  , where NI  is an identity matrix of dimension ]NN[ × , Tι  is 
                                                     
83)  Useful references on linear panel models with fixed effects include Baltagi (1995, chapters 2-4), Hansen 
and Janz (1998, chapter 1), Hsiao (1986, chapter 3) and Mátyás and Sevestre (1996, chapters 2-4). 
84)  “White noise” entails that the informational content of the error is zero, i.e. itv  is random, assumed to be 
independent t,i∀  and to follow a normal distribution with mean zero and variance-covariance matrix 
NT
2
vIσ . 
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a column vector of dimension ]1T[ ×  and ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product. In our 
specification, X  denotes the ]3TN[ ×⋅  matrix of explanatory variables, itLln , itKln  
and the time trend, and ][ KL
' γββ=β . The so-called within-estimator pre-multiplies 
equation (4.13) by the matrix )JI(IQ TNNT ⊗−= , where TJ  is a ]TT[ × -matrix with 
elements 1/T, and NTI  ( NI ) is an identity matrix of dimension ]NTNT[ ×  ( ]NN[ × ). 
(4.14)  vQZQXQιQyQ NT +µ+β+α= µ . 
Estimating (4.14) by OLS  
(4.15) yQ'X)QX'X(ˆ 1−=β  
is equivalent to regressing yQy~ =  with typical elements )yy( .iit −  on XQX~ =  with 
typical elements )xx( k.,ik,it −  for the kth regressor, k = 1,2,…K, where  
∑
=
=
T
1t
it.i yT
1y   
and  
∑
=
=
T
1t
k,itk.,i xT
1x .  
That is to say, pre-multiplying (4.13) by Q  yields the deviations of individual observations 
from their respective means across time. Since the overall constant α  and the firm 
effects iµ  are time-invariant, the Q -transformation wipes out these effects and only the 
sum of )( iµ+α  is estimable.85 This poses no problems because our main, actually only, 
interest is in the trend term. On this account, estimates of Kβ  and Lβ  are relegated to 
the Appendix to this chapter (Table 4-5), and Table 4-2 in the results section 4.3.3 lists 
only the estimates of the trend coefficient. Provided the model as specified in (4.13) is 
                                                     
85)  In our case, however, with small T and large N, estimates of )( iµ+α  would not be consistent – the number 
of the respective parameters increases as N increases. For separate estimates of α  and iµ  we would need 
to impose the restriction 0N1i i =µ∑ =  to avoid the dummy variable trap, or perfect multicollinearity. In this case,  
β−=α ˆxyˆ '.... , where the double dot symbolizes averages over time as well as across observations, and 
β−α−=µ ˆxˆyˆ '.i.ii . 
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the true one, then βˆ  from (4.15) above is the best linear unbiased estimator (BLUE) that 
yields consistent estimates if T or (as in our case) N→ ∞.  
4.3.2 Inference from the Covariance Model 
In the covariance model, heterogeneity enters through firm-specific intercepts 
ii µ+α=α . The slope coefficients are estimated as in eq. (4.15) and  
(4.16)  β−=α ˆxyˆ ' .i.ii . 
The literature on frontier economics and efficiency measurement interprets iµ  in 
negative terms, viz. as a measure of technical inefficiency, reflecting the shortfall of ity  
from the stochastic frontier )ux( it
'
it +β+α .86 The frontier is taken as the benchmark of 
attainable output that applies to all firms within an industry and iµ  reflects the shortfall 
specific to firm i.87 By definition, then, the most efficient firm establishes the production 
frontier )0( i =µ . For the remaining firms, the specific measures of technical inefficiency 
are calculated as  
(4.17)   )ˆˆ(ˆ i
*
i α−α=µ ,  
where  )ˆ(maxˆ ii
* α=α . 
Equivalently, a normalized index of firm-specific efficiency can be derived as 
(4.18)   }ˆˆexp{~ˆ *i
0
i α−α=µ , 
so that the most efficient firm is characterized by a level of technical efficiency of one, 
and the index approaches zero as the firm’s shortfall from the frontier grows large.  
Although iµ , or the efficiency index, 0i~µ , are in principle estimable, we have little 
interest in them, because the fixed effects estimator of the individual effects will only be 
consistent if T→ ∞. For small T and N → ∞, as in our case, the number of parameters to 
be estimated increases as N increases, so making the estimates inconsistent. This is not 
the case, however, if productive efficiency was modeled as time-varying in nature. 
Cornwell et al. (1990) suggest extending the former model with heterogeneity in 
                                                     
86)  It is stochastic because the error is so: the error decomposition from the error component model does not 
apply anymore. 
87)  See Mátyás and Sevestre (1996, chapter 32) for a comprehensive review of the literature.  
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intercepts )( ii µ+α=α  to a model where the firm-specific intercept is also a function 
of time with time-coefficients that vary over firms 
(4.19)  i
'
it
2
3i2i1iit wtt δ=θ+⋅θ+θ=α , 
where )tt1(w 2'it =  and )( 3i2i1i'i θθθ=δ .  
Within a sector, productivity varies across firms due to differences in production 
technology and differences in the efficiency of the production process. While the 
traditional approach to productivity measurement focuses on the temporal variation, 
the model above allows the rate of productivity growth to vary over firms. Conversely, 
the traditional approach to efficiency measurement focuses on the cross-sectional 
variation, and the model above allows efficiency levels to vary over time (Cornwell et 
al. (1990), p. 192).  
Following Cornwell et al., the first step is to estimate ]ˆˆˆ[ˆ KL
' γββ=β  by a generalization 
of the within-estimator as given in eq. (4.15). With firm-specific, time-varying deviations 
from the overall constant, the Q  in (4.15) changes to '1'NT M)MM(MIQ
−−= , where 
)W(diagM i=  with dimension ]3NTN[ ⋅×⋅  (ibid., p 187-188). The residuals )ˆxy( 'itit β−  
give the joint estimate of the productive efficiency and the error term, i.e. itit u+α . In 
order to separate out the error term and derive firm-specific, time-variant productive 
(in)efficiency measures, an OLS-regression is performed in which the above residuals 
are regressed on itw . The fitted values from this regression, i
'
it
ˆw δ , provide an estimate 
of the efficiency indicator itαˆ  that is consistent for all i and t as T→ ∞ (ibid, p. 192).88  
Finally, to derive normalized indices of firm-specific technical efficiency, we proceed as 
in (4.18) above and calculate  
(4.18.a)   }ˆˆexp{~ˆ *tit
0
it α−α=µ , 
where   )ˆ(maxˆ iti
*
t α=α . 
The firm-specific productivity growth rates as well as the time-varying efficiency scores 
are clearly hard to lay out in tabular form. Instead, they enter as explanatory arguments 
in the next chapter when we explore the risk of falling sick at the firm level. At this stage, 
                                                     
88)  For published applications of this approach see, for instance, Wu (1995), Fecher and Pestieau (1993), 
Kathuria (2001 and 2002). 
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we only list the common trend coefficient within industries for the 1989-1999 period 
(column 2 in Table 4-3) and the annual rate of change in mean sectoral efficiency 
levels (column 3 in Table 4-3). Mean sectoral efficiency levels are calculated as 
(unweighted) averages of itαˆ  in sector j and are depicted in Figure 4-1. 
4.3.3 Results 
Table 4-2 presents productivity estimates for the three distinct subperiods. 
Comprehensive results, including estimates of Lβ  and Kβ , are shifted to the Appendix  
Table 4- 2: Productivity estimates for various subperiods  
Industry  1989-1991 1992-1996 1997-1999 
Food & Beverages γˆ -OLS 0.005 (0.041) 0.024 (0.021) -0.045 (0.046) 
 γˆ -FE 0.014 (0.021) 0.028* (0.014) -0.021 (0.027) 
Textile & Leather γˆ -OLS 0.140* (0.029) -0.074* (0.015) -0.156* (0.043) 
 γˆ -FE 0.121* (0.019) -0.085* (0.010) -0.134* (0.027) 
Wood & Paper γˆ -OLS 0.107* (0.046) 0.041** (0.022) -0.217* (0.061) 
 γˆ -FE 0.122* (0.029) 0.062* (0.015) -0.174* (0.039) 
Chemicals γˆ -OLS 0.009 (0.026) 0.024** (0.013) -0.074* (0.038) 
 γˆ -FE 0.038* (0.014) 0.037* (0.009) -0.060* (0.021) 
Rubber & Plastic γˆ -OLS 0.156* (0.052) 0.040** (0.027) -0.078 (0.078) 
 γˆ -FE 0.169* (0.035) 0.106* (0.020) -0.076* (0.038) 
Non-metallic mineral products γˆ -OLS 0.104** (0.058) 0.011 (0.030) -0.133** (0.080) 
 γˆ -FE 0.128* (0.027) -0.008 (0.016) -0.081** (0.049) 
Basic metal & metal products γˆ -OLS 0.020 (0.039) 0.003 (0.017) -0.202* (0.043) 
 γˆ -FE -0.040 (0.026) 0.011 (0.013) -0.166* (0.028) 
Machinery γˆ -OLS 0.047 (0.031) 0.032* (0.014) -0.042 (0.035) 
 γˆ -FE 0.034 (0.022) 0.039* (0.009) -0.018 (0.023) 
Electronics γˆ -OLS 0.022 (0.058) 0.058* (0.020) 0.053 (0.061) 
 γˆ -FE 0.034 (0.045) 0.028* (0.014) 0.049 (0.033) 
Transport Equipment γˆ -OLS 0.071 (0.071) 0.065* (0.013) -0.115* (0.041) 
 γˆ -FE 0.058* (0.024) 0.057* (0.009) -0.112* (0.021) 
Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations 
Standard errors in parentheses 
a) Significance at the 5 percent (10 percent) level is marked by one (two) stars 
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to this chapter (Table 4-5), for they are of no particular interest for our purpose. 89 
Significance at the 5 percent (10 percent) level is marked by one (two) stars. Regardless 
of the estimator, OLS or fixed effects, the results on γ  (technological progress) are fairly 
robust. Although the fixed effects approach yields somewhat higher estimates of the 
rate of technical progress in the first two sub-periods and slightly lower ones for the 
1997-1999 period, the estimates are of similar magnitude. The overall picture that 
emerges from Table 4-2 is that the rate of technical progress is almost everywhere 
decreasing over the time period in question. Where the hypothesized inverse U-shaped 
productivity-trend can indeed be verified (Machinery and Electronics), we observe a 
zero rate of technological progress in the first and the last period, and statistically 
significant positive rates for the interim period. In the last sub-period, the γ -coefficients 
have a negative sign without exception. Where the growth accounting approach 
yielded positive TFP growth in the late 90s (Machinery and Electronics), the 
corresponding γ -coefficients now turn out to be insignificant. With an annual 
productivity decrease of – 7.4 percent (OLS), or - 6.4 percent (FE), respectively, the 
downturn (if significant) is lowest for firms in the chemical industry, which again 
corroborates the growth accounting results in Table 4-1 (- 1.2 percent). In Textiles & 
Leather, the rate of technical progress had already turned negative in the mid-nineties. 
With an annual decrease of - 7.4 percent (OLS), or - 8.5 percent (FE), respectively, the 
regression approach to productivity measurement again establishes a sharper drop in 
productivity than does the growth accounting approach (- 2.7 percent). Where the two 
approaches agree is that, except for the textile & leather sector, all other industries still 
experienced positive rates of technical change in the transition period. 
Taking the period as a whole, productivity trends are quite diverse across sectors (see 
Table 4-3). The results corroborate the findings from previous productivity analyses for 
the Indian manufacturing sector and agree well with the results in Tables 4-1 and 4-2. 
The only definite success story comes from Machinery, with an annual rate of technical 
change of +1 percent and an increase of mean efficiency at an annual rate of 2.2 
percent. Where productivity estimates are likewise positive, this comes to the cost of 
significant reductions in mean efficiency (Rubber & Plastics, Electronics and Transport 
Equipment) (see Figure 4-1).  
                                                     
89) Still, it comes as good news that the capital coefficient is statistically significant in almost all cases. This is by 
no means a foregone conclusion if the regression includes a trend term, as in our case. By contrast, many 
studies in the field of productivity analyses yield significant trend estimates only at the cost of insignificant 
capital coefficients. We take this as encouraging evidence that the elaborate work of constructing estimates 
of the capital stock has been worth it.  
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Table 4- 3: Productivity and annual rate of change in mean sectoral efficiency (1989-99) 
Industry γˆ  a) 
Annual rate of change in 
Mean sectoral efficiencyb) 
Food & Beverages 0.001 (0.004) -0.004 
Textile & Leather -0.038* (0.004) -0.034 
Wood & Paper -0.011** (0.007) 0.025 
Chemicals 0.001 (0.004) -0.055 
Rubber & Plastic 0.055* (0.008) -0.029 
Non-metallic Mineral Products -0.012** (0.006) 0.078 
Basic Metal & Metal Products -0.004 (0.005) 0.054 
Machinery  0.010* (0.004) 0.022 
Electronics 0.021* (0.006) -0.029 
Transport Equipment 0.042* (0.004) -0.050 
Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations  
a) Standard errors in parantheses. Significance at the 5% (10 %) level is marked by one (two) stars 
b)  Mean sectoral efficiency levels are calculated as (unweighted) averages of itαˆ  in sector j 
 
Figure 4-1a: Mean sectoral efficiency 1989-1999 (light industries) 
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Figure 4-1b: Mean sectoral efficiency 1989-1999 (heavy industries) 
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Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations  
 
4.3.4 Has Firm Performance Become More Heterogenous within the 1990s? 
For most industries, mean efficiency has been declining throughout the nineties, and 
certainly in the late nineties (see Figure 4-1). In this last sub-section we present some 
evidence on the relationship between the incidence of sickness within industries, mean 
sectoral efficiency and a measure of relative variability in individual firms’ efficiency 
scores, namely, the coefficient of variation.90 It is important to note that the results in 
Table 4-4 rely on a series of cross-section regressions (i.e. one for each industry and 
year), so that a maximum number of firms would be included; for the ultimate purpose 
of this analysis is to establish a link between productive efficiency and sickness. In 
contrast, the estimates in Tables 4-2 and 4-3 are based on the sub-sample of firms with 
at least one observation in each of the three distinct phases, whereas even firms with 
only one valid record contribute to Table 4-4. By construction, the efficiency index is 
highly sensitive to positive outliers. To remove such outliers from the sample is not a 
                                                     
90 The coefficient of variation is defined as the ratio of standard deviation and mean, both with respect to 
sectoral efficiency. 
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good idea, however, because the logic of efficiency measurement is precisely to 
define an optimum in terms of production possibilities and then to compare observed 
and optimal values thereof. Purging the sample would thus come down to an 
(arbitrary) leveling of the production frontier. In order to deal with the outlier problem, 
but in such a way that the logic of efficiency measurement is preserved, an index 
number approach is applied. On this basis, we can make inference about temporal  
Table 4-4: Incidence of sicknessa), mean technical efficiency and firm heterogeneity: 
Index numbers (1989 = 100) 
Industry   1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Food Sickness 100 98.1 118 82.5 98.3 54.4 82.9 86.2 138 201 269 
& Mean efficiency 100 107 113 113 114 112 114 112 113 110 109 
Beverages Coef. of Var. 100 97.3 95.4 93.4 95 93.7 93.3 95 94.7 100 102 
Textile Sickness 100 309 264 252 197 149 112 122 166 202 285 
& Mean efficiency 100 132 138 128 124 122 118 114 111 99.4 87 
Leather Coef. of Var. 100 104 96.7 91.2 86.3 89.1 88.9 91.6 95.5 102 110 
Wood Sickness 100 80.8 90.1 91.4 74.1 57 43.3 43.8 61 74.1 64.8 
& Mean efficiency 100 103 106 108 113 114 115 121 123 110 98.6 
Paper Coef. of Var. 100 98.1 90.2 85.8 79.3 78.8 80.3 80.6 82 94.3 99.2 
Chemicals Sickness 100 101 97 90.4 90 84.9 67.2 68.9 89.4 120 137 
 Mean efficiency 100 95.7 91.8 85.9 80.5 75 70.2 66.4 63.5 60.7 56.7 
 Coef. of Var. 100 113 116 116 118 122 127 133 140 145 154 
Rubber Sickness 100 94.8 81.1 93.8 98.3 63.8 35.8 32.5 51.2 85.2 101 
& Mean efficiency 100 117 142 164 168 173 177 167 156 141 134 
Plastic Coef. of Var. 100 99.9 87.6 82.1 80.2 77.4 79.3 86.3 90.3 96.9 101 
Non-metallic Sickness 100 126 131 110 111 94.2 80.6 73.2 71.3 87.9 111 
Mineral Mean efficiency 100 104 114 126 143 160 177 202 234 268 265 
Products Coef. of Var. 100 90.7 83.9 77.5 71.2 65.9 61.4 56.9 53.3 50.5 49.8 
Basic Metal Sickness 100 96.7 87.9 86.9 83.9 89.7 98.8 87.8 120 134 160 
& Metal Mean efficiency 100 112 115 120 125 132 132 123 112 102 90.2 
Products Coef. of Var. 100 95.8 94.1 92.3 90.3 90.7 91.4 90.9 92.9 95.7 101 
Machinery Sickness 100 118 137 109 95.8 78.1 78.7 70.6 91.2 100 133 
& Machine Mean efficiency 100 66.2 75 86.1 99 113 132 146 132 116 106 
Tools Coef. of Var. 100 136 124 113 106 101 99.1 101 105 111 119 
Electronics Sickness 100 131 120 84.6 94.9 59.1 70.1 98.3 91.6 125 99.8 
 Mean efficiency 100 120 131 136 107 86.1 71 59.1 48.1 41.4 34 
 Coef. of Var. 100 90.4 85.2 85.5 88.4 94.9 107 124 146 173 206 
Transport Sickness 100 87.1 109 115 101 87.3 76.9 82.2 74.2 73.5 77 
Equipment Mean efficiency 100 104 106 110 111 101 94.6 87.1 80.8 75.1 69.1 
 Coef. of Var. 100 88.6 85.6 81.9 79.7 81.2 82.3 85 90 95.1 100 
Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations 
a) Calculated from Table 3-6 in chapter 3. 
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patterns within industries, but comparisons between sectors are not permissible.  
Again, the expectation that deregulation and increased competition immediately after 
1991 fostered efficiency is generally not supported by Table 4-4. Although mean 
efficiency initially rose for Wood & Paper (at an annual rate of 2.6 percent between 
1989-1997), for Rubber & Plastics (at an annual rate of 10 percent between 1989-1995), 
and for Basic Metals (at an annual rate of 5.8 percent between 1989-1994), only the 
machinery sector experienced a significant turn for the better right after 1991. Here, the 
index of mean efficiency dropped from 100 to 75 between 1989 and 1991, but 
increased thereafter to a level of 146 in 1996. It is, of course, legitimate to argue that 
deregulation started prior to 1991. In fact, many studies that aim to evaluate the effects 
of liberalization on enterprise performance date the beginnings back to the mid 1980s. 
If we accept this view (and do not regard it as a means to resolve the non-availability 
of more recent data), Electronics and Transport would also provide supporting 
evidence.91 
The second insight from Table 4-4 confirms conclusions drawn earlier in this chapter, viz. 
that within the course of reforms (whenever they might have set in), the initially positive 
effects on enterprise performance have since vanished. Third, downturns in mean 
efficiency in most cases went with increases in the incidence of sickness. In particular, 
this held true for the late nineties. Fourth, we observe that upward movements in mean 
efficiency were mostly mirrored by downward movements in the coefficient of 
variation, in other words, increases in mean efficiency went along with sigma-
convergence and vice versa. Although these findings accord with intuition,92 they do 
not necessarily have to prove true, but the question of sigma-convergence/sigma-
divergence ultimately hinges upon the relationship of the growth factors of mean and 
standard deviation. Only if the growth factor of the standard deviation of 0it
~ˆµ  exceeds 
the growth factor of mean efficiency within sector j will the coefficient of variation rise, 
indicating sigma-divergence, i.e. the sample has become more heterogeneous with 
respect to the efficiency measure. By the last year in the sample period, this holds true 
(or rather is not rejected) for all but the firms in non-metallic mineral products. Indeed, 
this is the only sector in which mean efficiency increased throughout the entire sample 
                                                     
91)  For Electronics, mean efficiency between 1989-1992 increased at an annual rate of 10.6 percent and for 
Transport the average annual growth rate amounted to 2.6 percent. 
92)  A reduced efficiency index just means that the productivity gap to the best practice firm has widened, so 
performance-diverging factors are at work. Conversely, an increase in the efficiency index means that the 
productivity gap to the best practice firm has narrowed, so performance-converging factors should prevail. 
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period. This does not, however, rule out the possibility that the sectoral rate of technical 
change for the entire period ( γˆ  in Table 4-3) is negative, which was exactly the case. In  
other words, the frontier moved downwards, but the average inefficiency gap 
declined, indicating sigma-convergence to an overall lower performance level. For all 
other industries, movements towards convergence in the early nineties were 
subsequently counterbalanced (and eventually dominated) by divergence that set in 
in the mid nineties, or, as in the case of the chemical industry, strict sigma-divergence 
was observable for the whole sample period.  
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have analyzed changes in productivity in Indian manufacturing firms 
in the decade ending in 1999. Our results reveal a quite diverse picture. In qualitative 
terms we find support for the consensus in most other studies that sectoral productivity 
in the later 90s was generally no higher than in the pre-reform period. Furthermore, the 
late 90s witnessed noticeable declines in mean sectoral technical efficiency, indicating 
that the mean gap relative to the best-practice firm in each sector has widened. It is, 
however, incorrect to conclude from this that the NEP reforms led to a deterioration in 
either productivity or efficiency at the firm level. Instead, as indicated in the preceding 
chapter, increasing sickness rates in the late nineties lie behind increasing variations 
across firms in relation to the mean level of efficiency in the industry. Diverging 
performance levels combined with increasing sickness rates lead to the tentative 
conclusion that NEP reforms have not been generally unsuccessful, but rather that 
economically viable firms have benefited a great deal from the policy reform. The next 
chapter will address this issue in detail. It investigates whether increased sickness in the 
mid and late 90s rather reflects a successful pick-the-winner strategy that also denies 
providing further nursing to weak firms, which then fail.  
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4.5 Appendix to chapter 4 
Table 4-5: Production function estimates a) 
Industry Period Intercept Lβˆ  Kβˆ  γˆ  
Food 89-91 0.913 (0.294) 0.964 (0.091) 0.044 (0.119) 0.014 (0.021) 
& 92-96 0.628 (0.217) 0.280 (0.072) 0.305 (0.087) 0.028 (0.014) 
Beverages 97-99 1.176 (0.398) 0.903 (0.130) 0.091 (0.123) -0.021 (0.027) 
 1989-1999 0.288 (0.096) 0.674 (0.038) 0.374 (0.039) 0.001 (0.004) 
Textile 89-91 0.984 (0.370) 0.855 (0.076) -0.050 (0.132) 0.121 (0.019) 
& 92-96 0.488 (0.141) 0.822 (0.065) 0.363 (0.055) -0.085 (0.010) 
Leather 97-99 2.692 (0.475) 0.900 (0.115) -0.115 (0.118) -0.134 (0.027) 
 1989-1999 0.500 (0.087) 0.722 (0.036) 0.290 (0.033) -0.038 (0.004) 
Wood 89-91 1.893 (0.452) 0.795 (0.162) -0.278 (0.142) 0.122 (0.029) 
& 92-96 0.320 (0.249) 1.216 (0.107) 0.098 (0.090) 0.062 (0.015) 
Paper 97-99 2.542 (0.700) 0.568 (0.199) 0.181 (0.172) -0.174 (0.039) 
 1989-1999 0.550 (0.152) 0.878 (0.064) 0.218 (0.053) -0.011 (0.007) 
Chemicals 89-91 1.359 (0.210) 0.867 (0.053) 0.022 (0.078) 0.038 (0.014) 
 92-96 0.843 (0.142) 0.674 (0.059) 0.220 (0.051) 0.037 (0.009) 
 97-99 1.802 (0.487) 0.841 (0.133) 0.131 (0.142) -0.060 (0.021) 
 1989-1999 1.006 (0.078) 0.901 (0.034) 0.178 (0.029) 0.001 (0.004) 
Rubber 89-91 0.546 (0.374) 0.952 (0.127) 0.124 (0.146) 0.169 (0.035) 
& 92-96 1.536 (0.237) 0.472 (0.089) -0.071 (0.092) 0.106 (0.020) 
Plastic 97-99 2.658 (1.507) 1.322 (0.259) -0.183 (0.434) -0.076 (0.038) 
 1989-1999 1.290 (0.135) 0.814 (0.056) -0.004 (0.053) 0.055 (0.008) 
Non-metallic 89-91 1.822 (0.409) 0.655 (0.123) -0.158 (0.133) 0.128 (0.027) 
Mineral 92-96 0.657 (0.332) 0.981 (0.088) 0.272 (0.104) -0.008 (0.016) 
Products 97-99 -1.140 (0.738) -0.063 (0.211) 1.100 (0.150) -0.081 (0.049) 
 1989-1999 0.552 (0.165) 0.754 (0.051) 0.321 (0.053) -0.012 (0.006) 
Basic Metal 89-91 0.409 (0.438) 0.988 (0.064) 0.297 (0.158) -0.040 (0.026) 
& 92-96 0.641 (0.166) 0.791 (0.076) 0.257 (0.062) 0.011 (0.013) 
Metal Products 97-99 2.518 (0.601) 0.776 (0.110) 0.185 (0.156) -0.166 (0.028) 
 1989-1999 0.644 (0.089) 0.823 (0.036) 0.253 (0.033) -0.004 (0.005) 
Machinery & 89-91 0.740 (0.306) 1.210 (0.096 -0.014 (0.131) 0.034 (0.022) 
Machine 92-96 0.575 (0.141) 0.849 (0.072) 0.156 (0.060) 0.039 (0.009) 
Tools 97-99 1.304 (0.478) 0.818 (0.127) 0.052 (0.151) -0.018 (0.023) 
 1989-1999 0.712 (0.079) 0.934 (0.038) 0.124 (0.036) 0.010 (0.004) 
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Table 4-5 concluded 
 
Industry Period Intercept Lβˆ  Kβˆ  γˆ  
 89-91 1.523 (0.371) 1.129 (0.132) -0.236 (0.188) 0.034 (0.045) 
Electronics 92-96 0.240 (0.172) 0.760 (0.089) 0.443 (0.080) 0.028 (0.014) 
 97-99 1.321 (0.508) 0.864 (0.151) -0.091 (0.155) 0.049 (0.033) 
 1989-1999 0.873 (0.102) 1.025 (0.051) 0.114 (0.049) 0.021 (0.006) 
Transport 89-91 1.390 (0.613)) 1.149 (0.086) -0.253 (0.208) 0.058 (0.024) 
Equipment 92-96 0.133 (0.218) 0.948 (0.090) 0.220 (0.087) 0.057 (0.009) 
 97-99 1.702 (0.456) 0.941 (0.175) 0.205 (0.177) -0.112 (0.021) 
 1989-1999 1.027 (0.104) 0.984 (0.037) -0.052 (0.041) 0.042 (0.004) 
Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations  
a) For each industry, the first three lines pertain to Table 4-2, and the last one to Table 4-3 (fixed effects 
estimates). Standard errors in parantheses.  
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5 Impact of the New Economic Policy Reforms on Sickness 
Although industrial sickness has been endemic in Indian industriy since the late 
seventies, there have been very few attempts to quantify the factors causing it. An 
extensive list of contributions from the early nineties divides the “factors responsible for 
sickness” into two broad classes, viz. external vs. internal, depending on whether they 
are perceived as beyond or within the control of the individual firm (see, for instance 
Biswasroyee et al. (1990, pp. 20-29), Gupta (1990, p. 22-23), and various contributions in 
Ramakant et al. (1993a, b).93 It is especially the former that have attracted 
considerable attention from Indian scholars. The suggestive argument runs that the 
typical Indian manufacturing firm has been prevented from employing the least cost-
intensive input mix, for instance, because of capacity constraints or shortage of 
essential raw materials. These restrictions were reinforced by “unfavorable government 
policies” in respect of taxation, labor, or credit supply. Economic distress and eventually 
the phenomenon of industrial sickness then occurred as a natural consequence. 
Empirical evidence – if supplied at all - comes in the form of a binary indicator model 
(“1” for sickness, zero otherwise), or a linear model with the ratio of net worth to total 
assets as the left-hand side variable and explanatory variables such as the interest-sales 
ratio, the wage-sales ratio, the ratio of gross profits to net worth or the share of deferred 
liabilities per Rupee of sales.94 Yet it is obvious that these “explanatory” variables 
describe the symptoms of sickness rather than catching its claimed causes. To address 
the latter, a firm’s health status would have to be related to the degree to which it is 
subject to external constraints on performance. Unfortunately, however, this kind of 
information is simply unavailable as long as datasets consist of “observable” realizations, 
and are not supplemented by either “desirable” outcomes (as often is the case in 
survey data), or by fixed upper limits on, say, installed capacity, import quotas, or 
supplies of basic raw materials. In effect, the “tightness of constraints” at the firm-level 
remains an unknown.  
For all the difficulties of establishing its causes, there is no doubt that the incidence of 
industrial sickness in the late nineties was much higher than it used to be in the pre-
reform days. In the previous chapter, we established that industrywise downturns in 
productivity and mean efficiency were accompanied by greater variation in 
performance across firms. Greater divergence in efficiency scores combined with 
                                                     
93) From Ramakant et al. (1993a): Singh and Bhatia, pp. 35; Farsole, pp. 45; Kaur and Singh, pp. 98; Rao and 
Chari, pp. 157. From Ramakant et al. (1993b): Khanka; Girdhari & Joshi; Jain; Mishra 
94) Chattopadhyay (1995), chapter 3; Anant et al. (1995), section 3.4 
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increasing sickness rates suggest that the NEP reforms enabled economically viable 
firms to benefit a great deal. From chapter 2, we know what kinds of firms were highly 
regulated before 1991 and what types of firms operated under artificially “soft” 
conditions. Accordingly, as a first step, we take a static view and explore the hypothesis 
that the New Economic Policy discriminates against the right set of firms. Just as the 
planned economy favored selected types of firms (e.g. small scale units, public sector 
undertakings, or companies located in remote areas), we expect the NEP reforms to 
work to their disadvantage. To anticipate our findings, the answer is in the affirmative. 
But what if these ‘natural sickness candidates’ already faced a considerably higher risk 
of sickness in earlier years? In this case, we would only have demonstrated that the NEP 
reforms did not lower their chances of experiencing sickness.  
This question leads us to take up the outcomes of the reforms more directly: Why do at-
risk candidates eventually fall sick and then recover (or not), and what role is there for 
progressive changes in the economic environment? In particular, we investigate 
whether firms fall sick because government assistance measures have become less 
generous, or because, coincidentally, formerly protected firms have deteriorated in 
terms of their productive efficiency. If so, what drives the level of firm efficiency, and 
would these factors adversely affect sickness rates in turn? Here, we are confronted 
with core questions in industrial economics: how does the market structure impinge on 
the survival (or failure) of firms, and what effects are observable from increased 
competition or from deregulation policies?  
5.1 Pre-Reform Distress, Pre-Reform Relief and Past-Reform Health Status  
In the first part of this chapter, we proceed as in Zingales (1998) and Kovenock and 
Phillips (1997), and estimate a panel probit model in which observed health status in the 
post-reform period (1997-1999) is regressed against pre-reform measures of economic 
distress (“fitness”) and budget softness (“fatness”). Dummy variables are included to 
capture the effect of the policy shock on formerly protected types of firms.  
The concept of soft budget constraints was originally formulated by Kornai (1980). It 
refers to the lack of financial discipline at the firm level that results from the expectation 
of reliable government intervention to prop up chronic loss-makers in order to avert 
their financial failure. We begin by presenting some descriptive evidence on the 
temporal evolution of soft-budget indices at the enterprise level.  
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5.1.1 Measures of Budget Softness at the Firm Level 
The direct means of rescue or support can be classified into two main groups (Kornai 
(2001) and Kornai et al. (2003)). The first consists of fiscal instruments in the form of 
government subsidies, tax concessions or tolerance of tax arrears. Corresponding 
indicators at the macro-level include state subsidies as a percentage of the total 
budget or GDP, or tax arrears similarly expressed.95 With firm data available, we follow 
Hay et al. (1994, chapter 10), who propose taking the share of fiscal benefits in gross 
sales, or the share of the total tax burden (direct plus indirect taxes) in gross sales, 
respectively. The second group of ‘softening’ instruments involves granting some form 
of credit, e.g. preference for distressed firms in credit allocation. Alternatively, firms that 
have already obtained loans may have the servicing and repayment terms in their loan 
contracts relaxed. In what follows, we represent access to such credit by calculating 
the share of soft loans from DFIs and the (central or state) government in total 
borrowings, and the share of long-term borrowing in total borrowings. Figures 5.1 and 
5.2 depict index numbers of these measures for the 1989-1999 period.  
Figure 5-1: Fiscal benefits vs. tax burden (index numbers) 
year
 FiscalBenefits  Taxes
89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
45
55
65
75
85
95
100
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125
 
Source: CMIE; own calculations 
                                                     
95) For a comprehensive review and discussion of these concepts, see Raiser (1997) 
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The first year of the NEP brought with it sharp reductions in fiscal benefits. As elaborated 
in chapter 2, various support schemes to assist certain industries and/or to promote 
specific objectives were withdrawn, and the data mirror such changes quite well. True, 
the tax-sales ratio also declined until 1997/98, but these changes appear moderate in 
comparison with the withdrawal of subsidies – though the latter itself goes a little into 
reverse after 1996.  
It is possible that central and state governments initially attempted to soften the effects 
of the economy-wide recession of the late nineties, but then reversed course again. This 
suspicion is supported by the opposite movements of the tax and subsidy measure 
between 1998 and 1999: the tax load rose and simultaneously fiscal relief was cut 
down. In view of Figure 5.1, the dramatic level of sickness in 1999 is understandable and 
provides support for the idea that sickness is a reflection of more stringent budgetary 
policies.  
The budget-hardening argument for the re-emergence of industrial sickness in the later 
1990s is further supported by Figure 5.2. In the pre-reform phase, the aggregate share of 
soft loans in total borrowings climbed by roughly 15 percentage points and then 
stabilized. 
Figure 5-2: Long-term debt and soft loans (index numbers) 
year
 LongTermDebt  DFILoan
89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99
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Source: CMIE; own calculations 
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A closer look at the data reveals that in these years, loans from DFIs and central and 
state governments made up one-third of total borrowings. Starting in 1995, a steady 
retreat began, ending with a recovery of the status quo ante in 1991. In contrast, the 
share of long-term debt in total borrowings declined throughout the entire 1989-99, with 
the strongest drop early on.  
Lastly, we present some further evidence from cash-flow statements. The basic 
accounting principle is that the financial statements are prepared on accrual basis. But 
just as reported sales might not have translated into actual cash receipts, so the outlays 
shown in the expenditure account might not have translated into actual cash 
payments. This implies that a company’s financial position, as revealed by the income-
expenditure accounts and balance sheet statements, is not necessarily the same as 
that revealed from cash flow statements.96 Accordingly, Table 5-1 relates data from 
cash-flow statements to data from expenditure accounts to see how far firms actually 
meet their interest obligations (columns 2-4) or pay back loans, respectively (columns 5-
8). Columns 2 - 4 set out the difference between int.exp.acc., “interest on accrual basis”, 
and int.cf , ”cash outflow on account of interest payments” divided by int.exp.acc. 
throughout the 1995-99 period. If a firm meets none of its interest obligations, the 
respective ratio equals 100; if all interest obligations are met the ratio equals zero.  
In 1995, on average, 60 percent of interest due was unpaid; for the sample of sick firms, 
the figure was 75 percent. Starting with the 1996 accounting period, we observe a 
drastic drop, conceivably the result of attempts to harden budgets. 
Table 5-1: Hardening budgets: (combined) evidence from cash-flow and expenditure 
statements 
Share of companies reporting “no loan repayment” 
 
 
100
int
.int.int
.acc.exp
cf.acc.exp ⋅


 −
 
Expenditure Statement 
 
Cash Flow Statement 
 
Yeara) Total sound sick Sound Sick sound Sick 
1995 60.39 59.01 75.03 0.51 0.58 0.74 0.79 
1996 39.81 37.47 65.12 0.42 0.54 0.56 0.69 
1997 38.58 35.86 61.42 0.40 0.53 0.50 0.64 
1998 40.54 37.52 60.54 0.42 0.48 0.53 0.67 
1999 43.99 41.23 58.54 0.42 0.47 0.53 0.65 
Source: CMIE; own calculations 
a) In Prowess, cash flow statements are available only from 1995 onwards and that only for listed firms. 
                                                     
96) Prowess User’s manual, Vol. 2, p. 72 
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In 1999 the average payment morale with respect to interest due within the sample of 
sick firms was about the same as it was for the set of sound firms in 1995.  
When it comes to the repayment of loans, the first striking feature is that roughly half of 
the firms did not do so. A closer examination of the data reveals an (unweighted) 
average share of long-term borrowing in total borrowings of more than 60 percent in 
the relevant period 1995-1999. There is no further information on the terms of these loan 
contracts, but obviously the initial grace period is rather long (if not virtually unlimited). 
For this reason, an equivalent index of repayment behavior as reported above cannot 
be constructed. Instead, the share of companies reporting “no loan repayment” is 
used.97 Starting from an arguably extraordinarily high level of budget softness, we again 
find clear evidence of some budget hardening throughout the mid and later nineties. 
Still, only about every third sick firm reports cash outlays on loan repayments. The 
payment morale of healthy firms proves to be somewhat better, though it is not really 
overwhelming either. 
5.1.2 Econometric Model and Issues 
The purpose of the following analysis is to establish whether there is a link between the 
incidence of sickness in 1997-1999 and pre-reform measures of budget softness and 
efficiency. The ex post failure risk for formerly protected types of firms will be also 
quantified. Sickness is a binary variable, taking the value of unity if the sickness criteria 
are met and zero otherwise. We specify the model for firm i in period t as98  
(5.1) it
'
it
*
it uxy +β=     ( N,,2,1i K= ,   3,2,1t = ) 
and  

 >=
.otherwise0
0yif1y
*
it
it  
While ity  is the firm’s observed ‘health’ status, the latent variable 
*
ity  denotes the 
unobservable individual propensity to fall sick, which depends on the vector of K 
individual characteristics, itx , the corresponding parameter vector, β , and on an 
                                                     
97) Shares refer to the set of firms that report having outstanding loans.  
98) The following is based closely on Arulampalam (1999) and Arulampalam and Booth (2000); another useful 
reference is Greene (1997), chapter 19. 
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unobservable error term itu .99 itx  may include both time-varying as well as time-
invariant observable firm characteristics, kx , which meet the strict exogeneity 
assumption:  
0)ux(E itkis =    (s, t = 1, 2, ...T). 
Depending on the informational content of the error term, it is common to distinguish 
between two basic models. When itu  is white noise, a static model can be estimated 
by pooling the data. If *ity  is distributed normally, parameter estimates of the pooled 
probit model are consistent (Maddala, 1987). However, the pooled format is unable to 
control for individual-specific unobservable effects that may otherwise bias the 
estimates of the impact of observable firm characteristics. A more refined approach is 
called for if one allows for the possibility that unobserved and possibly unobservable 
effects may also affect the firm’s risk of failure, i.e. if some of the inter-firm heterogeneity 
cannot be captured by itx  alone (possibly not even in principle) and so remain in the 
error term. Assuming that unobservable firm-specific heterogeneity in the 3-year period 
1997-1999 is time-invariant, the well-known error-decomposition from eq. (4.12) applies 
again,  
(5.2) itiit vu +µ= . 
A fixed effects specification of the iµ  entails the serious drawback that time-invariant 
covariates cannot be estimated; but these are the ones we are particularly interested 
in, e.g. in the past-reform failure risk of public sector undertakings, or of firms located in 
remote areas. We therefore treat iµ  as random and estimate the random effects 
panel probit model.100 This approach brings other difficulties, however: because of the 
common iµ , firm i’s iT  observations are jointly normally distributed, which means that 
firm i’s likelihood function for the probability of sickness in years 1997-1999 involves 
integration of the joint density of the s'uit . 
                                                     
99) Notational conventions: underlined small letters represent column vectors and underlined capital letters 
denote matrices.  
100) “therefore“ means that we switch horses as a matter of convenience. The random effects model treats 
the observations as random draws from a larger population, about which one seeks to draw inference. In the 
view of the large number of firms in the CMIE data, which account for more than 70 percent of the economic 
activity in India’s organized industrial sector, this claim does seem to be justifiable. What are the alternatives? 
Unconditional fixed effects probit models yield biased estimates. A fixed effects (conditional logit) 
specification with and without slope dummies for various types of firms has been tried. We comment on this in 
the result section 5.1.4.  
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A less general approach is the Butler/Moffitt specification, which assumes both error 
components to be normally and independently distributed, itv ~IN(0, 
2
vσ ) and iµ ~IN(0, 
2µσ ), with the regressors strictly exogenous with respect to both, 0)x(E ikis =µ  and 
0)vx(E itkis =  (∀ s, t = 1, 2, ...T), and the firm specific effect is uncorrelated with the 
residual term. These assumptions imply that  
Var( itu ) = Var( iµ ) + Var( itv ), or  
Normalizing Var( itv ) to unity, 
2
uσ  = 2v2 σ+σµ  = 2µσ  + 1 and,  
(5.3) Corr( isit u,u ) = 12
2
+σ
σ
µ
µ ρ≡ ,   )st(s,t ≠∀ . 
Eq. (5.3) says that the correlation of firm i’s error across all periods is constant 
(‘equicorrelation’). Technically speaking, ρˆ  gives the proportion of the total variance 
contributed by the panel-level variance component iµ . The parameters of this 
equicorrelation model can be estimated. Heckman (1981) showed that conditioned on 
iµ , the distribution of *ity  is independent and normal. We have 
(5.4) Prob( ity =1| itx , iµ ) = Prob( itv > i'itx µ−β− ) = ( )i'itx µ+βΦ    t,i∀ , 
where Φ  denotes the cumulative normal distribution. 
The likelihood function is then marginalized with respect to iµ ,  
(5.5) iL = Prob( )y,,y,y iiT2i1i K = 
∫ ∏Φ
∞+
∞− =
iT
1t
ity
i
'
it )x( µ+β 



σ
µ




σ
µφµ+βΦ−⋅
µµ
− iiity1
i
'
it d)x(1( , 
where })(5.0exp{
2
1)( 2⋅⋅−π=⋅φ denotes the standard normal density. 
Black box routines of popular software packages such as STATA, which has been used 
here, yield random effects panel probit estimates (
v
ˆ/ˆ σβ ), but pooled RE probit 
estimates (
u
ˆ/ˆ σβ ) = βˆ , i.e. the coefficient vector when normalization is on 
u
σˆ (= 1). To 
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make these two comparable, we multiply the former by 
uv
2
v
22
v ˆ/ˆ)ˆˆ/(ˆˆ1 σσ=σ+σσ=ρ− µ . In the following *βˆ  = ( vˆ/ˆ σβ ) ρ−⋅ ˆ1  always refers 
to the vector of such adjusted estimates.  
5.1.2.1 Marginal Effects of Continuous Covariates and their Standard Errors 
The marginal effects measure the impact of an infinitesimally small change in a 
particular continuous covariate at its mean value on the outcome probability. For 
instance, what would be the average effect of an incremental change in pre-reform 
efficiency scores on the probability of sickness in the late 1990s? STATA’s blackbox-
routine provides the marginal effects and the associated standard errors of the RE 
pooled probit model, but not so for the RE panel probit. Where the latter are 
concerned, the routine had to be extended. Marginal effects are calculated as 
(5.6) *k
'
k
ˆ*)ˆx(m β⋅βφ=   (∀ k = 1,2, ...K), 
where 'x  denotes the row vector of mean covariates, both over i and t. The 
associated variance covariance matrix is calculated as  
(5.7) Asy. Var [ *ˆ*)ˆ'x( β⋅βφ ] = Asy. Var [ mˆ ] = 
'
*ˆ
mˆ'
*ˆ
mˆ




β∂
∂ΑΩΑ



β∂
∂
, 
where 
(5.8) 



β∂
∂
*ˆ
mˆ
= )'x*ˆ(*)ˆ'x(*)ˆ'x( β⋅βφ−Ι⋅βφ   
is the [(K+1)×(K+1)] matrix of derivatives of the marginal effects with respect to the 
adjusted coefficients, Ω  is the estimated asymptotic BHHH variance-covariance 
matrix of the original, unadjusted coefficients )ˆ/ˆ(
v
σβ  and ρˆ , and  
(5.9) Α  = 
)ρˆ1/(2βˆρˆ10
)ρˆ1/(2βˆ0ρˆ10
)ρˆ1/(2βˆ0ρˆ1
*
k
*
2
*
1
−⋅−−
−⋅−−
−⋅−−
KK
MKOM
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is a matrix of dimension [(K+1)×(K+2)], the kth row of which contains the derivatives of 
*
kβˆ  with respect to all (K+1) estimates )ˆ/ˆ( vσβ  as well as ρˆ . The standard errors of the 
marginal effects are the square roots of the elements on the main diagonal of  
Asy. Var [ *ˆ*)ˆ'x( β⋅βφ ] from equation (5.7). 
5.1.2.2 Marginal Effects of Discrete Covariates and their Standard Errors 
For discrete covariates it does not make much sense to measure the impact of 
infinitesimally small changes on the outcome probability. Where dichotomous variables 
are concerned, we are rather interested in the change in the outcome probability 
when the value switches from zero to one. For instance, what would be the risk of 
sickness for firms located in remote areas compared to firms located in urban regions? 
We calculate  
Prob(y = 1| *ˆx '1β ) = *)ˆx( '1βΦ , 
where the subscribt “1” in 1x  indicates that the mean of the dummy in question is 
replaced by one. Analogously, we calculate  
Prob(y = 1| *ˆx '0β ) = *)ˆx( '0βΦ ,  
viz. the expected outcome probability for a randomly drawn firm with dummy 
realization ‘zero’. The difference, 
(5.10) dmˆ  = *)ˆx(
'
1βΦ  - *)ˆx( '0βΦ ,  
gives the appropriate impact of a change in the dummy from 0 to 1 on the outcome 
probability for sickness. To calculate the standard errors, (5.8) is replaced by the 
following row vector of dimension (K+1): 
(5.11) 



β∂
∂
*
d
ˆ
mˆ
= '0
'
0
'
1
'
1 x*)ˆx(x*)ˆx( βφ−βφ ,  
where *dβˆ  gives the adjusted estimate of the dummy in question.  
When the number of discrete values the variable in question may take on exceeds two, 
the variable is referred to as ‘polychotomous’. For sequential polychotomous 
covariates, the appropriate question would be: how does the outcome probability 
change when the variable switches from the first class to the second, from the second 
to the third etc. The vector of means has to be changed accordingly.  
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We conclude this sub-section with an illustrative example: suppose we have three 
covariates, one of which is continuous, x, one is dichotomous, d, and the last one is 
sequential polychotomous, p, with four different possible realizations  
(p = 1, p = 2, p = 3, p = 4). Marginal effects for the continuous variable x are based on 
the vector of means, 'x  = ]pppdx[ 432 . For the dummy, the (omitted) reference 
group is d = 0, and for the polychotomous variable the reference group is p = 1.  
For the ‘marginal’ effect of the dummy, the appropriate mean vectors would be given 
by ]ppp1x[x 432
'
1 =  and ]ppp0x[x 432'0 = . Finally, the effect of a switch from, 
say, p = 2 to p = 3 on the expected outcome probability would be given by 
*ˆ]001dx[*ˆ]010dx[mˆ
3p
βΦ−βΦ= . 
5.1.3 Empirical Specification and Hypotheses 
As measures of budget softness, we include the share of fiscal benefits in total sales as 
realized in the pre-reform years 1989-1991, the share of soft loans from the government 
and DFIs in total borrowings, and the share of total borrowings in total liabilities. Initially, 
therefore, “fat” firms are highly indebted units, having been generously supplied with 
loans at rather favorable conditions and all kinds of fiscal benefits. 
To capture economic distress, we apply the time-varying, firm-specific efficiency scores 
from eq. (4.18a), again as realized in the 1989-1991 period. We argue that, regardless of 
adverse developments in sectoral productivity in the late 1990s, reforms can be 
considered as effective and in fact successful if initially efficient firms make use of their 
competitiveness and survive the unfavorable conditions that rule economy-wide, while 
“fat” firms face a significantly higher probability of becoming sick. This hypothesis will be 
tested below. 
The following qualitative variables have been included to capture the effect of the 
policy shock on formerly protected firm types: type of ownership, firm-size and whether 
a company is located in a remote area. It is also advisable to include industry dummies 
as heterogeneity controls. From the descriptive statistics, we expect foreign-owned firms 
to show better performance, while public sector undertakings should be exposed to a 
greater risk of sickness once their preferential treatment has come to an end in a 
liberalized setting. By symmetric reasoning, large undertakings belong to the winners of 
NEP-reforms and, accordingly, the dummy-coefficient of large-scale units should enter 
with a negative sign. Backward areas and small-scale industries used to be promoted 
through infrastructural support, priority lending at concessional rates of interest and 
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favorable repayment schemes, a policy of product reservation, and the absence of 
the need for entry licenses and of limits on installed capacity. In chapter 2 we noted, 
however, that SSIs have been exempted from major policy changes, particularly in the 
product reservation scheme. But even if former privileges continued to apply (which 
they do not)101, reforms still undermine the relative competitiveness of small-scale firms; 
for, in contrast to others, they do not belong to the beneficiaries of deregulation. 
Hence, while we expect industries in backward areas to be identified as natural 
sickness candidates in the past-reform years, the sign on the SSI-dummy should enter 
either with a positive sign or turn out to be statistically insignificant.  
So far, the presumptive winners and losers of NEP-reforms have been addressed, but 
none of the reform measures has been approached in a direct way. As noted above, 
this approach is largely doomed to fail, since we have no idea on the precise extent to 
which individual firms are subject to constraints. However, in addition to characteristics 
such as ownership, headquarter location, year of incorporation etc., the “basic 
background” part of PROWESS also contains information on the number of product 
groups manufactured and the number of plants operated by a company. This 
information is of the ‘one point in time’ – kind, and it is reasonable to assume that the 
basic background questions were posed when the company first entered the sample. 
Table 5-2 below presents the percentile distributions of the sequential polychotomous 
variables “number of products manufactured” and ‘‘number of factories maintained”. 
Table 5-2: Percentile distribution of “number of product groups” and “number of plants” 
  25% 33% 50% 75% 90% 95% 99% max. N 
Number of product            
Groups 1 2 3 4 8 10 18 64 4870 
Number of plants   1 2 3 4 8 28 4356 
Source: CMIE; own calculations 
Under the licensing system, the number of products manufactured and the number of 
plants set up by a company used to be subject to the approval of the state’s 
representatives. The median number of factories is one and the median number of 
products is three. Arguably, greater variety in manufacturing products would give the 
firm more flexibility. Single-factory firms and firms that only manufacture a few product 
groups should therefore face a higher risk of failure.   
                                                     
101) From the mid 1990s onwards, the small-scale industrial sector has had to cope with considerable 
reductions in financial support from the SIDBI and from SFCs (see sections 2.2 and 2.5 and in particular Figure 
2.3).  
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To conclude, there is the cardinal problem of identifying strictly exogenous 
determinants of the panel probit model. Recall that a firm is legally defined to be sick if 
it has been registered for at least five years and realizes negative net worth, where net 
worth is the sum of total paid up equity capital plus reserves. Since our data set 
basically consists of income-expenditure and balance sheet statements, the task of 
identifying ‘truly’ exogenous regressors with respect to the key variable net worth is 
more than troublesome – at least if contemporaneous observations on any balance 
sheet or income-expenditure variables were to be included as explanatory variables. In 
our case, however, the critical variables enter with eight-period lags: in any year 
between 1997 and 1999 (the regression period), the entire time series of eight years of 
lagged variables constructed from annual accounts are known, including ‘future’ 
values. This settles the potential endogeneity problem. The included dummies satisfy the 
strict exogeneity assumption with respect to net-worth realizations as well, at least in a 
statistical sense.102  
5.1.4 The Results 
Table 5-3 presents the first findings on the impact of the NEP on the incidence of 
industrial sickness in the late 90s. The LR test statistic indicates that the assumption of no 
random effects can be rejected, i.e. it would be a bad idea to run pooled probit 
estimations, as one would expect. By assuming that the inter-individual heterogeneity 
can be captured by the observed variables, the pooled model attributes 
unobservables, such as competence of the management, to observable proxies, such 
as form of ownership or the efficiency index, so that the marginal effects on these tend 
to be lower (in absolute terms) in the panel model. Even so, the adjusted coefficients 
and the marginal effects from the panel model do not look very different from those 
from the simple pooled model (see Table 5-6 in the Appendix to this chapter).  
                                                     
102) A variable x is defined as strictly exogenous if its entire time series, including future realizations, are known. 
Strictly exogenous variables do not correlate with the error at any time: 
0)vx(E itis =   (s, t = 1, 2, ...T). 
A variable is defined as predetermined (synonymously: weakly exogenous), if its present and past realizations 
are known, but not so its future realizations,  


≠
≥=
.otherwise0
stfor0
)vx(E itis  
A variable is defined as endogenous if only past realizations are known, but neither present, nor future 
realizations. 


≠
>=
.otherwise0
stfor0
)vx(E itis  (See Janz, 1997, p. 41). 
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Column two in Table 5-3 contains the estimates of the adjusted coefficients, which are 
to be interpreted as the change in the probit index when the respective covariate 
increases by one unit. Columns three to five list the marginal effects, their associated 
standard errors and t-statistics for the null-hypothesis 0mˆ:H k0 = . The last column 
displays the marginal effects of discrete regressors, as described in section 5.1.2.2. They 
give the percentage point increase/decrease in sickness probability caused by a 
switch of the discrete explanatory variable. Column three in turn says how the 
probability of sickness increases/decreases (in percent) if the continuous covariate 
changed by one percent. 
Table 5-3: Pre-reform firm characteristics and past-reform health status:  
Panel probit estimates for the probability of sickness (1997-1999) 
Regressora) Adj. Coef. Marg. Effect Std. Err t-valueb) Marg.Effect 
on Dummy 
EFFICIENCY-INDEX (t - 8) -0.928 -0.192 0.092 -2.087  
TOTAL BORROWINGS (t - 8) -0.004 -0.001 0.001 -0.837  
SOFT LOANS (t - 8) 0.017 0.003 0.021 0.166  
FISCAL BENEFITS (t – 8) 1.707 0.353 0.174 2.027  
Public Sector 1.044 0.216 0.088 2.447 0.322 
Private, foreign firms -0.286 -0.059 0.038 -1.556 -0.046 
Small-scale Sector -0.071 -0.015 0.023 -0.636 -0.017 
Large-scale Sector -0.395 -0.082 0.037 -2.235 -0.078 
Single-product firms 0.114 0.024 0.020 1.165 0.028 
Multiple-product firms -0.258 -0.053 0.022 -2.409 -0.053 
Multiple-factory firms -0.246 -0.051 0.027 -1.908 -0.051 
Backward-Dummy 0.389 0.081 0.033 2.471 0.094 
Sector Dummy variables      
Food & Beverages -0.253 -0.052 0.028 -1.878 -0.051 
Textiles & Leather 0.219 0.045 0.027 1.668 0.057 
Wood & Paper -0.742 -0.154 0.068 -2.266 -0.112 
Chemicals -0.027 -0.006 0.023 -0.242 -0.006 
Non-metalic Mineral products -0.166 -0.034 0.029 -1.176 -0.035 
Basic Metals 0.018 0.004 0.025 0.146 0.004 
Machinery -0.180 -0.037 0.028 -1.318 -0.038 
Electronics -0.303 -0.063 0.039 -1.620 -0.060 
Transport -0.651 -0.135 0.069 -1.956 -0.104 
Constant -0.644 -0.133 0.061 -2.188  
Number of firms 1510     
Number of firm-years 3495     
Loglikelihood -1007.07     
LR-Test )0:H( o =ρ  622.43 (0.000)    
Source: CMIE; own calculations 
a Reference group for sector dummies: rubber & plastic; reference group for type of ownership: private Indian; 
reference for number of products manufactured: 2-3; reference group for number of factories: 1; reference 
for backwardness: no backward area; b) Critical values for two-tailed tests: 1.645, 1.960 and 2.576 
(significance at the 10/5/1-percent level). 
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The empirical findings widely support the hypothesis that it was first and foremost initially 
highly inefficient and highly subsidized (public sector) firms which were the most likely to 
have become sick by the late 1990s. Evaluated at the mean efficiency level (0.139), a 
one percent increase therein would reduce the risk of failure by 0.192 percent. Getting 
fat on subsidies, however, was dangerous for future health: the marginal effect of 
FISCAL BENEFITS is both large and significant at conventional levels. Financing decisions, 
on the other hand, have no bearing on the chances of falling sick later. Note that these 
findings remain unaltered in qualitative terms if either the R.E. pooled probit (see Table 
5-6 in the Appendix attached to this chapter), or the fixed-effects conditional logit 
model (untabled results) is employed instead. The attempt to estimate the latter model 
with slope dummies for different firm types (to capture the effect of the time-invariant 
firm characteristics) failed, however, inasmuch as the coefficients on these were not 
statistically significant.  
As expected on the basis of earlier discussions, the predicted sickness probabilities of 
public sector undertakings greatly exceeded those of private Indian firms - by no less 
than 32.2 percentage points – and the coefficient is highly significant. Foreign firms 
faced a slightly lower risk ( - 4.6 percentage points), but the coefficient is at best 
borderline significant. These effects are calculated at the means, where the reference 
group (private Indian firms) faced a probability of falling sick of 11.4 percent. Thus, 
public sector undertakings faced a probability of 11.4 + 32.2 = 43.6 percent and foreign 
firms one of 11.4 - 4.6 = 6.8 percent (see Figure 5-3). The upper panel of Figure 5-3 
illustrates the fall in the probabilities of sickness with rising efficiency levels. The impact of 
different ownership forms on the predicted probabilities is lower, the higher is initial 
efficiency.  
In chapter 2.1 we saw that positive discrimination in favor of public sector undertakings 
manifested itself in the generous provision of all kinds of fiscal benefits. Accordingly, the 
lower panel of Figure 5-3 analyzes the ownership effect on the predicted probability of 
becoming sick for a whole range of values the (subsidy/sales)-ratio may possibly take. 
The probabilities as functions of ownership have been calculated as  
Prob(type = a) = Φ[( ' ~$*) $ ]x zaβ β+ ⋅ ,  
where 
~$*β  denotes the vector of adjusted coefficients in which the estimated 
coefficient for type a is set to zero and z∈ [0,1]. The vertical line in Figure 5-3 is the 
mean subsidy-sales ratio in the sub-sample used in estimation. With increases in the pre-
reform (subsidy/sales)-ratio, past-reform sickness probabilities for each ownership group  
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Figure 5-3: Effect of ownership type on predicted sickness probabilities 
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rise. Eventually, at the highest observable degree of subsidization (ratio of fiscal benefits 
to sales of 30 percent), the predicted probability of falling sick among public sector 
undertakings would exceed 60 percent, while that among foreign-owned firms would 
remain at a comparably low level (17 percent). Evaluated at the vector of means, a 
one percent increase in the ratio of fiscal benefits to total sales would increase the 
probability of sickness by 0.353 percent in the whole sample. A highly significant and 
positive coefficient on the backwardness dummy supports the hypothesis that the 
withdrawal of preferential schemes had a negative impact on those former 
beneficiaries (the probability of sickness increased by 9.4 percentage points). Firms that 
operated on a large scale before the NEP seem to have made good use of the 
abolition of the MRTP-restrictions – at least they faced a substantially lower chance of 
falling sick in the post-reform years: their probability was 7.8 percentage points lower 
than the reference group of medium-sized firms and the coefficient is significant at 
conventional levels. No such effect can be found for small-scale firms, which is 
consistent with the suspicion that deregulation did not really involve cuts in their special 
claims.  
Multi-product and multi-factory firms faced a significantly lower risk of failure. This result 
appears to be highly robust, since it is derived from a regression wherein the size effect 
is explicitly controlled for.  
The following conclusions may be drawn: While the NEP of the early nineties generally 
did not succeed in raising sectoral productivity, at least not in a sustainable way, it has 
been effective in exposing the ‘right’ set of firms to the risk of sickness. The lower the ex 
ante efficiency levels, the higher were the firm’s chances of being sick in the late 1990s. 
This effect has been reinforced by sharp cuts in the provision of direct subsidies. Ex ante 
financing decisions, in contrast, appear to have had no impact on ex post sickness 
probabilities. This finding supports the claim that the incidence of sickness is mostly a 
matter of economic distress, and not of financial distress.  
5.2 Links Between Market Structure, Efficiency and Re-Emerging Sickness  
As noted in chapter 2, the NEP reforms have been primarily successful in removing 
barriers to entry. A number of industries hitherto reserved exclusively to the public sector 
have been exposed to competition from private undertakings. Similarly, competition 
from abroad has been sharpened through the gradual removal of quantitative import 
restrictions and the reduction of import tariffs. The remainder of this section will explore 
whether and to what extent removal of entry barriers and better access to (foreign) 
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know-how and technology have helped to foster firm efficiency and whether factors 
that boost firms’ efficiency scores would at the same time reduce failure rates. 
5.2.1 A Quick Inquiry into the Determinants of Efficiency  
In chapter 4, we employed data on inputs and output to derive a vector of firm-
specific time-variant productive efficiency scores. Thus far, these data have been 
interpreted at the aggregate sectoral level (section 4.3) and utilized as an explanatory 
variable in section 5.1. They are now used as dependent variables and regressed 
against a set of explanatory variables. This approach has much in common with 
Kathuria (2001, 2002). He, however, rather focuses on the determinants of year-to-year 
changes in absolute firm-specific, time-varying productivity scores )ˆ( itα . Since our 
main interest is in the forces that have been at work in making for divergence over the 
post-1991 period, a relative performance measure is more appropriate, and hence we 
focus on firms’ technical efficiency scores. More precisely, the log values of time-
varying, firm-specific technical efficiency scores are regressed against a set of 2-digit 
log concentration measures, viz. concentration ratios of sales, of capital goods imports, 
of the amount of royalties paid, of exports, and R&D expenditures.103 In each case, the 
respective measure of concentration is the share of sales (or exports, capital goods 
imports, technical know-how fees and R&D spending) of the top ten percent firms in 
total sales (or exports, capital goods imports, technical know-how fees and R&D 
spending, respectively) of all firms belonging to the same two-digit industry. For lack of 
better data, changes in these concentration ratios are supposed to capture the effects 
of weakening the constraints on entry. The rationale is that if deregulation policies have 
been effective, then the distribution of any of these indices, which are well-known to be 
associated with greater efficiency, should be less concentrated. Lower concentration 
in both input and output markets points to increased competition where the notion of 
competitiveness comprises two dimensions. On the one hand, firms certainly 
experience distress as a result of increased sales (or export) competition; on the other 
hand, NEP reforms should have put them in a better position to respond to such 
challenges. In particular, better access to, and availability of, formerly scarce high-
quality inputs from abroad should enable firms to move to the best-practice frontier, i.e. 
to reduce inefficiency gaps.  
                                                     
103) A level specification has also been tested. In qualitative terms, results remain robust (see the Appendix to 
this chapter (Table 5-7),  which also provides for some robustness checks). The log-specification is preferable 
because the coefficients are more straightforward to interpret in terms of elasticities. 
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To test this hypothesis, we fit a two-way error component model with additional time 
effects ( tλ ), where the latter capture unobservable temporal shocks applying to all 
firms in the same way. In keeping with the exposition in section 4.3.1, this boils down to 
an OLS regression of )yyyy( ..t..iit +−−  on a transformed regressor matrix with typical 
elements )xxxx( k..,k.,t.k.,ik,it +−− . In addition to the usual slope coefficients, the 
results set out in Table 5-4 include the estimates of these time effects calculated as 
kk..,
k
k,t...t.t ˆ)xx(yy β−−−=λ ∑ .  
Turning to the results, we find that except for the coefficient on capital goods imports, 
all concentration ratios enter with a statistically significant, negative sign, which is highly 
plausible: sharper competition in (domestic) sales and export markets put pressure on 
firms to be efficient. The log-specification entails that the coefficients are interpretable 
as elasticities. In particular, if the lower 90 percent of firms increase their aggregate 
sales market share by one percent, then firms’ efficiency levels increase by 1.5 percent. 
Table 5-4: Determinants of Firm Efficiency (1992-1999)a) 
Log Concentration ratios in: Coefficient Std. Error p-value 
     Sales -1.493 0.134 0.000 
     Exports -0.737 0.106 0.000 
     Imports of Capital Goods 0.931 0.113 0.000 
     Imports of Disembodied Technical Capital -0.311 0.143 0.030 
     R&D Expenditure -1.045 0.159 0.000 
Year Dummy 1992 0.029 0.023 0.210 
Year Dummy 1993 0.009 0.021 0.646 
Year Dummy 1994 0.037 0.017 0.032 
Year Dummy 1995 0.135 0.016 0.000 
Year Dummy 1997 -0.098 0.017 0.000 
Year Dummy 1998 -0.070 0.017 0.000 
Year Dummy 1999 -0.047 0.018 0.010 
Constant -2.984 0.056 0.000 
# of obs. (firms) 11448 (1618)     
Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations 
a) Results from the two-way error component model in the fixed effects specification.  
 
The findings for R&D expenditures and imports of disembodied technical capital 
(captured by the fees paid to foreigners for technical know-how) point to converging 
production efficiencies among firms belonging to the same 2-digit industry: the 
inefficiency gaps with respect to the best practice frontier diminish. However, while less 
–  119  – 
  
concentration in R&D inputs raises efficiency scores, as expected, more evenly 
distributed capital goods imports work against them – an awkward finding. More 
strikingly, however, the very success of the NEP reforms must be questioned in light of 
the annual dummy coefficients. Before 1996 (the omitted reference year), the 
unobservable time effects improve firm efficiency; but they work to reduce it thereafter. 
Specifically, between 1996 and 1999, firm efficiency decreased by some 
 ( exp (  0.047) - 1)= 4.6 percent, while between 1994 and 1996, there was an increase in 
firm efficiency of 3.8 percent.104 Hence, while the hypothesized inverse relationship 
between concentration ratios and firms’ efficiency scores is generally confirmed, the 
evidence in Table 5-4 suggests that by the late 90s, markets had become more 
concentrated, from which adverse effects on efficiency resulted.  
A closer look at the data mostly affirms this presumption. Throughout the 1991-1999 
period, monotone decreases in concentration ratios are observable only for R&D 
expenditures. By contrast, imports of disembodied technical capital had been highly 
unbalanced at the outset. For quite a number of 2-digit industries, the early years were 
promising; a more even spread of technical know-how fees paid to foreigners was 
observable for Beverages, Tobacco & Tobacco Products, Wool, Silk & Synthetic Fibers, 
Textile Products, Chemicals; Non-Metallic Mineral Products, Machinery and Transport 
Equipment. In the mid 1990s, however, a reverse process set in, and by 1999, we mostly 
observe greater concentration than in pre-reform years. The early 1990s witnessed 
sharper sales competition for several 2-digit industries, but in the mid nineties 
concentration ratios started to move upwards again.105 As usual in empirical work, there 
is again an exception, viz. manufacturers of Leather and Leather & Fur Products faced 
harsher sales markets conditions from 1995 onwards. Furthermore, whereas the 
distribution of capital goods imports had been comparatively even (as in Textile 
Products, Wood & Wood Products, Leather & Leather Products), by 1999 the top ten 
percent firms accounted for 83 percent and more of total capital goods imports.  
To summarize, we have verified that harsher market conditions do, in principle, work in 
favor of higher firm efficiency. By the later 1990s, however, the stress of competition, as 
measured by various concentration ratios, had declined. Eventually the upper ten 
                                                     
104) See Halvorsen et al. (1980) on the correct interpretation of dummy variables in semilogarithmic regression 
equations. 
105) This holds true for Food Products (turning point 1996), Beverages, Tobacco & Tobacco Products (1994), 
Jute, Hemp & Mesta Textiles (1997), Chemicals & Chemical Products (1994), Basic Metals & Alloys Industries 
(1999), Machinery, Machine Tools & Parts except Electrical Machinery (1997) and for other manufacturing 
industries (NIC-87 = 38) throughout the entire period.  
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percent firms came to dominate 2-digit industries, while the prospects of the rest 
appear worse than before. The empirical results from this section corroborate the 
hypothesis that the NEP reforms have brought into play forces that cause performance 
among firms to diverge. 
5.2.2 Why do at-Risk Firms Ultimately Fall Sick or Sick Ones Recover?  
In section 5.1, we found that a one percent increase in productive efficiency in the pre-
reform years reduced the chances of falling sick in the 1997-1999 period by 0.192 
percent and the same increase in the subsidy-sales ratios in the initial phase raised the 
risk by 0.353 percent. Initially efficient firms faced low risks, while initially budget-softened 
firms faced high risks. The budget-hardening effect seems to have been more 
important than the issue of economic viability. But what if the fit (fat) firms had been less 
(more) afflicted with sickness in the initial years as well? We could repeat the above 
exercise and restrict the sample to the set of initially sound firms. In this case, however, it 
would be equally impossible to trace their recovery (if they indeed recovered) should 
they fall sick. Below, we reinvestigate the fitness/fatness-issue for the set of firms that 
actually change their health status in one direction or the other.  
We estimate a panel logit regression for the entire 1992-1999 period and test three 
different specifications. In the first, economic viability is measured by the firm-specific, 
time-varying efficiency indices, as before. In the other two, these are replaced by 
various input and output market concentration ratios, as in the previous sub-section.  
To scrutinize how changing (government) provisions for at-risk firms impinge on the risk 
of failure, the budget-hardening effect is captured by the one-year lagged share of 
fiscal benefits granted to loss-making units in the total amount of such subsidies within 2-
digit industry classes. Similarly, the respective shares of soft loans and total borrowings 
enter as explanatory variables, where in each case a negative coefficient would 
support the hypothesis that a process of gradual budget-hardening gave rise to the re-
emergence of industrial sickness in the 1990s.  
While a negative relationship between output market concentration ratios and 
efficiency scores is intuitively plausible and has mostly been confirmed, the question of 
whether increased (reduced) sales market competition works in favor of, or against, 
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sickness is not that clear.106 The appraisal of the effects of the latest NEP reforms 
depends on the answer.  
If the coefficient on the sales market concentration ratio is statistically significant and 
positive, then this suggests that firms respond to increased competition by adjusting 
their formerly sub-optimal production processes, and so improve and succeed in 
business. As we have shown, competitive pressure has enhanced firm efficiency. The 
hypothesis to be tested at this point is that these gains in efficiency brought about lower 
failure rates.  
On the other hand, a negative coefficient would point to overdue adjustment 
processes, which were taking effect: tougher competitive conditions (indicated by 
reduced sales market concentration ratios) send increasingly inefficient firms into 
sickness. A negative coefficient then implies that vulnerable firms are not in a position to 
survive once market forces are free to work and it would seem right to let them exit. The 
results are displayed in Table 5-5.  
5.2.1.1 The Econometric Model 
When analyzing the factors responsible for changes in firms’ state of health in the 
course of the 1990s, the sample set becomes highly restricted, as firms that remain 
invariably sound or sick are omitted. Apparently, a fixed effects specification of the iµ  
is applicable to this kind of problem. As opposed to the random effects approach used 
in the previous section, inference is now being drawn with respect to the effects that lie 
within the specific sample (and not with respect to the total population). The question 
of which distribution to use (normal vs. logistic) is unresolved on theoretical grounds. In 
most applications the particular choice does not make much of a difference, and the 
choice is rather governed by practical reasons (Greene, 1997, p. 875).107 While the 
probit model lends itself well to the random effects treatment, the logit model lends 
itself better to a fixed effects treatment. In the context of modeling company failure (or 
recovery), the fixed effects logit specification has been adopted, for instance, by 
Hunter and Isachenkova (2000, 2002), Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) and Keasey and Mc 
Guinness (1990). 
Recalling section 5.1.2, a firm’s probability of being sick at time t is given by 
                                                     
106) Recall that the notion of efficiency used here is a relative concept, whereas the state of sickness is 
defined to prevail if the (absolute) negative net worth criterion is satisfied. 
107) A thorough treatment of such models is given in Hsiao (1992), or Chamberlain (1984); for a less algebraic 
account, see Greene (1997).  
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)(⋅Λ  is the commonly used notation for the logistic cumulative distribution function. In 
the nonlinear case, it is impossible to sweep out the time-invariant fixed effects by 
subtracting means across time (i.e. to apply the Q-transformation from eq. (4.14)), thus 
giving rise to the well-known incidental parameter problem (Neyman and Scott, 
1948),108 and ML estimates of the iµ  and the β  will be inconsistent if N becomes large 
but T is small – as in our case.  
Chamberlain (1980) suggests an approach based on the conditional maximum 
likelihood function, where the conditioning is on the number of episodes of sickness, 
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Taking partial derivatives with respect to iµ  yields  
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Note that the probability of ∑ =T 1t ity  episodes in T trials is 
                                                     
108) In total we have K+N unknown parameters to be estimated. The number of unknown parameters iµ  
increases with the number of firms. Increasing N  yields no further information about iµ ; this is gained only by 
an increase in the number of periods.  
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Accordingly, the joint probability of firm i’s vector of outcome observations, 
i
y , 
conditioned on (technically: divided by) the probability of ∑ =T 1t ity  is  
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The important thing to see in eq. (5.18) is that conditioning on ∑ =T 1t ity  (or rather the 
probability thereof) results in a term where the iµ  can be factored out and cancelled 
thereafter.109  
The conditional log-likelihood function for this problem is given by 
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Taking partial derivatives with respect to β  and solving for β  gives the conditional ML 
estimator, which - under mild regularity conditions - is consistent and asymptotically 
normal.110 From these estimates, the marginal effects km  are derived as again 
evaluated at the mean, 
(5.20) kk ˆ)]ˆ'x(1[)ˆ'x(m β⋅βΛ−⋅βΛ= . 
                                                     
109) Also note that for invariably sound or sick firms ( 0yit =∑  and Tyit =∑ , respectively), the RHS of eq. 
(5.18) equals 1; hence their contribution to the likelihood function is zero and they would drop out on 
technical grounds if we had not omitted them anyway.  
110) Also, if we were interested in the fixed effects, for given βˆ  corresponding estimates could be derived by 
solving eq. (5-16) for iµ . 
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5.2.1.2 Estimation Results 
The first thing to note from the results is that all three specifications do fairly well. 
Between 68-69 percent of the observations are correctly predicted by the respective 
models, quite a number of regressors are statistically significant, and the null that all 
coefficients equal zero is comprehensively rejected.111 However, according to 
specification one, the explanatory power of the budget-hardening argument vanishes 
now that the sample is effectively reduced to the set of firms that actually changed its 
health status over the 1992-1999 period. Univocal effects come only through total loans 
provided to loss-making units, with the right, viz negative, sign and statistically  
Table 5-5: Re-emergence of industrial sickness: competitive pressure vs. budget 
hardening (Panel logit estimates (1992-1999)) 
  Marg. p- Marg. p- Marg. p- 
  Effects. value Effects. value Effects. value 
Firms’s Efficiency Index (t-1) -1.4666 0.000       
Lagged two-digit concentration ratios in:          
     Sales    -0.0025 0.015 -0.0019 0.026 
     Exports    0.0020 0.004 0.0013 0.015 
     Imports of Capital Goods    0.0008 0.178 0.0007 0.139 
     Imports of Disembodied Technical Capital    0.0025 0.009 0.0016 0.039 
     Embodied Technical Capital (R&D)    0.0004 0.630 0.0008 0.249 
Lagged Share of…          
     Softloans to loss-making units 0.0154 0.141 0.0001 0.012    
     Subsidies to loss-making units -0.0138 0.207 -0.0001 0.087    
     Total borrowings by loss-making units -0.0532 0.004 -0.0003 0.000    
Year Dummy 1992 0.0912 0.001 0.0002 0.130 0.0001 0.361 
Year Dummy 1993 0.0943 0.001 0.0002 0.092 0.0000 0.648 
Year Dummy 1994 0.0399 0.142 0.0000 0.683 0.0000 0.727 
Year Dummy 1995 0.0110 0.654 0.0000 0.632 -0.0001 0.275 
Year Dummy 1997 0.0062 0.800 0.0002 0.000 0.0002 0.000 
Year Dummy 1998 0.0407 0.136 0.0004 0.000 0.0004 0.000 
Year Dummy 1999 0.1768 0.000 0.0006 0.000 0.0005 0.000 
Number of observations (firms) 307 (2033) 615 (3609) 616 (3633) 
LR-χ2- test on the null that all coeff. equal 0a) 259 (11) 0.000 524 (15) 0.000 497 (12) 0.000 
Log-Likelihood -624  -1130  -1152  
Correctly classified observations in % 68.86  69.05  68.51  
Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations 
a) In parentheses degrees of freedom equal to the number of regressors included 
 
                                                     
111) Combining aggregate data and micro data may result in standard errors that are biased downwards 
owing to intragroup error-term correlations. To cope with this problem we applied the correction procedure 
suggested in Moulton (1990). 
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significant. The greater the share thereof in aggregate 2-digit borrowings, the lower the 
individual firms’ risks of falling sick. Note, however, that total borrowings include all kinds 
of loans, and not only government and DFI loans. The corresponding soft-loan 
coefficient is not significant in specification one, in which the efficiency index is highly 
significant. 112 If, however, the efficiency drivers are included instead, as in the second 
specification, then the lagged share of soft loans has a positive and highly significant 
coefficient. This finding not only rejects the budget-hardening argument for the re-
emergence of industrial sickness, but casts serious doubts on the notion that soft loans 
may exert a beneficial influence upon companies’ health.  
As with government assistance in the form of fiscal benefits, soft loans do seem to prop 
up weak firms, and a less generous supply thereof in turn increases firms’ risk of falling 
sick. As stated above, however, the overall explanatory power of the budget-
hardening argument is quite low in comparison with the efficiency argument.  
As with the role of market conditions (specifications 2 ond 3) we find that the availability 
of foreign technical know-how exerts a positive impact on firms’ health status, as is 
plausible. More (less) evenly distributed imports of knowledge within 2-digit industries not 
only leads to higher (lower) efficiency scores (Table 5-4), but is also associated with a 
reduction (increase) in sickness probabilities. In principle, imports of capital goods and 
R&D expenditures work in the same direction, but the respective coefficients are not 
statistically significant at conventional levels. In the light of the unambiguously negative 
coefficient on sales concentration ratios and, in the alternative specification one, a 
negative coefficient on efficiency, our results strongly support the position that the 
introduction of self-regulating market elements raises the chances that less efficient 
companies will fall sick. Competitive forces drive up efficiency scores, but more 
vulnerable firms meet the sickness criterion. Yet the shake-out process remains 
incomplete as long as de facto exit constraints remain in place and sick firms are not 
actually liquidated.  
                                                     
112) In the first specification, a clearly significant and positive coefficient is verified if the soft-loan regressor 
entered contemporaneously. 
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5.3 Conclusions  
The incidence of industrial sickness in the late nineties was much higher than it had 
been in pre-reform days. This finding, combined with the results of chapter 4 (diverging 
sectoral productive efficiency scores), leads to the supposition that sickness in the mid 
and late nineties was not so much the result of effective constraints on performance 
that put the fate of a firm beyond its control, but rather that weak firms fell sick once 
government measures of assistance were withdrawn from them. At first sight, the 
empirical tests support this view: public sector undertakings, firms located in backward 
regions, and those that had been highly subsidized before the policy reform all faced a 
considerably higher probability of finding themselves in a state of severe financial 
distress by the late nineties when compared to private sector firms, urban firms or firms 
with initially low levels of subsidization. Also, we found that firms that had formerly 
operated under heavy constraints, e.g. firms operating on a large scale or with 
substantial foreign investment, benefited from the reforms at least in terms of lower 
sickness probabilities (compared to medium-sized firms and private Indian firms as 
reference group).  
However, a second and more direct test of the contribution of NEP reforms to the 
heavier incidence of industrial sickness in the later nineties revealed that at-risk firms did 
not primarily fall sick because state financial assistance was withdrawn, but rather 
because their (relative) efficiency deteriorated. Low efficiency levels were found to be 
the key determinant of sickness, and efficiency, in turn, is adversely affected by policies 
that restrict competition in output and input markets. Hence, although the common 
view that the erosion of firms’ net worth is policy-induced could not be evaluated by 
means of a direct test, the indirect evidence unambiguously points in this direction.  
The intuition is that the NEP reforms removed various barriers to entry, so that Indian 
manufacturing firms have come under greater pressure from (worldwide) competition. 
A more even distribution of (foreign) technology inputs and capital goods imports have 
likewise fostered efficiency among viable firms, while the unviable ones have been less 
able to meet the challenges of a liberalized policy regime. The working hypothesis that 
the NEP reforms unleashed forces that make for divergence in performance has found 
some support; in particular, the factors that account for gains in productive efficiency 
for viable firms, also account for the greater risk of sickness among the others. 
Returning once more to the budget-hardening explanation for the re-emergence of 
industrial sickness, we found that the two different measures of capital structure in the 
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regression analysis produced opposite effects on sickness probabilities.113 Greater 
provision of total loans to loss-making units strengthened vulnerable firms, but a more 
generous supply of soft loans increased their risk of failure. This is a peculiar finding - 
after all, funds are funds – but the creditors are not the same. Presumably, financially 
weak and economically unviable firms were able to attract loans only from the 
government and its associated financial institutions, while financially distressed, but 
none the less economically viable, firms were able to tap a wider range of loan 
schemes (including market debt). In the next chapter, we will explore the relationship 
between preferential terms of finance and sickness, and analyze the role the law plays 
therein.  
                                                     
113) This finding pertains to one-year lagged financing decisions. When financing variables enter with eight-
year lags (as in section 5.1),  they exert no statistically significant influence on ex post sickness probabilities.  
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5.4 Appendix to Chapter 5  
Table 5-6: Pre-reform firm characteristics and past-reform health status:  
Pooled probit estimates for the probability of sickness (1997-1999) 
Regressora Coefficient Marg. Effect p-value 
EFFICIENCY-INDEX (t - 8) -1.403 -0.289 0.000 
TOTAL BORROWINGS (t - 8) -0.003 -0.001 0.588 
SOFT LOANS (t - 8) 0.002 0.000 0.983 
FISCAL BENEFITS (t – 8) 1.320 0.272 0.010 
Public Sector 1.138 0.350 0.000 
Private, foreign firms -0.531 -0.085 0.000 
Small-scale Sector -0.011 -0.002 0.940 
Large-scale Sector -0.440 -0.083 0.000 
Single-product firms 0.140 0.031 0.095 
Multiple-product firms -0.108 -0.022 0.102 
Multiple-factory firms -0.333 -0.069 0.000 
Backward-Dummy 0.199 0.044 0.013 
Sector Dummy variables    
Food & Beverage 0.032 0.007 0.827 
Leather & Textile 0.224 0.050 0.083 
Wood & Paper -0.514 -0.079 0.008 
Chemicals -0.037 -0.008 0.780 
Non-metalic Mineral products -0.001 0.000 0.993 
Basic Metals 0.071 0.015 0.595 
Machinery -0.145 -0.028 0.295 
Electronics -0.366 -0.062 0.033 
Transport -0.526 -0.082 0.003 
Constant -0.616   
Number of firm-years 3495   
Loglikelihood - 1318.28   
Source: CMIE; own calculations 
a Reference group for sector dummies: rubber & plastic; reference group for type of ownership: private Indian; 
reference for number of products manufactured: 2-3; reference group for number of factories: 1; reference 
for backwardness: no backward area 
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Table 5-7: Robustness Checks on the Determinants of Firm Efficiency – Level 
Specificationa)  
  
Static Model 
 
Dynamic Panel Data Model 
 
   Marginal Short-run Marginal Implied long 
  Coeff. Signif. Lev. Coeff. Signif. Lev. run Coeff. 
lagged Efficiency Index    0.299 0.000   
Concentration ratios in…        
Sales -0.120 0.005 -0.052 0.107 -0.074 
Exports -0.154 0.000 -0.045 0.013 -0.064 
Imports of Capital Goods 0.059 0.014 0.240 0.000 0.342 
Imports of Disembodied Technical Capital -0.131 0.000 -0.348 0.000 -0.496 
Embodied Technical Capital (R&D) -0.078 0.016 -0.047 0.038 -0.067 
Year Dummy 1992 0.003 0.516 0.016 0.000   
Year Dummy 1993 0.009 0.021 0.036 0.000   
Year Dummy 1994 0.008 0.011 0.033 0.000   
Year Dummy 1995 0.025 0.000 0.055 0.000   
Year Dummy 1997 -0.009 0.005 0.018 0.000   
Year Dummy 1998 -0.004 0.149 0.039 0.000   
Year Dummy 1999 0.003 0.431 0.030 0.000   
Constant 0.523 0.000 -0.030 0.000   
# of obs. (firms) 11448 (1618) 10200 (1575)   
Source: CMIE manufacturing panel; own calculations 
a) Results from the two-way error component model in the fixed effects specification and from a dynamic 
panel data model that uses the one-step GMM estimator in first differences. The partial adjustment coefficient 
is (1-0.299) = 0.7 
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6 Sickness as a Strategic Device 
In this chapter, we depart from the notion that being officially declared sick may entail 
great advantages. The main features of India’s bankruptcy statutes have already been 
highlighted in chapter 2, wherein we motivated why and how the (anti-) sickness law 
may induce financially distressed firms to slip into sickness rather than to encourage 
their timely reconstruction and to reward good performers. In particular, sick units do 
not have to honor their debt contracts: they are exempted from debt repayment or 
other obligations, e.g. to suppliers, to the extent that the BIFR may suspend any existing 
obligations and liabilities for up to seven years. Outside experts are called on to help to 
work out a rehabilitation scheme, in which generous financial assistance usually plays a 
key role. For poorly performing firms, it might therefore pay to gamble in the hope of 
acquiring the status of sickness. This should be especially true for potentially sick or weak 
firms which do not appreciate the above privileges, but still face the same risk to be 
sent into liquidation (see sub-section 2.6.2).  
Section 6.1 starts with an inquiry into the effectiveness of the BIFR, the SICA’s main 
executive body. The most important finding is that SICA’s performance in tackling the 
problem of industrial sickness is disappointing, if not utterly woeful. We seek to 
understand why so few firms are eventually sent into liquidation. In particular, we ask, 
first, how employment considerations impinge on the BIFR’s recommendation (‘winding 
up’ vs. ‘rehabilitation’) and, second, how leverage affects a firm’s probability of 
qualifying for the rehabilitation process. Some sectoral evidence on employment, 
unionization and indebtedness will be presented, which motivates the theoretical 
model of section 6.2.  
This model takes account of the adverse incentives under SICA and approaches the 
incidence of sickness among firms as the result of conscious and rational behavior. The 
principal actor is a politician, who assists highly indebted firms with further government 
and DFI funds precisely in order to run them into sickness. The model predicts that both 
a firm’s probability of falling sick, and its provisioning with soft loans are: 
• increasing in its liquidation value 
• decreasing in the firm’s future economic potential (if it survives)  
• the higher, the greater the politician’s benefit from obtaining control (over the 
sick firm). 
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Conversely, the probability that a firm is run into sickness will be the lower, the higher the 
utility of the incumbent management to remain in control (of a sound firm). 
Section 6.3 tests the model’s predictions. To begin with, we estimate single-equation 
models of the incidence of sickness and the firm's provisioning with funds from the 
government and its development finance institutions. Subsequently, we take into 
account the simultaneous nature of failure and financial assistance, and specify a two-
equation model in which they are interdependent. As a by-product, we address the 
question of causality, i.e. whether industrial sickness may be viewed as the result of the 
law that was introduced to prevent it.  
6.1 Execution of the Sickness Law 
In the following, we evaluate the working of the BIFR, the institution in charge of 
implementing the law. We present some descriptive evidence supporting our main 
argument, namely, that the poor implementation of the law leaves wide scope for 
politicians to misuse their control rights over sick firms, especially by undertaking vote-
catching ‘rescue’ operations.  
6.1.1 Performance of the BFIR 
Table 6-1 lists the status of all companies that have ever been registered with the BIFR 
since the introduction of SICA in 1987. The second column lists the number of 
companies which registered with the BIFR in a given year, while the third column gives 
the cumulative figures. The BIFR’s jurisdiction over registered cases remains in force until 
the company is either considered as revived114 (column six) or fatally sick and sent for 
liquidation (column seven). Note that a winding-up recommendation does not 
necessarily entail actual liquidation; instead, ‘winding-up recommended’ merely 
indicates an intention.115 The BIFR may turn down a company’s ‘application’ for sickness 
status and dismiss it immediately if its net worth position has turned positive at the inquiry 
stage (column eight). Presumably, firms in this group are attracted by the various relief 
measures under SICA, but then fail to qualify for sickness status. If the BIFR considers an 
applicant not to be ‘fatally sick’ or if continuation of the firm is in the ‘public interest’, 
then a revival scheme is worked out (column five). The difference between the accu- 
                                                     
114) Interestingly, the BIFR classifies a company as revived if its net worth position has turned positive. A 
revived company may therefore still meet the SICA sickness criteria.  
115) Mathur (1993) has analyzed delays in liquidation for 1859 Indian firms: For 27 percent of the firms, winding-
up had been executed after 10-20 years, and for every third firm, actual liquidation took place only after at 
least 20 years had passed.     
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Table 6-1: Status of companies registered with the BIFR 
col. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Year No. of 
new cases 
Accum. 
cases 
No. of 
ben-
ches 
Cases 
under 
revival 
Revived 
cases 
Winding-up 
recom-
mended 
Dis- 
missed 
cases 
Total 
cases 
decided 
Pending 
cases 
1987 311 311 24 0 0 0 8 8 303 
1988 298 609 36 0 1 12 29 42 559 
1989 202 811 42 6 1 31 78 116 645 
1990 151 962 48 7 3 44 44 98 698 
1991 155 1,117 42 12 4 48 28 92 761 
1992 177 1,294 36 12 7 30 42 91 847 
1993 152 1,446 36 17 12 64 59 152 847 
1994 193 1,639 45 33 37 80 48 198 842 
1995 115 1,754 48 50 25 64 30 169 788 
1996 97 1,851 38 56 93 86 25 260 625 
1997 233 2,084 25 26 37 86 22 171 687 
1998 370 2,454 11 27 21 50 36 134 923 
1999 413 2,867 27 31 10 66 71 178 1,158 
2000 429 3,296 36 26 38 163 168 395 1,192 
Total  3,296 494 303 289 824 688 2,104 1,192 
Source: BIFR (2001) at http://www.bifr.nic.in/vsbifr/status.htm as on February 15th, 2001 and July 4th, 2001 
 
mulated number of registered cases (column three) and the accumulated number of 
cases decided by the BIFR in column 9 (which equals the sum of columns five to eight) 
constitutes the ‘pending cases’ category. Until the mid-1990s, we observe generally 
falling numbers of companies registering under SICA, with a  local peak in 1994, which 
was (arguably) due to the wider sickness definition in that year’s Amendment Act.116 In 
contrast, the 1991 Amendment Act, which brought public sector firms under the 
purview of SICA, seems not really to have affected the number of new cases. The late 
1990s saw steadily rising numbers of registered cases, starting in 1997.  
In the first 14 years of SICA's existence, 494 benches (tribunals) took place, i.e. an 
average of three sessions per month. If the sum of decisions taken by the Board in each 
year is related to the respective number of benches (column 9 divided by column 4), 
one finds that the effectiveness of the hearings has increased remarkably during the 14-
year period. When the first revival schemes were developed in 1989, SICA had been in 
force for more than two years, i.e. it took at least 60 tribunals to pass the first 6 schemes. 
                                                     
116) Prior to 1994, the law pertained only to companies which had been registered for at least seven years 
(rather than at least five years). Furthermore, accumulated losses equal to or exceeding the net worth 
position would not suffice to be declared sick; an additional criterion was that the respective firm had 
realized negative pre-depreciation profits for two or more consecutive years, including the current year.  
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In contrast, approximately 11 cases on average were decided per hearing in 2000. 
Even though the pace of BIFR decision-making has improved, it is still far from swift: By 
December 2000, approximately one out of three companies ever registered under SICA 
was a ‘pending case’. While pending cases cannot expect to receive direct transfers, 
they indirectly benefit from this status in as much as the suspension provisions under 
article 22 of the sickness law come fully into force. Although a winding-up 
recommendation is one of the possible outcomes when the decision is eventually 
taken, it is hardly an immediate threat in view of the time it takes the BIFR to reach this 
next decision, to say nothing of the delays in liquidation itself.  
Table 6-1 shows that only in 2000 were a considerable number of companies sent into 
liquidation. A similar number of cases were dismissed, so that comparatively few cases 
entered the revival process in this year. In all earlier years, however, a considerable 
fraction of cases was allowed to meander through rehabilitation schemes. By 2000, not 
even nine percent of registered firms had been successfully revived with the Board's 
help117 – and revival may not even be permanent. As of 31.12.2001, the number of 
survivors had dropped from 289 to 254, indicating that 35 firms had suffered a relapse.118 
If success rates are that low, what justifies the maintenance of an extensive 
bureaucracy that allocates public resources to evidently lost cases? A preliminary 
answer may come from Tables 6-2 and 6-3. 
6.1.2 The Role of Employment, Unionization and Indebtedness: Sectoral 
Evidence 
Table 6-2 classifies the 3,296 firms that have ever been registered with the BFIR until 
December 2000 by industries and gives the associated total employment as the sum of 
the reported levels of employment upon application (yearly figures on employment are 
not available). Firms are asked to give this information when making first application to 
the Board.119 We compare these figures with the 1993 employment data in the 
manufacturing sector available from the Statistical Abstract India (see Table 6-3; 1993 
marks the halfway point of the 1987-2000 period). What is most striking is that it is exactly 
the industries employing the greatest number of workers (viz. Textiles & Leather, Basic  
                                                     
117) Firms that fall into the ‘dismissed’ category have managed to recover without external help. 
118) Information from the BIFR’s homepage 
119) Nonetheless, nearly 10 percent of BIFR-registered firms did not follow this instruction. 
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Table 6-2: Employment data for BIFR-registered firms: cumulative position in 2000 
Industries Total no. of firms 
Accumulated 
employment 
Employment. 
share in total 
Food & Beverages 321 72,193 3.83 
Textile & Leather 620 671,242 35.62 
Wood & Paper 213 58,705 3.12 
Chemicals 332 80,434 4.27 
Rubber & Plastic 46 8,188 0.43 
Non-metallic mineral products 130 34,571 1.83 
Basic Metal & Metal Products 485 152,814 8.11 
Machinery 165 80,138 4.25 
Electronics 82 13,921 0.74 
Transport Equipment 50 31,213 1.66 
Other Manufacturing    
Miscellaneous 852a) 681,146 36.14 
Total 3,296 1,884,565 100.00 
Source: BIFR (2001) at http://www.bifr.nic.in/vsbifr/status.htm as on July 4th, 2001 
a) Of these, only 534 firms actually fall into the ‘miscellaneous’ class; for the remaining 318 firms, sector 
affiliation and accordingly ‘total cases’ are known, but no break-down is available as to the accumulated 
number of workers. 15 firms belong to Food & Beverages, 42 to Chemicals, 60 to Non-metallic Mineral 
Products, 22 to Electronics and, notably, 179 firms belong to the machinery sector.  
 
Metals & Metal Products and Food & Beverages120) which are the most frequently 
affected by sickness. To qualify this finding, the last column in Table 6-3 gives a measure 
of labor-intensity in 1993: the number of persons engaged divided by the value of net 
fixed assets and physical inventories. In order to facilitate inter-sectoral comparisons, we 
present this measure in index form, where the (L/K)-ratio of Food & Beverages, the 
highest, is set to 100. The leading sickness sector, viz. Textiles & Leather, is right behind, 
with 98.7. The Metal sector ranks number two in the absolute list of sickness cases, but its 
labor intensity is the lowest. This suggests that the BFIR-sample of sick Metal firms is 
characterized by small firms in employment terms, and that the comparatively high 
figure of accumulated factory employment in Table 6-2 rather results from the sheer 
number of factories in that sector. For Textiles, both arguments (sheer frequency and 
labor- intensity) apply, so that one out of three workers employed in a sick company 
was engaged in Textiles & Leather. 
                                                     
120) With 336 sick cases, Food & Beverages ranks number five behind Chemicals (374 cases) and Machinery 
(344 cases). See footnote to Table 6-2.  
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Table 6-3: 1993 employment data from the Annual Survey of Industriesa) 
Industry 
Total no. 
of factories 
Total factory 
employment 
Share in total 
manufacturing empl. 
Labor intensity 
index 
Food & Beverages 63,185 1,427,245 17.1 100 
Textile & Leather 26,564 2,065,828 24.8 98.7 
Wood & Paper 33,137 519,462 6.2 73.2 
Chemicals 9,748 333,896 4.0 24.4 
Rubber & Plastic 11,224 678,224 8.1 23.3 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 16,723 657,290 7.9 54.1 
Basic Metal & Metal Products 23,698 1,051,100 12.6 23.0 
Machinery 16,505 918,288 11.0 51.3 
Electronics 874 6,4404 0.8 38.5 
Transport Equipment 3,760 490,702 5.9 57.7 
Other Manufacturing 2,326 12,2947 1.5 52.8 
Total  207,744 8,329,386 100  
Source: CSO (ASI Summary Results for Factory Sector) 
a) Formal sector only. Figures relate to factories employing 20 workers or more. Factories employing at least 10 
workers are covered if manufacturing takes place with the aid of power.  
 
Table 6-4 reports the degree of unionization (as measured by both the number of 
workers’ trade unions and the number of union members per 100,000 employees) and 
average annual wages. 
Table 6-4: Sectoral union data  
 
 
Industry  
Number of 
workers’ trade 
unions per 
100,000 empl.a) 
Union members 
per 1,000 
employeesa) 
Average 
1993 earnings per 
employee 
in Rs.b) 
Food & Beverages 43 186 17,572 
Textile & Leather 42 174 26,399 
Wood & Paper 54 75 31,872 
Chemicals 53 120 46,492 
Rubber & Plastic 28 56 36,974 
Non-metallic Mineral Products 30 157 24,147 
Basic Metal & Metal Products 23 86 41,189 
Machinery c) 48 275 45,310 
Transport Equipment  14 88 45,610 
Other Manufacturing 76 309 34,600 
Total 38 154 33,343 
Sources: columns 2-3, Statistical Abstract India, 1999, tables 24.5 and 25.3; column 4, CSO: ASI - summary 
results for factory sector 
a) Figures only relate to unions which have been registered under the Indian Trade Unions Act; b) Calculated as 
(total emoluments/total employees); c) Also contains numbers for the electronic sector, for which no separate 
data on unionization are available. 
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While a high degree of unionization does not necessarily result in above-average wage 
rates, we do observe a strong positive correlation between the degree of unionization 
and the number of sick cases registered (see Figure 6-1).  
Figure 6-1: Unionization vs. sicknessa) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
a)T The correlation coefficient is + 0.54 but significant only at the 14% level 
 
The evidence at hand suggests that industrial sickness is not necessarily attributable to 
strong unions enforcing high wage rates. Instead, politicians seem to seek the support 
of a highly politicized working-class by securing employment. We shall argue that the 
presence of a self-confident working class undercuts the willingness to rationalize and 
retrench labor. In response, the management will put pressure on the government to 
soften the budget. Eventually, many such firms will fall sick – but sickness hardly ever 
entails winding-up. For instance, in 1992 there were 19,458 sick units in the cotton textile 
industry, but a mere 130 mills were closed in that year.121 Besides Textiles, the Food and 
Machinery sectors serve as prominent examples of this kind of opportunism. 
                                                     
121) Report on Currency and Finance 1992-93, table IV-25A 
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Finally, we try to provide some intuition for the practice of endlessly nursing sick units 
instead of sending them into liquidation. Goswami (1995 b, p. 128) and Hanson (2001) 
argue that the banks' desire to preserve a firm’s value would be the greater, the higher 
the level of leveraging and outstanding debt. They reason that this would be especially 
so if it was just the creditor with the largest exposure who was entrusted to design the 
rehabilitation plan – as is the case with many sick units which primarily rely on DFI-funds. 
In such a situation, the operating agency, or creditor, respectively, would presumably 
be tempted to pump in additional funds, in the hope that the subsequent turnaround 
would protect existing claims. 
Table 6-5: Outstanding bank credit and net worth deficit 
 ASI-Data BIFR-Data 
Industry 
Outstanding bank 
credit to factories 
in Rs. Crorea) 
Acc. Net worth  
deficit of sick firms 
 in Rs. Crore 
Number of 
sick units 
Net worth 
deficit per unit 
in Rs. crore  
Food & Beverages  8,380 1,674 336 4.98 
Textile & Leather 14,368 6,296 620 10.15 
Wood &Paper  3,953 708 213 3.32 
Chemicals 20,927 4,533 374 12.12 
Rubber & Plastic  5,147 218 46 4.74 
Non-Met. Mineral Prod. 5,615 790 190 4.16 
Basic Metal & Met. Prod. 29,640 2,785 485 5.74 
Machinery 6,932 2,629 344 7.64 
Electronics 2,351 481 104 4.62 
Transport 5,261 4,576 50 91.52 
Miscellaneous  641 534 1.20 
Other Manufacturing 983    
Total 103,557 25,332 3,296 7.69 
Sources: column 2: CSO: ASI Summary Results for Factory Sector; columns 3-5: BIFR (2001) at 
http://www.bifr.nic.in/vsbifr/status.htm as on July 4th; a) as on March 1993 
 
According to the ASI figures, which cover both sound and sick firms, outstanding bank 
credit is highest in the Metals sector, followed by Chemicals and Textile & Leather (see 
Table 6-5). In the latter two sectors, the average net worth deficit of BIFR-registered firms 
is comparatively high as well. This observation suggests that outstanding sectoral bank 
credit is large, not only due to the sheer number of firms within Chemicals and Textile & 
Leather, but also because the average indebtedness of (sick) firms within these sectors 
is high as well. According to the CMIE's evaluations, however, the share of public 
money locked up in sick units in 1993 was a low 3.3 percent in the chemical industry, in 
contrast to 19.7 percent in cotton industries and over 25 percent in Jute (CMIE, 1996). 
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Hence, in aggregate, the chemical sector does not fare too badly; but once chemical 
firms register as sick, they can be expected to be terminally ill.   
Based on these facts, we have tried to establish an argument as to why certain 
industries are more prone to fall into sickness. In particular, we hypothesize that 
politicians do not hesitate to intervene in order to ward off liquidation of even fatally 
sick companies as long as their workers are strongly organized and numerous enough 
or, if excessive leveraging rules out coverage of existing claims anyway, value-
preservation would possibly leave some scope for future debt repayment.  
We leave to section 6.3 the task of clarifying how leverage affects debt renegotiation in 
the BIFR, and whether the reorganization schemes approved by the BIFR are correctly 
designed in the first place, taking into account basic economic principles and 
incentive effects. The next section outlines a theoretical approach that takes these 
considerations explicitly into account. 
6.2 A Micro-Theoretical Approach to the ‘Economics of Sickness’ 
Wohlschlegel (2002) has recently developed a microeconomic analysis of sickness. A 
brief description will suffice here. He considers two periods and three agents: a 
manager, a private investor and a politician. The manager possesses some 
entrepreneurial abilities, but lacks the funds to finance the enterprise, while the private 
investor owns funds but lacks managerial skills. The politician can influence the disposal 
of public funds, which may be invested in the firm or elsewhere.  
At the start, the manager investigates potential forms of finance for his project and signs 
financial contracts with the private investor and/or politician accordingly. In period 
one, the project generates some random level of output drawn from the interval 
],[ 11 ππ . At the end of the first period, the firm either defaults - in which case it is 
regarded as sick - or meets all its debt repayment obligations. In Wohlschlegel’s model, 
default implies sickness, and sickness entails replacement of the incumbent 
management in favor of a government-controlled director. These assumptions are very 
strong. Recall the evidence from Table 5-1: the incidence of loan default is not only 
high among sick firms, but the repayment morale of sound firms is quite poor as well. 
Hence, default might be a necessary indicator for sickness to occur, but it is by no 
means a sufficient one.  
The director appointed by the government realizes some constant ‘2nd period output in 
sickness’, S; but the original manager would realize an output of either zero or 2π  in the 
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second period. The probability of realizing the high second-period outcome is assumed 
to be continuous and increasing in 1π . Wohlschlegel assumes that ),0(S 2π∈ . He 
derives equilibrium leverage levels in a bargaining game between the politician and 
the manager, in which the parties involved have diametrically opposed interests: 
Whereas the manager obtains the utility MB  only when he has continued control over 
a non-defaulting firm, the investor’s interest is focused exclusively on cash flow 
maximization. The politician, for his part, seeks to trade off the two objectives of high 
cash-flow on the one hand and the benefits PB  he would derive from controlling a sick 
firm on the other. Notice that the strategic conflict between the politician and the 
manager rests on the assumption that the incumbent management is replaced in case 
of default (sickness). There is, however, some evidence that management 
replacements are rather the exception than the rule. 122  
In the event of default, an investigation process is initiated with the aim of exploring the 
firm’s recovery potential. Since this process potentially culminates in a winding-up 
recommendation, and politicians are the only ones who can prevent liquidation, one 
can easily imagine politicians taking advantage of this situation. Hence, if a politician 
derives utility from (indirectly) controlling the affairs of the firm when it is sick, he will 
prefer to invest in precisely those projects which are ‘promising’ candidates for default, 
viz. highly leveraged firms. At the same time, the leverage level preferred by the 
politician, and thus the probability of sickness, will be the higher, the greater is the firm’s 
value in sickness, S, and the greater the politician’s benefits from obtaining control over 
the sick firm, PB . We will argue below that his benefits from control are increasing in the 
number of (potential) beneficiaries of his regency. On the other hand, the firm’s future 
economic potential when it is sound, namely 2π , reduces the probability that it will 
default in the present.  
A second proposition in Wohlschlegel (2002) states that the government’s stake in a firm 
is increasing in S and PB  and decreasing in 2π . The intuition is that the government, as 
a proxy for sitting politicians, seeks to control as many firms as possible but possesses 
only limited resources. Hence, available funds should be allocated in the most efficient 
manner, given the objectives in question. 
The manager is eager to avoid default because he fears dismissal in the case of 
sickness. The leverage preferred by the manager is therefore strictly smaller than that 
                                                     
122) Soni (1999), p. 8. 
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preferred by the politician. Wohlschlegel distinguishes between two different scenarios. 
If a project cannot be financed by private funds alone, so that government funds are 
essential, the politician has the power to dictate the terms of the firm’s debt contract, in 
accordance with his own utility-maximization. If, on the other hand, purely private 
financing is available, then the utility the manager would obtain if the firm was purely 
privately financed constitutes his threat point. Therefore, the leverage preferred by the 
manager, and thus the probability of sickness, will decrease with the size of the 
manager’s benefit from control, MB . 
There are two key features of the model. The first is a Shleifer-Vishny (1994) kind of 
argument: the politician benefits from controlling a sick firm, because only a politician-
manager would be in a position to enforce the ‘sacrifices in the public interest’ that 
prevent the firm from being sent into liquidation. Needless to say, concessions in the 
form of employment guarantees are at the same time vote-catching concessions that 
work in favor of the incumbent politician’s popularity and his chances of getting re-
elected. Second, since default implies sickness, sickness hinges entirely on the leverage 
level. Sickness is therefore ultimately a matter of accounting and does not necessarily 
reflect the economic value of the firm. In particular, firms can manipulate their health 
status by changing their capital structure.  
6.3 Econometric Approach 
We begin by fitting two different models: Proposition one on the optimal probability of a 
firm falling sick is tested by means of a panel probit model along the lines of sub-section 
5.1.2, where a “1” is assigned to the observation if the sickness criteria are met, and a 
zero otherwise. For Proposition two, on the optimal share of subsidized debt in total 
debt, we estimate a panel tobit model, since the provision of loans from governmental 
bodies or development finance institutions is censored at zero. In both models, the 
endogenous variable is regressed against ex ante firm characteristics in order to 
capture the model’s sequential structure. Second, it has been argued that the higher a 
sick firm’s amount of outstanding debt, the greater is the banks’ desire to preserve the 
firm’s value and pump in additional money. This is especially the case when the creditor 
with the largest claim is also the operating agency in charge of examining the 
company’s recovery potential. Such financing practice is grounded on the (often vain) 
hope of a subsequent turnaround (Goswami,1996b, p. 128 and footnote 32; Hanson, 
2001). Hence, once sick, companies that relied heavily on institutional finance can 
expect to extract fresh finance from old creditors. However, only if the government 
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provides these funds in excess will over-leveraging eventually lead to sickness. Since the 
key variables in this setting, viz. government debt and the probability of sickness, are 
both endogenous and mutually dependent, the well-known simultaneous model is in 
order:  
(6.1) 11
'
12121 uxyy +β+γ=  
(6.2) 22
'
21212 uxyy +β+γ= .  
In matrix notation the two-equation system is represented by 
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or compactly written, 
(6.4) uBxy '' +=Γ , 
where x  is the ]1K[ ×  vector of all the exogenous variables in 1x  and 2x  and B  
denotes the matrix of structural parameters belonging to it. 1x  includes KK1 <  
exogenous variables and 2x  includes KK2 <  exogenous variables such that 
K)KK()2K2( 21 ≥+≥− .123  
Whenever 1k xx ∉  )xx( 2k ∉ , the associated coefficient k1β  )( k2β  is set to zero. 
Multiplying eq. (6.4) by 1−Γ , we arrive at the reduced form equations, 
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123) This identifying condition means that the two sets of explanatory variables have to differ in respect of at 
least one exogenous regressor and that one set cannot be a perfect subset of the other.  
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Reduced-form coefficients take into account not only how 1x  ( 2x ) directly impinges 
on 1y  )y( 2 , but also that 2x  )x( 1  indirectly affects 1y  )y( 2  via 12γ  )( 21γ .  
The peculiarity of our specification is that one endogenous variable (the share of 
government loans in total loans) is censored at zero,124 while the other endogenous 
variable (the sickness probability) is modeled as dichotomous in nature.125 Let 1y  be the 
censored variable and 2y  be the binary variable. We specify  

 >=
otherwise0
0yifyy
*
1
*
1
1   and 
 >=
.otherwise0
0yif1y
*
2
2   
The reduced form of equation (6.5) now involves the latent variable *1y : 
(6.7) 1
'
1
*
1 vxy +π= . 
Second, when 2y  is binary, reduced form estimation of (6.6) only identifies the ratio 
( 22 /σπ ), where )v(Var 222 =σ .126 Therefore, we write (6.6) as  
(6.8) *2
'*
2
2
2
2
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2
2
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2**
2 vx
vxyy +π=σ+σ
π=σ≡ .  
The first step involves estimation of eq. (6.7) by tobit and estimation of eq. (6.8) by ML 
probit techniques. We store fitted values xˆyˆ '1
*
1 π=  and xˆyˆ '*2**2 π= , calculate the 
variance-covariance matrix of reduced form residuals, )vv(E '*21 , and extract the 
variance 21σ  and covariance )/( 212 σσ . 
For the second step, we recall that we have **22
*
2 yy σ=  (from (6.8)) and estimate the 
new structural form equations, where endogenous regressors have been replaced by 
their fitted values: 
(6.9) 11
'
1
**
2212
*
1 uxyˆy +β+σγ=   
and 
                                                     
124) In the estimation sample, there is no firm for which total borrowings equal loans from the government 
and from DFIs, that is, there are no cases of censoring at unity. 
125) A useful reference on this type of model is Maddala (1986, pp. 242 ff., ‘Model 5’) 
126) Strictly speaking, the left-hand side variable in (6.6) now becomes the latent variable  *2y  instead of 2y . 
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RE tobit estimation of (6.9) gives a vector of two-stage coefficients ),( '1212
'
1 βσγ=α  
and ML probit estimation of (6.10) gives a vector of two-stage coefficients 
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2 , . Standard errors for these two-stage estimates are derived by 
bootstrap-methods. For the sake of easier interpretation, we will not present the 
coefficients for the probit part, but rather the marginal effects and associated standard 
errors (see section 5.1.2). 
The main purpose of the present analysis is to test the predictions from the theoretical 
model. As a ‘by-product’, we also attempt to shed some light on the nature and 
direction of causality between the two endogenous variables SICAsick and GOVDEBT, 
the share of loans from the government and its financial institutions in total borrowings. 
Strictly speaking, Wohlschlegel’s theoretical model suggests an SUR-structure, i.e. 


 =σ
σ
=
.otherwise0
jiif
)vv(E 2
12
'*
j2i1 .  
In this case, the endogenous variables do not interact, but both equations would be 
influenced only by common factors which are not explicitly captured in x , so that 
I=Γ .  
For the recursive model, we would verify a clear direction of causality, e.g., 1y  depends 
only on 1x , while 2y  is directly affected by both 2x  and 1y , so that 1x  would 
indirectly impinge on 2y , too. Technically, all elements either beneath or above the 
main diagonal of Γ  would be equal to zero, Σ  would be a diagonal matrix, and the 
error terms of the two basic equations would be uncorrelated for each firm (‘con-
individual uncorrelation’).  
The simultaneous approach will be based on the 1999 cross-section, while single-
equation estimation uses the 1992-1999 panel. The different handling of the data rests 
upon their limitations: testing the simultaneous model requires the inclusion of (at least) 
one identifying variable per equation. For the government loan equation, the 
availability of this variable (viz. equity shares held by DFIs, government companies and 
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corporate bodies as percentage of total equity shares; see below) is confined to the 
most recent sample year.127 In principle, however, a simultaneous panel approach 
would follow along just the above lines. 
6.3.1 Empirical Specification 
The theoretical considerations in section 6.2 lead to two propositions, both of which rest 
on the basic assumption that highly leveraged, but profitable firms are generously 
supplied with government loans. The rationale behind this is that politicians want to 
push firms into financial distress in order to take over control once they have fallen into 
sickness. Since government funds are scarce, they will be spent on the most promising 
candidates for sickness, viz. on highly leveraged firms – ideally, also profitable ones. To 
test this basic assumption, both a proxy for financial distress, LEVERAGE, and profitability, 
MEANPROF, enter the soft loan equation. LEVERAGE is defined as the share of total 
borrowings in total liabilities as realized in the previous period, while MEANPROF is mean 
R.o.A. (pbdit divided by total assets) over the last three years.128 If the key idea of the 
model is correct, both LEVERAGE and MEANPROF should enter the government loans 
equation with a positive sign.  
The main message from the descriptive statistics in section 6.1 is that a sick firm is never 
closed down immediately: it takes a very long time until the BIFR recommends 
liquidation, even of fatally sick firms. Actual liquidation can take much longer. As long 
as the firm continues to operate, jobs are relatively safe. For government-controlled sick 
firms, politicians can therefore present themselves as the ones who preserve jobs. Since 
control over jobs and workers eventually means control over voters, we proxy PB , the 
politician’s benefit from control, by EMPLOYMENT, the one-year lagged number of 
employees scaled by total borrowings.129 From the theoretical model, we expect 
positive signs on EMPLOYMENT in both equations. 
Second, a firm’s ‘value in sickness’ contributes to the opportunity costs of reducing the 
firm’s probability of falling sick. Hence, the theory predicts that, in equilibrium, an 
                                                     
127) See PROWESS User’s Manual, Vol. II, section on equity holding pattern datafields (page 11) „The equity 
holding pattern is a point-in-time kind of information. In the PROWESS package such information is available 
for the latest available date.“ 
128) R.o.A. = return on assets; pbdit = profits before depreciation, interest and tax. See the glossary in 
Appendix A (chapter 8, Table A-1).  
129) Dividing by total borrowings is compelling, since the endogenous variable of the tobit model is scaled by 
total borrowings, too. Otherwise a negative relation between employment and the share of subsidized loans 
in total loans could result just because large firms with many workers in general dispose of higher balances.  
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increase in S raises this probability. In the empirical specification, S is measured by the 
firm’s LIQUIDATION VALUE, defined as the share of net fixed assets in total assets.  
A healthy firm’s future prospects are captured in the theoretical model by 2π , which 
contribute to the opportunity cost of increasing the firm’s probability of falling sick. 
Therefore, the manager, as the firm’s residual claimant, will be the more reluctant to 
increase the leverage of his firm the higher is 2π . From this argument, the theoretical 
model yields the result that good future prospects will reduce both the probability of 
sickness and the share of subsidized loans in total borrowings. We reason that 
(unobservable) future output is proxied best by a firm’s future growth potential which, in 
turn, is captured by observed growth rates in the most recent past. In the empirical 
analysis, the relevant regressor is AVERAGE GROWTH, the average period-to-period 
growth rate of sales over the last three years. 
In the equation for government loans, we include three further indicators of good future 
growth potential, namely, INTANGIBLE ASSETS (defined as the share of intangible assets 
in total assets), a dummy on R&D-activity, and MARKET DEBT (defined as the share of 
market debt in total debt). According to the theory, we should expect negative 
coefficients on all three; for those possessing good prospects will take advantage of 
their outside option and so refuse “excessive” government financing. 
Finally, proposition one states that the probability that a firm will fall sick is decreasing in 
BM, the manager’s private benefit from controlling the company’s affairs. We follow 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) in arguing that the manager’s position goes with a high 
reputation and desirable fringe benefits. In accordance with the empirical literature on 
the choice of capital structure, we reason that both of these rewards of office are 
increasing in firm size, so that the ‘large firm’ dummy is expected to enter the sickness 
regression with a negative sign. Size is measured by the official criteria that define 
monopolies and small-scale industries, respectively, as outlined in chapter 2.2.  
The panel probit model includes MEANPROF and RISK, defined as firm-specific standard 
deviations of R.o.A. over the last three years. Inclusion of these variables is justified on 
the grounds that unprofitable and highly risky projects considerably raise the chances 
of the firm falling into sickness, so we should control for them.  
At the same time, RISK serves as the identifying variable in the probit equation of the 
simultaneous system. Since loans from the government and DFIs are long-term in nature, 
volatile income streams in the most recent past are not expected to have any impact 
on access to such term finance. As for the identifying variable in the tobit part of the 
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simultaneous system, we employ EQGOVT, i.e. equity shares held by DFIs, government 
companies and corporate bodies as a percentage of total equity value. According to 
Wohlschlegel’s model, EQGOVT should not affect the probability of sickness, for if the 
state and its institutions already maintain a considerable stake in a company, it is 
useless (and in fact wasteful) intentionally to push the firm into sickness. On the other 
hand, Goswami (1996b, p. 128 and footnote 32) and Hanson (2001) point to the role of 
institutional credit suppliers in India, which often provide precisely those companies with 
loans in which the state maintains large shares. While this view would be supported by a 
positive coefficient on EQGOVT, the theoretical model in section 6.2 implies a negative 
or insignificant coefficient. The empirical results of the following section will show which 
of the two opposing hypotheses is supported by the data.  
In PROWESS, data on equity holding patterns is a point-in-time kind of information which 
is available for the most recent year only. Furthermore, information on these patterns is 
limited to companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE for short). For this 
reason, all estimation in this chapter is confined to the sample of Indian privately owned 
BSE-listed firms, and the relevant sample for the simultaneous system is further restricted 
to the 1999 cross-section.130  
Finally, industry affiliation and, in particular, a location dummy enter all regressions as 
heterogeneity controls, where the location dummy is set to one if the headquarters of 
the firm are located in a backward area. This dummy aims to capture the effect of 
India’s ideologically motivated practice of priority lending on the financial soundness of 
firms in backward regions.  
6.3.2 Discussion of the Results  
Table 6-6 presents the results from the panel tobit model, with which we estimate the 
supply of soft loans from the government or its development finance institutions. The key 
idea of the theoretical model is verified: access to such funds is preferentially given to 
financially distressed but profitable firms. Another of the model’s predictions is not borne 
out, however: it is not high-employment firms which mainly benefit from the provision of 
government funds. Instead, the share of such funds in total investment is higher, the 
lower is EMPLOYMENT, the coefficient on which is borderline significant. Furthermore, not  
                                                     
130) The sample is selective, but the selectivity criterion (firms listed at the BSE)  is immaterial to the research 
question. Tables 4-1 and 4-2 in Wohlschlegel (2002, p. 124 and  p. 126)  present the results for the single 
equation approach, which is based on the (nonselective) sample of some 2,500 privately held Indian 
manufacturing firms. Comparing these tables with their ’selective’ counterparts (Tables 6-6 and 6-7 in this 
study), we find no substantial changes in the results.  
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Table 6-6: Testing the basic model: soft loan determinants (panel estimates) a) 
  predicted 
sign 
Coefficient Marg. signif. level 
 Model Assumptions:    
 LEVERAGE(t-1) (+) 0.076 0.000 
 MEANPROF (+) 0.161 0.000 
 Testable Hypotheses:    
BP: EMPLOYMENT(t-1) (+) -0.017 0.085 
S: LIQUIDATION  VALUE (t-1) (+) 0.391 0.000 
2π : AVERAGE GROWTH (-) 0.002 0.649 
 INTANGIBLE ASSETS (t-1)  0.123 0.283 
 MARKET DEBT (t-1)  -0.240 0.000 
 Dummy for R&D-activity (t-1) (ref. group: no R&D) 0.001 0.892 
 Dummy for large firmsb)  0.011 0.152 
 Dummy for small firmsb)  -0.161 0.000 
 Backward-Dummy (ref. group: non.backward) 0.034 0.003 
Industry  Food & Beverages  -0.094 0.000 
Dummies Textile & Leather  0.010 0.605 
 Wood & Paper  -0.001 0.979 
(ref. industry: Chemicals  -0.001 0.969 
Rubber & Non-metallic Mineral products  0.032 0.154 
Plastic) Basic metal & Metal products  0.014 0.508 
 Machinery & Machine tools  -0.044 0.048 
 Electronics  -0.032 0.209 
 Transport Equipment  0.000 0.985 
 Miscellaneous  -0.064 0.174 
Year  1992  0.087 0.000 
Dummies 1993  0.078 0.000 
 1994  0.073 0.000 
(ref. Year: 1995  0.057 0.000 
1999) 1996  0.050 0.000 
 1997  0.032 0.000 
 1998  0.017 0.002 
 Constant  0.047 0.025 
Source: CMIE; own calculations 
a) Results from the tobit panel model. The dependent variable is the share of government and DFI loans in 
total loans. Number of firms: 1,916; Number of obs.: 8,300; 1,191 left-censored observations; Wald-Teststatistic: 
χ2(28) = 1,336.14; LogLikelihood: 1,258.88; b) Reference group: medium-sized firms. Size is measured by the 
criteria for SSI and MRTP firms. Small firms: gfa < Rs. 6 million until 1996 and gfa< Rs. 30 million since 1997. Large 
firms: gfa > Rs. 1 billion or gfa > Rs. 1 million and market share of at least 25 %. 
 
even the large-firm dummy has a statistically significant positive sign, i.e. there is no 
evidence that politicians direct the disbursement of generous subsidies wherever this 
enhances the chances of gaining influence over as many workers (and voters) as 
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possible.131 The descriptive statistics in section 6.1 suggest the following ranking with 
respect to the degree of political awareness amongst workers (i.e. unionization): 
Machinery, Food & Beverages, Textile & Leather, Non-metallic Mineral Products. But the 
coefficients on the first two are negative and significant; those on the latter pair are 
positive, but statistically insignificant. The reference case is Rubber & Plastic, which is the 
least unionized.  
It is possible, of course, that EMPLOYMENT is a poor proxy for BP, and that a more 
promising approach would be to use political variables in a narrower sense, such as the 
number of parties within states or turnout. In the spirit of Wohlschlegel’s model, one 
could argue that the government would be particularly eager to make funds available 
just before elections, when parties compete for votes and a high turnout indicates that 
people respond to political events. We did some research in this direction and 
screened data sources that were kindly provided by the Political Science Department 
of the South Asia Institute, Heidelberg. The problem is that elections are not held on an 
annual basis. To maintain the variation in time, it is hard to think of any such variable 
that would not be ultimately related to annual firm employment data, e.g. turnout of 
the last state assembly election multiplied by the number of employees as a proxy for 
political awareness. We constructed an index of workers’ political awareness by linking 
sectoral union data to firm employment. However, the resulting regressor, viz. the 
number of unionized workers within a firm, also entered the tobit equation with a 
negative sign.  
While a firm’s LIQUIDATION VALUE clearly has a positive sign, just as the theory predicts, 
the results for regressors which aim to capture the prospects of high future returns are 
mixed. The coefficient on AVERAGE GROWTH (π 2 ) itself is statistically insignificant. In 
other words, we cannot confirm the hypothesis that managers of promising projects 
avoid relying unduly on government funds, and thereby minimize the risk of sickness. 
However, MARKET DEBT is highly significant and enters with a negative sign. If it were the 
case that only firms with high growth potentials managed to attract private funds, then 
this result would be perfectly in line with the predictions from the theory.  
The remaining coefficients mirror India’s DFI-policy of the 1990s quite well:132 Firms 
located in remote areas rely more heavily on soft loans. The progression of the annual 
dummies (all highly significant) nicely reflects the steady decline in the disbursement of 
                                                     
131) Though size is defined in terms of gross fixed assets and not via employment, these two alternative size 
concepts are highly correlated in general.  
132) Recall section 2.5. 
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overall financial assistance. In particular, the small-scale industrial sector suffered 
especially heavy reductions in financial support from the mid-‘90s onwards, as 
indicated by the negative and highly significant coefficient on small firms. 
Table 6-7 reports results of the panel probit model, in which the firm’s probability of 
falling sick is regressed against its ex-ante characteristics. We present classical marginal 
effects with corresponding standard errors and z-values, and, for discrete regressors, the 
last column gives the change in the outcome probability when the dummy switches 
from zero to one. The first result is that, once again, there is no empirical support for the  
Table 6-7: Testing the basic model: the case of sickness (panel estimates) a) 
  predicted 
sign 
Marg. 
Eff. 
(classic) 
Std. Err. z-value Marg. Eff. 
(Dummy) 
Testable Hypotheses:     
BP: EMPLOYMENT(t-1) (+) -0.046 0.025 -1.851  
S: LIQUIDATION  VALUE (t-1) (+) 0.093 0.027 3.452  
2π : AVERAGE GROWTH (-) -0.012 0.005 -2.357  
BM: Dummy for large firmsb) (-) -0.048 0.014 -3.499 -0.042 
 Dummy for small firmsb)  -0.048 0.019 -2.506 -0.042 
 Backward-Dummy (ref.: non. back) 0.019 0.010 1.876 0.021 
 RISK  0.376 0.096 3.929  
 MEANPROF  -0.628 0.135 -4.656  
Industry Food & Beverages  0.033 0.019 1.711 0.031 
Dummies Textile & Leather  0.029 0.017 1.702 0.025 
 Wood & Paper  -0.003 0.024 -0.129 -0.002 
(reference Chemicals  0.013 0.017 0.772 0.010 
Industry Non-metallic Mineral products  0.055 0.022 2.513 0.058 
Rubber & Basic metal & Metal products  0.055 0.019 2.879 0.059 
Plastic) Machinery & Machine tools  0.000 0.018 -0.021 0.000 
 Electronics  0.024 0.021 1.170 0.021 
 Transport Equipment  0.013 0.022 0.610 0.011 
 Miscellaneous  -0.015 0.056 -0.260 -0.010 
Year  1992  -0.007 0.015 -0.459 -0.008 
Dummies 1993  -0.006 0.009 -0.682 -0.008 
 1994  -0.027 0.010 -2.682 -0.029 
(reference 1995  -0.039 0.011 -3.446 -0.039 
Year: 1996  -0.048 0.013 -3.875 -0.045 
1999) 1997  -0.018 0.008 -2.282 -0.020 
 1998  -0.010 0.007 -1.443 -0.011 
 Constant  -0.142 0.033 -4.366  
Source: CMIE; own calculations 
a) The dependent variable is observed health status as defined by the negative net worth criterion; Number 
of firms: 1,927; Number of obs.: 8,328; Wald-Teststatistic: χ2(25) = 496.08; LogLikelihood: -1525.43; b) Reference-
group: medium-sized firms. Size is measured by the criteria for SSI and MRTP firms. Small firms: gfa < Rs. 6 million 
until 1996 and gfa< Rs. 30 million since 1997. Large firms: gfa > Rs. 1 billion or gfa > Rs. 1 million and market 
share of at least 25 %. 
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model’s prediction concerning EMPLOYMENT. A one percent increase in EMPLOYMENT 
reduces the firm’s probability of falling sick by 0.046 percent, and the coefficient is 
significant at conventional levels. At the same time, three of the four most unionized 
sectors (Food & Beverages, Textile & Leather and Non-metallic Mineral Products) enter 
the regression with positive coefficients. This certainly confirms the positive bivariate 
correlation between the degree of unionization and the incidence of sick cases (Figure 
6-1). But since firms in these sectors did not manage to attract higher DFI-finance (Table 
6-6), with Food & Beverages even facing significantly lower provision, it seems highly 
questionable whether this finding on the sectoral dummies can be regarded as 
evidence in favor of the theoretical predictions.  
That said, all remaining coefficients are in agreement with Wohlschlegel’s theoretical 
results: A positive coefficient on LIQUIDATION VALUE supports the idea that politicians 
drive the ‘right’ firms into sickness, viz. firms which maintain a high value in sickness. Such 
a policy will indeed be hindered, however, if managers are keen to remain in control, 
which is presumably the case if the firm is large or high returns are expected in the near 
future. More specifically, a marginal effect as high as –0.042 implies that for large firms, 
the probability of falling sick is reduced by 4.2 percentage points in comparison with 
the reference group of medium-sized firms, and a one percent increase in AVERAGE 
GROWTH reduces the chances of sickness by 0.012 percent. Also, coefficients on RISK 
and MEANPROF have the expected signs, and both are highly significant. When profits 
are unstable and low, any firm will, of course, face a much higher chance of 
experiencing financial distress. While it is no surprise that industries in backward areas 
face a higher probability of sickness (plus 2.1 percentage points), the negative and 
significant coefficient on small firms clearly contradicts the notion that the incidence of 
industrial sickness was especially high in the SSI sector.133 Arguably, differences in the 
concept of sickness account for this counter-intuitive finding, for the sickness criteria 
that apply to SSI-firms are softer.134 Hence, it may very well be the case that small firms 
which met the less demanding SSI sickness criteria still realized positive net worth – in 
which case, they enter as “sound” in our setting.135  
                                                     
133) See, for example, Chattopadhyay (1995), chapter 2. See also the descriptive evidence in chapter 3 
(Tables 3-9 and 3-10).  
134) A small scale unit is declared sick if 50 percent or more of its peak net worth during the preceding four 
years has been eroded and if, in addition, there is a delay in payment of principal or interest in respect of any 
of its creditors for a period exceeding two and a half years. 
135) See section 3.1 for an extensive discussion of various sickness criteria, and when they coincide or conflict 
with each other.  
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Tables 9-10 and 9-11 in the Appendix to this chapter present cross-section estimates for 
the year 1999 when each equation is estimated independently. The changes in the 
results are minor. Things are different, however, if we estimate the 1999 cross-section 
simultaneously and allow for interdependence of the left hand-side variables (see 
Tables 6-8 and 6-9). The first thing to note is that both equations are clearly identified 
owing to the highly significant variables RISK in the sickness equation and EQGOVT in 
the soft loan equation. However, the positive sign on the latter again casts some doubt 
on the validity of Wohlschlegel’s model, in that it rather supports the view that the 
government backs its own holdings with additional funds.  
Table 6-8: Model extension: soft loan determinants (1999 cross-section) a) 
  predicted 
sign 
Coef. Std. Err. t-value 
 SICAsick (fitted value from 1st stage)  -0.033 0.023 -1.391 
 Model Assumptions:     
 LEVERAGE(t-1) (+) 0.351 0.110 3.202 
 MEANPROF (+) 0.278 0.233 1.189 
 Testable Hypotheses:     
BP: EMPLOYMENT(t-1) (+) -0.254 0.112 -2.278 
S: LIQUIDATION VALUE(t-1) (+) 0.573 0.049 11.797 
2π : AVERAGE GROWTH (-) -0.033 0.014 -2.415 
 EQGOVT (-) 0.001 0.000 2.038 
 INTANGIBLE ASSETS (t-1)  -0.051 0.274 -0.187 
 MARKET DEBT (t-1)  -0.354 0.057 -6.176 
 Dummy for R&D-activity (t-1)  0.011 0.017 0.628 
 Dummy for large firmsb)  0.011 0.021 0.524 
 Dummy for small firmsb)  -0.233 0.052 -4.480 
 Backward-Dummy  0.063 0.018 3.394 
Industry  Food & Beverages  -0.018 0.037 -0.475 
Dummies Textile & Leather  0.006 0.031 0.180 
 Wood & Paper  0.006 0.051 0.117 
 Chemicals  0.029 0.031 0.919 
 Non-met. Mineral products  0.043 0.044 0.994 
 Basic metal & Metal prod.  0.051 0.034 1.491 
 Machinery & Mach. tools  0.031 0.035 0.879 
 Electronics  0.002 0.039 0.043 
 Transport Equipment  0.082 0.038 2.175 
 Miscellaneous  -0.127 0.149 -0.852 
 Constant  -0.215   
Source: CMIE; own calculations 
a) The dependent variable is the share of government and DFI loans in total loans.; Number of firms: 1570; 327 
left-censored observations;  LR –Test: χ2(23) = 557.56; LogLikelihood: -375.15; b) Reference group: medium-sized 
firms. Size is measured by the criteria for SSI and MRTP firms. Small firms: gfa < Rs. 6 million until 1996 and gfa< 
Rs. 30 million since 1997. Large firms: gfa > Rs. 1 billion or gfa > Rs. 1 million and market share of at least 25 %. 
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With respect to the causal relationship between the probability of sickness and DFI-
finance, the evidence suggests that it runs in one direction. The higher the share of 
government loans in the firm’s total debt, the higher is its propensity to register sick (see 
Table 6.9). When evaluated at the mean, a one percent increase in GOTVTLOAN 
enhances the probability of sickness by no less than 0.858 percent. Once sick, however, 
the firm does not boost the proportion of government debt in its total borrowings. The 
relevant two-stage coefficient of the sickness-dummy in the tobit part of the system is 
far from statistically significant (see Table 6.8). These findings support the model’s key 
idea that politicians pump in money in order to induce over-leveraging, with the result 
that, eventually, the probability of default (sickness) would be increasing. Once the firm 
is declared sick and has come under the authority of the politician-manager, however, 
he would rather spend scarce resources on capturing other units.  
In keeping with the direction of this causal relation, the results on the remaining 
determinants of subsidized loans remain unaltered in qualitative terms. In quantitative 
terms, all covariates now exhibit somewhat greater coefficients (Table 6-8 in 
comparison with Table 6-6). Greater effects of the covariates are found, too, in the 
probit part of the simultaneous system (see Table 6-9 in comparison with Table 6-7). 
When soft-loan provisions and the probability of sickness are allowed to be 
interdependent, however, three out of four “determinants of sickness” (from theory) 
now switch signs. To begin with, we note that EMPLOYMENT has the anticipated, viz. 
positive, sign: marginal increases in the labor force raise the chances of falling sick by 
0.219 percent. The same applies to the dummy on SSI firms, which now enters positively 
(and significantly). However, the signs on LIQUIDATION VALUE and AVERAGE GROWTH 
reverse, too, an awkward finding for the theory. The same applies to firms in backward 
areas, which have distinctly lower failure risks than those in non-backward ones.  
We have already questioned the validity of Wohlschlegel’s model on the basis of the 
results when each equation is estimated separately. The model is unambiguously 
rejected by the simultaneous estimation approach.  
Why not question the latter econometric approach instead? The theoretical model 
may be rejected because it rests on assumptions that find no exact empirical 
counterpart. This refers to the claims that default implies sickness and that the manager 
of a sick company will invariably be replaced. More importantly, the theoretical model 
ignores the mechanics of BIFR decision-making, as outlined in Figure 2-4: if the BIFR 
considers a sick case not to be ‘terminally ill’ or if the continuation of a terminally ill 
company is in the ‘public interest’, then a revival scheme is worked out.  
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Table 6-9: Model extension: the case of sickness (1999 cross section)a) 
  Predicted 
sign 
Marg. 
Eff.c) 
Std. Err. z-value 
 Model Assumption:     
 GOVTLOAN  
(fitted value from 1st stage) 
 
(+) 
 
0.858 
 
1.288 
 
6.516 
 Testable Hypotheses:     
BP: EMPLOYMENT(t-1) (+) 0.219 0.455 4.707 
S:  LIQUIDATION VALUE (t-1) (+) -0.464 0.924 -4.912 
2π : AVERAGE GROWTH (-) 0.021 0.122 1.693 
BM: Dummy for large firmsb) (-) -0.030 0.157 -2.178 
 Dummy for small firmsb)  0.187 0.553 1.763 
 Backward-Dummy  -0.035 0.157 -2.758 
 RISK  0.897 1.618 5.427 
 MEANPROF  -1.271 1.389 -8.952 
Industry Food & Beverages  0.033 0.317 0.845 
Dummies Textile & Leather  0.033 0.292 0.967 
 Wood & Paper  -0.012 0.391 -0.339 
 Chemicals  -0.005 0.275 -0.167 
 Non-met. Mineral products  0.022 0.364 0.516 
 Basic metal & Metal products  -0.016 0.309 -0.576 
 Machinery & Machine tools  0.000 0.326 0.012 
 Electronics  0.001 0.362 0.020 
 Transport Equipment  -0.022 0.373 -0.687 
 Miscellaneous  -0.050 0.448 -3.707 
 Constant   0.272 -3.430 
Source: CMIE; own calculations 
a) The dependent variable is observed health status as defined by the negative net worth criterion; Number of 
firms: 1585; LR-Test: χ2(19) = 562.53; LogLikelihood: -327.53; b) Reference-group: medium-sized firms. Size is 
measured by the criteria for SSI and MRTP firms. Small firms: gfa < Rs. 6 million until 1996 and gfa< Rs. 30 million 
since 1997. Large firms: gfa > Rs. 1 billion or gfa > Rs. 1 million and market share of at least 25 %.; c) For 
continuous regressors classical marginal effects are displayed, while for discrete regressors we report the 
change in outcome probability when the respective dummy switches from zero to one. 
 
Implementation of the rehabilitation plan requires unanimous approval of all parties 
involved – including representatives of the sick company (management and workers). If 
the latter vote against the draft, it must be revised. In fact, the unanimous consent 
provision in SICA allows for endless to-ing and fro-ing, so that the notion that only 
politicians can prevent liquidation would be limited to terminally ill firms whose 
continuation is not ‘in the public interest’. But then, when it is not in the public interest to 
save the company: why should a politician who supposedly cared so much (or only) 
about the voting public make efforts to prevent liquidation?  
On the other hand, if the BIFR indeed recommends winding-up, its responsibility with 
respect to the sick company comes to an end, and the High Court takes over. The High 
Court works too inefficiently for the BIFR’s liquidation-recommendation to be more than 
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a distant threat. These considerations lead to serious doubts about the central place 
given to the politicians’ ‘benefit from control’, because either he cannot realize such 
benefits, or it is simply not the case that politicians are the only ones who can prevent 
liquidation. 
6.4 Conclusion  
This chapter has addressed the political economy of industrial sickness. In particular, we 
have tested a theoretical model developed for this purpose, whose core idea is that 
politicians benefit from, and accordingly pay for, sickness. Inference from single-
equation estimation mostly supports the model, except for its predictions regarding the 
politician’s benefit from controlling a sick firm. Wohlschlegel (2002, p. 128) concludes 
that these private benefits are hard to capture empirically and leaves it to “challenging 
future work” to find appropriate proxies other than variables based on employment. I 
am more skeptical. First, if the politician’s prime goal is to be re-elected, and only that, 
then he would attempt to rescue firms and secure employment as a means of 
increasing his popularity. In that case, not linking his private benefits to employment 
would cause the whole line of argument to break down.  
Second, let us focus on the estimates themselves and put the theory aside.136 First and 
foremost, the state backs its own property holdings with sufficient finance and adheres 
to its own stated principles of priority-sector banking. Accordingly, soft loans are 
channeled to firms located in remote areas. These firms are typically small scale in terms 
of employment. Firms eligible for financing at market conditions are regarded as 
residual claimants and attract lower shares of soft finance. LEVERAGE, defined as total 
borrowings (stocks) divided by total liabilities, includes soft loans, so that a positive 
coefficient reflects persistence in the dependency on such subsidized loan schemes. 
Controlling for these banking principles, government and DFI loans are increasing in the 
collateral a firm can offer, which explains why a firm’s profitability and its liquidation 
value enter the soft loan equation with a positive sign.  
Third, since the model allows the provision of soft loans to increase the probability that 
the firm will fall sick, it would be straightforward to include the soft-loan variable in the 
sickness equation. Proceeding in this way and allowing the left hand-side variables to 
be interdependent, we find a clear direction of causality between the variables 
GOVTLOAN and SICAsick, viz. from the former to the latter, but not vice versa. While the 
                                                     
136) The following bears on the results in Tables 6-6 and 6-8. 
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results from the subsidized loan equation remain more or less stable (see Table 6-8 in 
comparison with Table 6-6), the findings from the probit (sickness) part are totally 
different, which accords once more with intuition (see Table 6-9 in comparison with 
Table 6-7). Endogenizing the provision of soft loans results in changes in signs because 
dependence on state financial assistance and sickness are highly related phenomena, 
which depend to a large degree on the same covariates. Given that excessive 
dependence on soft-loans develops before sickness, it follows that high-employment 
firms face a considerably higher risk of sickness precisely because government funds 
have been preferentially directed to low-employment firms. Similarly, firms with a high 
LIQUIDATION VALUE and low growth potential also qualify for government and DFI 
funds. Controlling for these selection criteria, these types of firms would face a lower risk 
of sickness, as would firms in backward areas.  
We conclude that the sickness law certainly provides several ways for the firm’s 
stakeholders to find advantages in sickness and thereby to get rid of their financial 
responsibilities. Wohlschlegel’s model is original, but not especially convincing in the 
empirical context analyzed here.  
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6.5 Appendix to chapter 6 
Table 6-10: Testing the basic model: soft loan determinants (1999 cross-section)a) 
  predicted 
sign 
Coefficient Marg. signif. level 
 Model Assumption:    
 LEVERAGE(t-1) (+) 0.221 0.000 
 MEANPROF (+) 0.576 0.000 
 Testable Hypotheses:    
BP: EMPLOYMENT(t-1) (+) -0.284 0.002 
S: LIQUIDATION  VALUE(t-1) (+) 0.573 0.000 
2π : AVERAGE GROWTH (-) -0.034 0.003 
 EQGOVT (-) 0.001 0.053 
 INTANGIBLE ASSETS (t-1)  0.002 0.992 
 MARKET DEBT (t-1)  -0.353 0.000 
 Dummy for R&D-activity (t-1)  0.016 0.360 
 Dummy for large firmsb)  0.027 0.148 
 Dummy for small firmsb)  -0.219 0.000 
 Backward-Dummy  0.060 0.001 
Industry  Food & Beverages  -0.020 0.558 
Dummies Textile & Leather  -0.002 0.954 
 Wood & Paper  0.008 0.851 
 Chemicals  0.020 0.477 
 Non-met. Mineral products  0.024 0.524 
 Basic metal & Metal prod.  0.041 0.182 
 Machinery & Mach. tools  0.023 0.473 
 Electronics  -0.002 0.954 
 Transport Equipment  0.065 0.077 
 Miscellaneous  -0.055 0.537 
 Constant  -0.136 0.000 
Source: CMIE; own calculations 
a) The dependent variable is the share of government and DFI loans in total loans; Number of firms: 1570; 327 
left-censored observations;  LR –Test: χ2(22) = 553.85; LogLikelihood: -377.01; b) Reference group: medium-sized 
firms. Size is measured by the criteria for SSI and MRTP firms. Small firms: gfa < Rs. 6 million until 1996 and gfa< 
Rs. 30 million since 1997. Large firms: gfa > Rs. 1 billion or gfa > Rs. 1 million and market share of at least 25 %. 
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Table 6-11: Testing the basic model: the case of sickness (1999 cross-section)a) 
  predicted 
sign 
Marginal 
Effectsc) 
Marg. signific. 
level 
 Testable Hypotheses:    
BP: EMPLOYMENT(t-1) (+) -0.124 0.211 
S LIQUIDATION VALUE (t-1) (+) 0.085 0.017 
2π : AVERAGE GROWTH (-) -0.009 0.320 
BM: Dummy for large firmsb) (-) -0.026 0.087 
 Dummy for small firmsb)  -0.061 0.001 
 Backward-Dummy  0.017 0.304 
 RISK  0.978 0.000 
 MEANPROF  -1.013 0.000 
Industry Food & Beverages  0.047 0.216 
Dummies Textile & Leather  0.065 0.058 
 Wood & Paper  -0.005 0.903 
 Chemicals  0.034 0.284 
 Non-met. Mineral products  0.091 0.051 
 Basic metal & Metal products  0.063 0.090 
 Machinery & Machine tools  0.045 0.230 
 Electronics  0.020 0.621 
 Transport Equipment  0.068 0.185 
 Miscellaneous  -0.062 0.315 
Source: CMIE; own calculations 
a) The dependent variable is observed health status as defined by the negative net worth criterion; Number of 
firms: 1585; LR-Test: χ2(18) = 482.39; LogLikelihood: -367.32; b) Reference-group: medium-sized firms. Size is 
measured by the criteria for SSI and MRTP firms. Small firms: gfa < Rs. 6 million until 1996 and gfa< Rs. 30 million 
since 1997. Large firms: gfa > Rs. 1 billion or gfa > Rs. 1 million and market share of at least 25 %.; c) For 
continuous regressors classical marginal effects are displayed, while for discrete regressors we report the 
change in outcome probability when the respective dummy switches from zero to one. 
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7 What Has Been Learned and what Directions Should Future Work 
Take? 
This thesis deals with the phenomenon of industrial sickness in Indian manufacturing. So 
far, very few studies have explored this phenomenon in an empirically rigorous way. 
Based on a rich panel data set of some 4,400 manufacturing companies covering the 
1988-1999 period, this thesis attempts such an analysis by looking at the problem from 
three different angles.  
First, the descriptive evidence presented in chapter 3 assembles the elements of the 
picture. We investigated the temporal patterns of sickness for various industries; we 
identified sectors that are particularly prone to sickness, analyzed firm-wise patterns of 
sickness and evaluated the risk of sickness by age-class, size-class and by form of 
ownership. We compared sick and sound firms with respect to key variables which bear 
upon their health status. In doing so, state-of-the-art methods of analyzing sickness were 
applied to firm-level panel data. The possibilities of disaggregation over units and time 
dimension have been fully exploited. The resulting improvements are substantial, but in 
the end they are attributable to the data.  
It is well-known that any bivariate empirical exercise may readily lead to fake 
interpretation. The merits of econometric approaches are that they allow one to 
evaluate the impact of any hypothetical determinant of, say, sickness, while controlling 
for other potential factors. Subsequent chapters therefore follow the multivariate route, 
and in this spirit, two approaches are pursued. The first (in chapter 5) is inherently 
empirical in nature, the second (in chapter 6) is model-based.  
Industrial sickness increased in the 1990s and, at the same time, a wide deregulation 
process was also initiated. This is the starting point of chapter 5, which frames the 
problem of industrial sickness in the broader context of analyses of productive 
efficiency. Low levels of pre-reform efficiency were found to be the key determinant of 
sickness. Controlling for this apparent driver, the natural candidates for sickness still 
perform as (badly as) expected from the bivariate analyses. For instance, a high 
dependency on state subsidies promotes later failure, public sector firms still face a very 
high risk of sickness, as do firms that are located in remote areas. Efficiency, in turn, is 
been found to be negatively affected by policies that restrict competition, both in 
output and input markets. Admittedly, the established link between (former) policies of 
erecting barriers to entry and the subsequent rise of industrial sickness is a fragile one. 
When revising the thesis, I thought of renaming the corresponding section 5.2 as “A 
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Quick Look into the Relationship Between Market Structure, Efficiency and Re-Emerging 
Sickness”. But since the first subsection therein is already titled as “A Quick Inquiry…” 
and writing the whole chapter – including the preliminary work later shifted to 
chapter 4 – was anything but a quick job, I decided to leave the critical appraisal to 
the thesis committee. In fact, I would highly appreciate suggestions as to how to model 
this relationship more rigorously. I have challenging future work to do in this field. Though 
the geographical focus is on the EU member states, I suppose that the channels 
through which deregulation in product-markets affects macroeconomic performance 
(through increasing competition, through its impact on exit and entry, and on 
innovation activities) are fundamental enough to allow for some generalizations.  
As for the soft budget argument, Chapter 5 strongly suggests that the provision of 
assistance results in inefficiencies at the firm level, making the recipients more prone to 
the risk of sickness. This is especially true when the business climate is getting tougher, 
subsidies are withdrawn from former beneficiaries, and new entrants challenge the 
incumbents with keen competition. Using the vocabulary of Rodrik and Subramanian 
(2004), the conclusion is that industrial sickness results from a policy shift in the 1990s, 
which changed the “pro-business” economic environment of the 1980s into a “pro-
market” environment. To put it the other way round: in spite of comparatively low 
sickness rates in the pre-reform years, the causes of the disease were arguably 
prevalent long before and the real extent of the problem was actually revealed in the 
later period. Economic consultants would conclude that greater exposure to 
competition forces companies drastically to restructure their ways of doing business, 
and to the extent that firms are incapable of adapting, adjustment should come in 
form of the exit of sick units.  
Apparently, however, the reforms were insufficiently radical; for it is otherwise 
incomprehensible why soft loans continued to be granted, even though such measures 
drive firms into sickness. There is a clear intuition for such gradualism: it is hard to solve 
the sickness problem in a rigorous manner when large sections of the employees are 
inadequately insured against unemployment and the chances of comparable 
employment in other sectors are not that great. Intuitively, this makes sense; but doing 
applied work, I would be told more than once, ”No estimation without theory!“.  
For this reason I was glad that my good friend and former colleague Ansgar 
Wohlschlegel worked out a theoretical model that motivates why there might be a 
generous supply of soft loans to vulnerable firms when employment considerations are 
important to politicians. (Actually they do not care for labor per se, but for the votes of 
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the working class). The model establishes a rationale for the government’s decisions 
since, in the end, the provision of such loans is in its sphere of influence. Politicians, who 
can replace the incumbent management of a sick company, benefit from control, and 
these benefits are high enough that – if certain conditions are met – it is worthwhile to 
provide soft finance in order to increase the risk of sickness. It is certainly nice to have 
such a model. But, unfortunately, this model proved to be not really suitable to undergo 
an empirical test. In particular, what are the politician’s ultimate ‘benefits from control’? 
If the mapping of the model’s variables to measurable variables leaves too much room 
for free association, then it is hard to understand the value added by the theoretical 
model. Being a brutal empiricist, I ask: what is the point of setting up a model if its 
predictions cannot be falsified due to data limitations? I accept that deriving pleasure 
from building models is enough reason to build them. But the assumptions must be very 
carefully specified to maintain a link with real-world phenomena if that is what we are 
interested in. If so, it is essential to dig into the “stylized facts” data section and to take a 
close look at the economic environment. Is the chance that the manager of a sick firm 
is replaced by a government official more than a distant threat? Is the politician-
manager really the only one who can prevent liquidation of a sick unit and who can 
thereby save jobs? If he was in fact that powerful, would such rescue-actions reward 
him with greater popularity on such a scale as to get re-elected? 
In my view, the theoretical model is rejected by the data. None the less, its key idea 
remains valid, viz. that the sickness law leaves much room for manipulation by defining 
sickness in terms of a particular capital structure. I think it would be more promising to 
rationalize the firm’s (as opposed to the government’s) decision given the existence of 
soft loans and the toothless sickness law. For example, it would be interesting to 
confront the temporal evolution of debt-profiles with the dividend payouts prior to an 
application for the status of sickness and then to analyze whether the peculiar Indian 
legislation has resulted in a kind of self-service mentality on the part of entrepreneurs 
who keep profit as their private property, but “socialize” their losses. The working title of 
this project would be “Investment in India – how to beat the system”. 
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8 Appendix 
A Concepts & Definitions 
Table A-1: Glossary (in alphabetical order) 
Item Definition 
Break-Even 
Sales 
= 100 * fixed cost / profit volume ratio = fixed cost /(contribution/sales) 
Capital 
Employed 
= net worth + long term borrowing 
Cash Profit = profit after tax + (direct) tax + amortization 
Combined 
Leverage 
= contribution/pbt (n.n.r.t.) 
Contribution (= producer surplus) = sales – variable cost  
Contribution to 
Fixed Cost 
= 100 * contribution / fixed cost 
Crore Indian unit of measurement. 1 crore equals 10 million 
Current Assets = (marketable securities – marketable securities in group companies) 
+ inventories + cash & bank balance – application money 
+ (receivables – receivables from group and other companies) 
Current Ratio = current assets / current liabilities & provisions 
Debt Service 
Coverage Ratio 
= (amount of income left for covering debt repayment in each 
year)/(past and current debt including interest on these) 
Debt-Equity 
Ratio 
= total liabilities of a firm divided by total shareholder equity (OECD 
definition) 
Depreciation 
Rate 
= depreciation/gross fixed assets  
Financial 
Leverage 
= profit before interest and tax (n.n.r.t.)/profit before tax (n.n.r.t.) 
Financial 
Leverage 
= (total debt/equity) 
Fixed Cost = (repairs & maintenance – repairs to plant and machinery) + other 
expenses + depreciation + interest on short term loans + lease rent + 
foreign exchange loss + bad debts + amortization + 0.3*(wages & 
salaries) 
Gross Value 
Added 
= profit before depreciation, interest and tax (n.n.r.t.) + wages + lease 
(and other) rent 
Holding Period  (=Number of days) = Average statement/daily statement. Example: 
average stock of w.i.p./average daily cost of production 
Internal Sources 
of Funds 
= retained profit + depreciation 
Interest 
Coverage 
= (profit before interest and tax (n.n.r.t.) / (interest payments + interest 
capitalized)  
Interest 
Incidence 
= (interest payments + interest capitalized ) / average borrowings 
Investment 
Income 
= interest earned + dividend received  
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Table A-1 continued  
Item Definition 
Lakh Indian unit of measurement. 1 lakh equals 100,000 
Leverage = amount of long term debt relative to equity (OECD-definition) 
Long-term 
Borrowing 
= total borrowings – short term bank borrowings – commercial papers 
Margin of Safety = sales – (break-even-sales) 
Market Debt = debentures (= bonds) + fixed deposits 
net Debt-to-
Capital 
= (total debt – cash reserves)/(debt + equity) 
n.n.r.t. = net of non-recurring transactions  
= extraordinary expense – extraordinary income 
Net Sales gross sales – indirect taxes 
Net Value 
Added 
= gross value added – depreciation 
Net Worth = share capital + reserves & surplus – revaluation reserves – misc. 
expenditures not written off 
non-performing 
assets 
repayment defaults for four quarters 
Operating 
Income 
= gross sales (synonymously) 
Operating 
Leverage 
= contribution / profit before interest and tax (n.n.r.t.) 
Operating Profit = sales – variable cost – fixed cost 
Other Income = dividends receipts + interest earned + rent received + other misc. 
income 
Profit-Volume 
Ratio 
= 0, if contribution < 0 and 
100 * (contribution/sales), if contribution ≥ 0 
Retained Profit = profit after tax – dividends 
Return on Assets = profit before interest, depreciation and tax / total assets 
Return on 
Income 
= profit before interest, depreciation and tax / total income 
Share Capital = equity capital + preference capital 
Solvency Ratio  
Total Income = operating income + other income 
+ change in stocks of finished and semi-finished goods 
Total Liabilities = net worth + total borrowings + current liabilities & provisions 
unit = factory 
Value Added See gross value added, and net value added, respectively 
Value of Output = gross sales – indirect taxes + change in stocks of finished & semi-
finished goods 
Variable Cost = total raw material expenses – change in stocks of finished and semi-
finished goods + energy + indirect taxes + 0.7*(wages & salaries) + 
repairs to plant and machinery + other operating expenses + 
advertising + marketing + distribution 
Working Capital = current assets - current liabilities & provisions 
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Table A-2: List of abbreviations 
ASI  Annual Survey of Industries. 
BIFR  Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction 
BSE Bombay Stock Exchange 
CMIE  Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy 
CSO  Central Statistical Organisation 
DFIs  Development Finance Institutions 
Exim 
Bank 
Export-Import Bank of India 
FDI  Foreign Direct Investment 
FERA  Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973 
FIPB  Foreign Investment Promotion Board 
GFCF Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
ICICI  Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India 
IDBI  Industrial Development Bank of India 
IDRA  Industries (Development and Regulation Act), 1951 
IFCI  Industrial Finance Corporation of India 
IGIDR  Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research  
IIBI  Industrial Investment Bank of India 
IRBI  Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India 
MRTP  Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1970 
NEP  New Economic Policy 
OA  Operating Agency 
RBI  Reserve Bank of India 
Rs Rupees 
SFCs  State Financial Corporations 
SICA  Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 1985 
SIDBI  Small Industries Development Bank of India 
SSI  Small scale industries  
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Table A-3: Scheme of income-expenditure account of Indian manufacturing firms 
INCOME EXPENDITURE 
Sales  Raw Materials, Stores, etc. 
 Manufacturing  Raw Materials, Stores, etc. 
 Trading   Stores & Spares 
 Fiscal Benefits  Packaging Expenses 
 Internal Transfers  Purchase of Finished Goods 
 Others Wages & Salaries 
Other Income Energy (Power & Fuel) 
 Dividend Received Other Manufacturing Expenses 
 Interest earned Indirect Taxes 
 Miscellaneous Income  Excise Duties 
Change in Stocks  Repairs & Maintenance 
 Finished Goods  Plant & Machinery 
 Semi-finished goods  Other Repairs 
Non-recurring Income Selling & Distribution Expenses 
 Gain on Sale of Assets    Advertising  
 Gain on Sale of Investment  Marketing 
 Provisions written back  Distribution 
 Others Provision for doubtful/bad debts 
  Amortization 
  Miscellaneous Expenses 
  Non-recurring Expenses 
   Loss on sale of Assets 
   Loss on Sale of Investment 
   Others 
  Less: Expenses Capitalized 
   Interest Capitalized 
= PBDIT   
- Interest  
 on short term loans 
 on long term loans 
- Lease Rent  
= PBDT   
- Depreciation  
= PBT   
- Tax Provision  
 Corporate Tax 
 Other Direct Taxes 
= PAT   
   
 
Appropriation of Profit 
 
Dividends  
 Equity Dividends 
 Preference Dividends 
Retained Earnings  
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Table A-4: Stylized scheme of balance account 
 
Fixed Assets
Intangible Assets
Current Assets =
   Inventories
+ Receivables
+ Cash
Investment
Equity
+ Reserves
Long-term
Short-term
Debt
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Table A-5: Scheme of balance sheet of Indian manufacturing firms 
ASSETS    LIABILITIES 
Gross Fixed Assets Net Worth 
 Land & Building  Share Capital 
 Plant & Machinery  Equity Capital 
 Other Fixed Assets  Preference Capital 
 Capital Work-in-Progress   
Less: Cumulative Depreciation  Reserves & Surplus 
Net Fixed Assets  Free Reserves 
  Share Premium Reserves 
Investments  Other Free Reserves 
 In Group/Associate Companies  Specific Reserves 
 In Mutual Funds  Revaluation Reserves 
 Other Investments  Other Specific Reserves 
  
Inventories Total Borrowings 
Raw Materials & Stores  Bank Borrowings 
 Raw Materials  Short Term 
 Stores & Spares  Long Term 
 Finished and Semi-finished Goods  Loans from Indian development 
institutions 
 Finished Goods  Loans from Government 
 Semi-finished Goods  Debentures/Bonds 
 Hired Stock  Fixed Deposits 
 Stock of Shares/Securities  Foreign Borrowings 
 Other Stock  Loans from Corporate Bodies  
  Group/Associate Companies 
  Other Companies 
  Commercial Paper 
  Other Borrowings 
Receivables  
 Sundry Debtors Current Liabilities & Provisions 
 Debtors exceeding 6 Months  Current Liabilities & Provisions 
Accrued Income  Sundry Creditors 
Advances/Loans to Corporate Bodies  Interest Accrued/Due 
 Group/Ass. Companies  Share Application Money 
 Other Companies  Other Current Liabilities 
Deposits with Govt./Agencies  Provisions 
Advance Payment of Tax  Tax Provision 
Other Receivables  Dividend Provision 
  Other Provisions 
Cash & Bank Balance   
 Cash in Hand   
 Bank Balance   
  
Intangible/misc. assets not written off   
 Intangible Assets (Goodwill, etc.)  
 Miscellaneous Expenses not written off   
TOTAL ASSETS                                                      =           TOTAL LIABILITIES   
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Table A-6: Sources of funds - stylized scheme 
 
Internal Sources
B orrow ings
E xternal Sources
E quity
D ebt
C apital M arkets
 
 
Table A-7: Sources of funds - detailed scheme 
 
Internal Sources 
 Retained Profit 
 Depreciation 
External Sources 
 Capital Markets 
  Equity 
   ∆Share Capital 
   ∆Share Premium Res. 
  Debt 
   ∆Debentures 
   ∆Fixed Deposits 
 Borrowings 
  ∆Bank Borrowings 
  ∆Financial Institutions 
  ∆Government Loans 
  ∆Foreign Loans 
  ∆Loans from Corporate Bodies 
  ∆Commercial Papers 
  ∆Others 
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B Construction of variables from PROWESS database 
B-1 Qualitative Variables 
Table B-1: Re-classification of industry affiliation at the 3-digit level and wholesale-price 
deflators used 
 
Product name 
Starting with CMIE 
product-code 
WPI-deflat. 
useda 
A) Food Products   
Vegetable oils  40,200,000,000 III-A-i 
Vanaspati 40,300,000,000 III-A-i 
Oil cakes & animal feed  40,603,000,000 III-A-j 
Marine foods  50,100,000,000 III-A-c 
Dairy products  50,400,000,000 III-A-a 
Sugar  50,501,000,000 III-A-f 
Cocoa products & confectionery  50,602,000,000 III-A-h 
Bakery & milling products  50,701,000,000 III-A-e 
Food processing  50,900,000,000 III-A 
Starches 51,000,000,000 III-A-l 
Food processing  51,100,000,000 III-A 
B) Beverages, Tobacco & Tobacco Products   
Beer & Liquors 51,400,000,000 III-B-b 
Tobacco products  51,500,000,000 III-B-d 
C) Textiles   
Silk textiles  60,100,000,000 III-C-b 
Woolen textiles  60,200,000,000 III-C-c 
Cotton textiles 60,300,000,000 III-C-a 
Jute products  60,400,000,000 III-C-d 
Synthetic yarn  60,500,000,000 III-C-b 
Manufacture of readymade garments and misc. 
textiles  
60,700,000,000 III-C 
Misc. textiles  69,900,000,000 III-C 
F) Leather & Leather Products   
Other leather products  70,000,000,000 III-F 
Footwear  70,600,000,000 III-F 
D) Wood & Wood Products   
Wood  80,100,000,000 III-D 
E) Paper & Paper Products   
Paper & Paper Products 90,100,000,000 III-E-a 
Books & newspapers  90,300,000,000 III-E-c 
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Table B-1 (continued) 
 
Product name 
Starting with CMIE 
product-code 
WPI-deflat. 
useda 
H) Chemical & Chemical Products   
Inorganic chemicals  100,100,000,000 III-H-a 
Organic chemicals  100,200,000,000 III-H-b 
Drugs & pharmaceuticals  100,300,000,000 III-H-f 
Fertilizers 100,400,000,000 III-H-c-1 
Pesticides  100,500,000,000 III-H-c-2 
Dyes & pigments  100,600,000,000 III-H-e 
Paints & varnishes  100,605,000,000 III-H-d 
Cosmetics & toiletries  100,700,000,000 III-H-g 
Soaps & detergents  100,800,000,000 III-H-g-1 
Misc. chemicals  100,900,000,000 III-H 
Explosives  101,000,000,000 III-H-i 
Photographic films  101,100,000,000 III-H 
Misc. chemicals  101,300,000,000 III-H 
G) Rubber & Plastic Products   
Primary plastic: thermoplastics, plastic resins and others 110,100,000,000 III-G-b 
Plastic products: plastic tubes & pipes, plastic sheets, 
films, packaging goods and other plastic product 
110,200,000,000 III-G-b 
Rubber & rubber prod.: tyres & tubes & other rubber 
prod. 
110,300,000,000 III-G-a 
I) Non-Metallic Mineral Products   
Cement  120,101,000,000 III-I-c-1 
Cement & asbestos products  120,102,000,000 III-I-e 
Abrasives and others graphite products 120,105,000,000 III-I-e 
Structural clay products: refractories, ceramic tiles 120,200,000,000 III-I-a 
Glass & glassware  120,300,000,000 III-I-b 
Gems & jewellery  120,400,000,000 III-I-b 
J) Basic Metals, Alloys & Metal Products   
Iron: pig iron, sponge iron 130,101,010,000 III-J-a-1 
Ferro alloys  130,101,030,000 III-J-a-4 
Steel: finished steel, stainless steel 130,102, 000,000 III-J-a-1 
Castings & forgings  130,106,000,000 III-J-a-2 
Steel tubes & pipes  130,106,040,000 III-J-a-3 
Structurals  130,106,060,000 III-J-a-2 
Metal tanks & fabrications  130,106,070,000 III-J-c 
Steel wires  130,106,100,000 III-J-a-3 
Other basic metal products  130,106,110,000 III-J-a 
Non-ferrous metals  130,200,000,000 III-J-b 
Aluminum & Aluminum Products 130,400,000,000 III-J-b-1 
Other non-ferrous metals  130,500,000,000 III-J-b-2 
Other metal products  139,900,000,000 III-J-c 
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Table B-1 concluded 
 
Product name 
Starting with CMIE 
product-code 
WPI-deflat. 
useda 
K) Machinery & Machine Tools    
   Including Electrical Machinery   
Prime movers  140,100,000,000 III-K-a-1 
Heavy machinery & parts: pumps & compressors, ball 
bearings, other machinery  
 
140,200,000,000 
 
III-K-a-1 
Non-electrical machinery & parts 140,300,000,000 III-K-a 
Industrial machinery (excl. chem.& text.) 140,500,000,000 III-K-a-1 
Textile machinery  140,502,000,000 III-K-a-2 
Chemical machinery  140,506,000,000 III-K-a-1 
Industrial machinery (excl. chem.& text.)  140,507,000,000 III-K-a-1 
Machine tools  140,600,000,000 III-K-a 
Industrial machinery (excl. chem.& text.)  140,700,000,000 III-K-a-1 
Misc. electrical machinery  150,000,000,000 III-K-b 
Motors & generators  150,100,000,000 III-K-b-1 
Transformers  150,200,000,000 III-K-b-1 
Switching apparatus  150,300,000,000 III-K-b-1 
Welding machinery  150,600,000,000 III-K-b-1 
Domestic electrical appliances 150,800,000,000 III-K-b-4 
Wires & cables  150,900,000,000 III-K-b-2 
Dry cells, storage batteries 151,000,000,000 III-K-b-3 
Domestic electrical appliances: air- conditioners, 
refrigerators and others  
 
151,100,000,000 
 
III-K-b-4 
Misc. electrical machinery  159,900,000,000 III-K-b 
K-b-5) Electronics   
Electronic equipments  160,000,000,000 III-K-b-5 
Consumer electronics  160,100,000,000 III-K-b-5 
Electronic equipments  160,200,000,000 III-K-b-5 
Computer hardware & software 160,300,000,000 III-K-b-5 
Communication equipment  160,400,000,000 III-K-b-5 
Electronic components  160,600,000,000 III-K-b-5 
L) Transport Equipment & Parts   
Other vehicles  170,100,000,000 III-L 
Commercial vehicles, passenger cars, multi utility 
vehicles, two- and three wheelers 
 
170,400,000,000 
 
III-L-b 
Automobile ancillaries  170,500,000,000 III-L-b 
Bicycles  170,600,000,000 III-L-b 
M) Other Miscellaneous  Manufacturing Industries   
Misc. manufactured articles  180,000,000,000 III-M 
a  Codes as in ‘Report on Currency and Finance’ 
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Table B-2: National industry classification at the 2-digit level (NIC-87 codes) 
NIC-87 Description of Industry CMIE codes 
20-21 Manufacture of Food Products 40,200,000,000-51,399,999,999 
22 Manufacture of Beverages, Tobacco & 
Tobacco Products 
51,400,000,000-59,999,999,999  
23 Manufacture of Cotton Textiles 60,300,000,000-60,399,999,999 
24 Manufacture of Wool, Silk and Synthetic Fibre 
Textiles 
60,100,000,000-60,299,999,999 
and 
60,500,000,000-60,599,999,999 
25 Manufacture of Jute, Hemp and Mesta Textiles 60,400,000,000-60,499,999,999 
26 Manufacture of Textile Products 60,700,000,000-69,999,999,999 
27 Manufacture of Wood & Wood Products, 
Furniture & Fixtures 
80,000,000,000-89,999,999,999 
28 Manufacture of Paper & Paper Products, 
Printing & Publishing 
90,000,000,000-99,999,999,999 
29 Manufacture of Leather and Leather & Fur 
Products 
70,000,000,000-79,999,999,999 
30 Manufacture of Chemicals and Chemical 
Products 
100,000,000,000-109,999,999,999 
31 Manufacture of Rubber & Plastic 110,000,000,000-119,999,999,999 
32 Manufacture of Non-Metallic Mineral Products 120,000,000,000-129,999,999,999 
33 Manufacture of Basic Metals & Alloys Industries 130,000,000,000-130,199,999,999 
34 Manufacture of Metal Products & Parts except 
Machinery & Transport Equipment 
130,200,000,000-139,999,999,999 
35 Manufacture of Machinery, Machine Tools & 
Parts, except Electrical Machinery 
140,000,000,000-149,999,999,999 
36 Manufacture of Electrical Machinery, 
Apparatus, Appliances and Supplies & Parts 
150,000,000,000-169,999,999,999 
37 Manufacture of Transport Equipment & Parts 170,000,000,000-179,999,999,999 
38 Other Manufacturing Industries 180,000,000,000-229,999,999,999 
 
Table B-3: Ownership classification system 
Ownership-form CMIE-code 
Public Sector 10,000,000,000 
 Central Government 10,100,000,000 
  Central Government – Commercial 10,101,000,000 
   Central Government – Takeover 10,101,010,000 
  Central Government- Miscellaneous 10,102,000,000 
 State Government 10,200,000,000 
Non-Public Sector 20,000,000,000 
 Indian  20,100,000,000 
  Group Firms 20,101,000,000 
  Private Firms 20,102,000,000 
 Foreign 20,200,000,000 
  Group Firms 20,201,000,000 
   Group1 20,201,010,000 
   Group2 20,201,020,000 
  Private Firms 20,202,000,000 
 Cooperatives 20,300,000,000 
 Joint Ventures 20,400,000,000 
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B.2 Quantitative Variables 
B.2.1 Construction of the Output Measure 
The output measure is gross value added (see glossary in Concepts-and-Definitions 
Appendix (chapter 8), Table A-1). To obtain real values we deflated the series by the 
Index Number of Wholesale Prices (base year 1988 = 100) from the RBI’s annual ‘Report 
on Currency and Finance’ (Vol. 2, various years) and for most recent years from the 
Statistical Abstract, India. Table B-4 below contains the relevant deflators at the 3-digit 
level. Details on the proper wholesale price indices for the respective industries are 
supplied in Table B-1 above.  
Table B-4: Output-deflators at the 3-digit level 
year IIIA IIIAa IIIAc IIIAe IIIAf1 IIIAh IIIAi IIIAj IIIAl IIIBb IIIBd IIIC 
1981 67.7 57.2 60.0 67.2 78.9 74.5 58.8 62.8 82.3 59.6 54.7 71.6 
1982 65.9 59.8 79.2 72.4 65.6 76.8 61.6 61.6 85.5 63.7 54.6 75.1 
1983 72.9 60.4 68.3 76.7 72.6 78.0 69.0 72.8 91.7 63.1 58.5 78.4 
1984 77.1 73.2 65.6 77.2 78.9 80.9 74.2 77.6 93.3 64.9 61.0 86.0 
1985 79.3 73.8 73.1 79.2 91.3 87.4 68.5 71.4 96.5 75.3 67.4 85.6 
1986 87.3 78.8 80.3 87.2 93.0 93.7 84.7 84.5 106.3 83.0 73.0 83.1 
1987 95.1 87.6 92.0 93.8 92.4 96.8 103.1 110.3 99.6 96.4 84.9 90.7 
1988 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1989 111.8 107.1 102.8 105.4 119.9 107.7 104.3 103.5 128.4 102.3 116.0 113.3 
1990 122.9 109.6 102.8 110.9 120.1 116.1 131.2 118.2 139.3 110.1 136.2 122.6 
1991 139.6 128.6 109.8 133.5 126.3 122.4 156.2 141.4 158.4 117.1 149.3 134.9 
1992 151.4 149.1 140.1 154.4 141.7 134.3 155.6 151.4 180.9 123.0 165.5 143.8 
1993 166.9 145.2 153.8 161.4 187.1 138.6 149.6 162.1 184.7 131.1 171.6 157.5 
1994 183.0 166.3 146.7 170.2 204.3 158.3 164.5 187.4 205.2 142.8 188.4 184.0 
1995 188.6 184.9 146.7 185.1 192.6 174.5 177.2 196.5 220.2 169.9 206.7 211.0 
1996 201.2 195.0 146.7 209.7 198.0 183.5 176.9 221.0 238.1 187.8 218.2 217.8 
1997 217.4 207.4 146.7 248.5 239.7 188.5 175.9 226.8 255.1 205.6 247.5 222.3 
1998 233.2 224.7 146.7 265.3 244.8 195.4 204.8 229.6 259.9 228.1 270.0 229.5 
1999 235.6 246.2 157.2 286.8 248.8 200.2 179.7 237.8 291.6 231.7 283.6 230.7 
Source: Report on Currency and Finance, Vol. 2 (var. issues) and Statistical Abstract India (var. issues); own 
calculations 
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Table B-4 continued 
year IIICa IIICb IIICc IIICd IIID IIIEa IIIEc IIIF IIIGa IIIGb IIIH IIIHa 
1981 71.1 86.5 79.7 50.8 63.9 59.6 46.0 59.4 73.6 52.7 73.6 65.6 
1982 74.3 90.7 84.6 57.4 72.4 62.2 53.7 59.6 82.4 54.5 76.2 67.9 
1983 77.3 90.6 84.7 73.5 78.2 71.1 56.8 64.3 82.6 53.0 79.0 72.7 
1984 80.3 93.0 89.3 119.0 79.8 79.9 62.4 68.5 86.3 56.2 82.5 74.1 
1985 82.7 92.8 92.2 91.2 93.2 83.1 72.4 76.1 94.1 61.8 87.1 83.5 
1986 82.4 90.2 90.0 72.0 95.1 88.4 80.8 79.7 92.9 71.4 91.8 89.6 
1987 90.5 95.3 96.3 79.5 98.8 93.6 94.5 84.9 96.5 85.1 97.1 92.1 
1988 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1989 113.8 112.5 117.5 124.5 100.7 120.3 113.7 110.3 107.3 97.1 103.1 111.7 
1990 122.8 115.6 125.0 143.6 101.6 128.2 121.6 133.2 112.8 98.6 108.9 121.4 
1991 140.5 124.3 132.7 143.9 103.2 147.5 151.4 138.9 119.4 99.4 124.0 141.7 
1992 153.1 132.8 147.0 138.8 203.2 155.0 205.9 135.5 129.4 102.4 141.8 163.3 
1993 166.7 139.8 155.4 162.2 243.2 159.1 221.2 145.6 135.1 102.3 153.0 175.9 
1994 200.4 145.8 176.9 177.9 268.8 167.2 211.5 155.4 139.7 102.5 171.3 206.1 
1995 229.6 161.4 200.2 235.9 282.2 225.7 209.2 164.4 171.2 109.3 184.0 230.5 
1996 236.0 167.6 195.1 251.2 284.7 230.7 206.1 167.0 175.9 118.4 190.9 257.6 
1997 243.4 168.9 210.3 223.5 327.6 218.2 207.1 172.5 174.0 123.1 198.3 246.4 
1998 253.1 169.1 191.1 247.2 386.5 215.5 226.9 176.4 175.7 126.9 207.5 238.0 
1999 252.0 171.2 184.1 263.8 376.7 224.3 317.7 204.8 173.9 128.7 220.9 240.8 
Source: Report on Currency and Finance, Vol. 2 (var. issues) and Statistical Abstract India (var. issues); own 
calculations 
Table B-4 continued 
Year IIIHb IIIHc1 IIIHc2 IIIHd IIIHe IIIHf IIIHg IIIHg1 IIIHi IIIIa IIIIb IIIIc1 
1981 92.9 101.1 71.8 n.a. 72.2 73.0 64.4 64.1 62.3 56.2 69.2 75.1 
1982 95.4 106.2 78.6 n.a. 72.6 76.3 66.8 66.6 63.0 63.1 70.0 93.5 
1983 94.4 100.1 84.2 n.a. 74.7 78.7 72.7 73.2 72.0 73.7 71.0 108.6 
1984 94.6 99.5 87.0 n.a. 78.4 81.4 82.4 82.7 74.8 77.8 74.6 118.9 
1985 100.3 101.8 88.9 n.a. 86.5 86.3 86.9 87.3 74.2 81.3 79.2 115.2 
1986 99.9 108.7 91.0 n.a. 92.9 89.3 90.5 91.3 80.3 88.9 89.3 14.6 
1987 97.5 108.8 95.4 n.a. 96.8 93.9 97.8 99.2 95.9 94.2 95.0 104.5 
1988 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1989 101.6 100.2 106.5 107.6 110.3 102.6 99.9 99.1 100.4 112.1 104.8 111.0 
1990 103.9 100.2 113.6 113.8 116.3 109.3 104.1 103.0 109.8 120.0 107.9 130.0 
1991 111.3 125.3 142.3 124.7 138.2 116.7 117.2 117.3 119.3 151.8 117.1 148.0 
1992 118.2 162.6 145.5 154.7 157.5 124.5 132.2 128.9 125.9 169.1 124.6 157.5 
1993 119.4 183.8 155.2 170.3 160.3 136.3 139.2 129.9 139.5 188.3 128.6 156.3 
1994 139.6 197.8 233.3 169.7 166.6 161.1 154.5 146.1 147.6 194.5 132.6 176.9 
1995 142.6 213.0 216.5 177.0 185.5 171.9 168.3 161.1 155.1 220.1 156.5 205.2 
1996 140.1 214.3 202.4 185.8 182.9 176.9 179.5 173.2 162.4 240.9 165.7 213.0 
1997 142.3 226.0 206.4 191.1 180.2 191.5 196.0 189.7 172.0 255.3 164.8 204.4 
1998 126.5 229.9 210.6 196.1 179.5 234.4 202.3 194.4 192.5 272.3 174.7 207.8 
1999 126.5 237.9 212.0 199.6 174.8 270.5 222.9 177.7 191.2 280.2 174.1 203.8 
Source: Report on Currency and Finance, Vol. 2 (var. issues) and Statistical Abstract India (var. issues); own 
calculations 
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Table B-4 continued 
Year IIIIe IIIJa IIIJa1 IIIJa2 IIIJa3 IIIJa4 IIIJb IIIJb1 IIIJb2 IIIJc IIIKa IIIKa1 
1981 65.3 57.3 61.1 54.9 51.8 56.8 50.7 58.6 45.7 58.9 64.8 63.5 
1982 72.2 60.3 62.2 62.6 53.0 55.0 50.9 59.1 45.8 61.8 68.0 67.5 
1983 73.9 64.4 65.4 67.5 58.3 58.8 55.1 59.7 52.3 65.6 70.8 71.1 
1984 82.6 70.6 71.7 74.2 63.5 65.8 61.2 67.0 57.5 73.1 74.7 75.3 
1985 87.1 83.3 86.4 82.2 79.1 73.1 64.4 71.6 59.9 77.7 80.9 81.3 
1986 88.5 83.3 84.6 83.8 80.3 78.4 66.4 73.6 61.8 80.4 85.0 85.9 
1987 94.3 86.8 87.5 86.7 84.9 86.8 78.8 86.4 74.1 83.7 87.4 87.8 
1988 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
1989 107.4 112.6 115.3 113.0 103.8 117.9 122.9 124.5 121.9 123.2 112.1 109.6 
1990 118.2 118.9 123.0 118.5 108.2 122.7 129.6 129.4 129.7 137.0 123.1 120.5 
1991 128.6 126.2 129.8 127.0 114.7 130.6 137.5 133.3 140.0 148.9 142.6 142.3 
1992 136.9 139.0 142.2 144.2 123.2 136.6 149.7 141.9 152.8 160.1 157.7 165.2 
1993 174.6 149.9 154.3 154.0 133.1 146.7 156.1 161.0 153.1 175.7 159.9 162.6 
1994 194.8 164.4 165.1 171.2 148.2 180.1 173.1 179.2 169.3 184.8 172.2 183.1 
1995 221.4 177.8 177.5 192.2 147.8 214.5 201.5 227.3 185.4 200.5 183.7 198.0 
1996 229.7 185.1 186.5 197.5 154.3 221.8 200.6 231.0 181.6 207.1 195.1 209.9 
1997 238.9 190.8 192.8 199.8 164.0 224.3 206.9 235.4 189.2 210.7 202.0 217.1 
1998 240.5 192.8 195.1 201.5 166.4 225.6 208.9 242.6 188.0 214.3 209.7 230.4 
1999 218.1 195.5 197.6 208.4 166.8 225.9 216.2 252.7 192.4 215.9 213.3 236.0 
Source: Report on Currency and Finance, Vol. 2 (var. issues) and Statistical Abstract India (var. issues); own 
calculations 
Table B-4 continued 
Year IIIKa2 IIIKb IIIKb1 IIIKb2 IIIKb3 IIIKb4 IIIKb5 IIIL IIILb IIIM   
1981 72.5 68.1 64.1 61.1 68.4 82.9 81.7 67.2 68.4 88.4   
1982 75.3 68.3 65.0 58.1 73.3 84.2 83.0 69.6 70.5 90.0   
1983 79.8 70.7 67.7 62.9 74.3 84.7 82.4 70.9 70.8 89.8   
1984 81.6 74.1 71.1 66.1 81.4 86.8 84.8 75.2 74.8 89.7   
1985 88.1 80.1 78.6 71.4 88.9 91.2 87.7 82.6 83.2 87.8   
1986 90.5 83.7 83.3 74.8 90.5 95.9 88.6 87.0 87.7 94.6   
1987 92.1 88.1 87.6 79.4 100.5 96.8 92.8 91.0 91.7 97.1   
1988 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0   
1989 107.3 108.1 104.0 112.0 108.5 111.4 109.6 111.6 111.6 103.6   
1990 115.4 115.3 109.3 119.5 121.1 119.7 118.0 121.8 121.3 105.2   
1991 132.9 133.1 127.5 141.0 143.6 132.3 128.8 136.0 134.4 113.4   
1992 142.3 147.4 142.4 160.6 152.9 142.8 136.4 146.5 144.7 122.7   
1993 148.4 155.3 155.5 163.8 150.8 154.2 140.7 150.3 147.6 131.0   
1994 153.7 176.8 186.7 188.5 156.4 160.1 148.0 160.2 158.2 146.7   
1995 157.7 192.1 197.8 223.6 165.5 163.4 149.5 170.9 169.7 150.2   
1996 164.8 196.4 205.8 220.5 185.1 167.8 148.4 178.6 178.4 154.8   
1997 170.6 194.6 209.4 204.0 197.9 172.3 146.0 184.6 185.2 158.3   
1998 171.0 193.3 210.3 189.1 203.6 178.6 155.0 191.9 191.4 159.9   
1999 171.3 190.6 208.9 183.6 203.6 176.3 153.0 197.8 197.4 161.6   
Source: Report on Currency and Finance, Vol. 2 (var. issues) and Statistical Abstract India (var. issues); own 
calculations 
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B.2.2 Construction of Labor Input 
The PROWESS-item ‘wages’ displays a company’s total expenses for labor. Besides 
salaries and wages, items such as payment of bonuses, contributions to employees’  
provident funds and staff welfare expenses are also included under ‘wages’. Dividing 
this figure by the average annual payment per employee, we get a good estimate for 
the number of persons employed. This is a widespread, commonly accepted method 
to derive employment figures at the company level. In the context of Indian 
manufacturing firms, recent applications include, inter alia, Hasan (2002), or Kathuria 
(2002). We calculated average annual payments per employee, AvWage, from the ASI 
data137 at the 2-digit level: 
jt
jt employeesofnumber
.exp.welfstaff&workmenfundsother&provident.emolum.totAvWage 


 ++=  
where j denotes the industry index at the two-digit NIC-87-level and t represents time. As 
of November 2001, the relevant ASI “Summary Results for the Factory Sector” had been 
available only up to the accounting year 1997-1998. For the two remaining years, i.e. for 
1998-99 and 1999-2000, we fell back on ASI internet publications at 
http://www.nic.in/stat. Here, Annexure III provides for so-called quick estimates of the 
number of employees (‘Employee’), as well as ‘Labour Cost’ for the accounting years 
1996-97 until 1999-2000. After having corrected some obviously faulty entries, we 
divided ‘Labour Cost’ by ‘Employees’ to obtain 1998,jAvWage and .AvWage 1999,j  
From the two overlapping years (1996-97 and 1997-98), we could verify that AvWage-
figures as constructed from Summary Results are almost identical to AvWage as 
constructed from the Quick Estimates and that the transition from one data source to 
the other causes no break. Industrywise results for average annual payments per 
employee are displayed in Table B-5. 
From Table B-5 we constructed index numbers of average annual payments per 
employee, with base year 1988-89 in the form )AvWage/AvWage( 1988,jjt (t = 1988, 
1989, ... 1999), i.e. as the growth factors of average annual payments per employee 
relative to the base year 1988. As a last step, we divided the PROWESS-item ‘wages’ by 
this deflator to get firm-wise labor labor inputs into the production function.  
 
                                                     
137) Annual Survey of Industries: Summary Results for Factory Sector; Table 5: Selected Characteristics by 
Major Industry Groups. 
–  176  – 
  
Table B-5: Average annual paymentsa per employee, by Industry (in Rs.) 
NIC-
87 
 
1988 
 
1989 
 
1990 
 
1991 
 
1992 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
1995 
 
1996 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
20-21 12296 14388 16392 18852 20803 22461 25596 28910 34044 33271 37680 43754 
22 8142 8641 9776 10811 11935 15054 15164 16565 18935 19958 20455 20013 
23 19528 21445 23810 26434 29191 30989 35368 37406 39766 43290 48637 54913 
24 21213 23693 26703 29619 32898 36967 39346 43949 45855 50140 49690 44495 
25 20497 22123 26077 26207 31827 34905 38053 42595 44796 54731 57892 65362 
26 13922 15054 17587 19219 21506 21953 24338 28527 31696 34954 35865 40492 
27 11724 11804 13039 13740 16420 18204 20127 21560 25611 24328 40896 47555 
28 22813 27166 29907 33540 37148 41403 52548 54643 61596 64206 68327 65889 
29 14026 16317 18768 20805 24409 24901 25803 30618 33257 38737 39912 41416 
30 27841 38010 44507 47440 58075 59782 68508 76366 80100 86014 98575 100528 
31 33071 31789 34040 37360 41965 46058 50107 63017 65170 71542 75493 83051 
32 15558 18093 19483 22196 25890 29103 33765 36572 42562 46096 47497 51487 
33 31342 36311 39229 36663 49649 55718 64403 67980 78364 87396 99399 90339 
34 23324 22449 26612 28975 34209 37272 43298 49546 50316 59222 63545 62672 
35 29870 35761 39314 45751 50904 56071 63124 74287 79806 89422 81525 107088 
36 33856 38455 42329 45751 50904 56071 63124 74287 79806 89422 81525 107088 
37 32434 37548 40642 46198 50952 54370 62271 76070 80340 92040 101657 101913 
38 23142 24980 28041 30693 35806 41792 44173 49295 55024 63409 68426 70852 
Source: ASI Summary Results for Factory Sector (1988-1997); For 1998 and 1999: ASI Quick Estimates at 
www.nic.in/stat/comp96_00.htm 
a Payments include ASI-categories ‘emoluments’, ‘workmen and staff welfare expenses’ and ‘provident and 
other funds’.  
 
B.2.3 Construction of Firm-Specific Capital Stocks 
PROWESS provides data on total gross fixed assets, the plant and machinery 
component thereof, the land and buildings component and a residual which is made 
of work-in-progress and miscellaneous other capital, for which the breakdown is not 
available. Investment in each of the three components is obtained as the difference 
between the current value and the lagged value of the respective gross fixed asset 
component, which appear in the balance sheet at historic cost (hence the superscript 
“H”):  
(B-1) kitkt
H
1t,ki
H
kit Ipgfagfa ⋅=− −  (k=1, 2, 3), where 
(B-2) kisks1t-,ki1t,kkitkt
H
kit Ip...IpIpgfa +++= − . 
kitI  is the physical amount of investment of component k at time t and “s” is the year 
of incorporation. kitkt Ip  is referred to as current investment at replacement cost. 
The replacement cost series for capital component k is calculated as 
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(B-3) )Ip()Kp(
p
p
)1()Kp( kitkt1t,ki1t,k
1t,k
kt
kitkt ⋅+⋅δ−=⋅ −−−
  (k = 1, 2, 3). 
The LHS in eq. (B-3) is the current value, at replacement cost, of the physical stock, 
kitK , of asset k owned by firm i at time t. The RHS is the sum of the previous year’s stock, 
after depreciation at the rate δ , and current investment, both valued at the current 
price of asset k.  
(i) The problem with the initial year 
The recursive perpetual inventory algorithm in eq. (B-3) requires appropriate starting 
values )Kp( 0,ki0k . When long time series are at hand, book values of the respective 
gross fixed asset type of the first sample year are typically taken, for the resulting 
approximation error diminishes with the length of the leading period that has been 
chosen. In our case, this procedure is inappropriate, for one because the time 
dimension is relatively short (T=12 at the most), and also because we are particularly 
interested in the effects of policy reforms. Hence, it is crucial to maintain the records of 
the initial pre-reform years. Instead, we employ transformed book values to derive the 
initial year capital-stock at base year b (the time a firm enters the sample): 
(B-4) H b,kib,kikb gfaR)Kp( ⋅=⋅ , 
where R is the factor that revalues the base year’s gross fixed assets at historic cost to 
their replacement cost values: 
(B-5) )gfa/gfa(R H b,ki
R
b,ki= . 
The derivation of the revaluation factor follows in sub-section B.2.3.1 below. 
 
(ii) From replacement cost series to “real” capital component series at constant 1988 
prices 
The National Accounts Statistics and for more recent years the Statistical Abstract India, 
provide time series on gross fixed capital formation (gfcf) at current and constant 
prices, from which implicit deflators can be derived as the ratio between the former 
and the latter.138 There are separate time series available for total gfcf, public sector 
gfcf as well as gfcf for the private corporate sector. Within the latter two sectors gfcf is 
                                                     
138) Within the considered 20-year period, the base year changes from time to time, so the first step is to 
construct smooth real time series with a uniform base year 1988. 
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split up into “gfcf construction”, from which the “land-and-buildings”-deflator is derived 
and “gfcf machinery and equipment”, an appropriate deflator for the “plant-and-
machinery”-component. For the residual capital component (other capital) we apply 
the aggregate deflator within each ownership sector. The relevant deflators are listed in 
Table B-6. 
 
Table B-6: Capital stock deflator-series by ownership form and type of asset (base year 
88-89) 
 economy- Public sector Private corporate sector 
year wide total construc-
tion 
machinery 
&equipment 
total construc-
tion 
machinery 
&equipment 
1980 0.499 0.490 0.416 0.584 0.570 0.398 0.603 
1981 0.559 0.544 0.465 0.642 0.619 0.471 0.645 
1982 0.610 0.597 0.533 0.675 0.642 0.560 0.658 
1983 0.674 0.645 0.587 0.709 0.716 0.627 0.729 
1984 0.733 0.698 0.661 0.743 0.755 0.702 0.764 
1985 0.821 0.789 0.758 0.821 0.837 0.768 0.851 
1986 0.861 0.848 0.825 0.868 0.889 0.853 0.896 
1987 0.902 0.908 0.912 0.905 0.889 0.926 0.887 
1988 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1989 1.104 1.094 1.112 1.119 1.092 1.077 1.108 
1990 1.212 1.194 1.197 1.228 1.187 1.156 1.201 
1991 1.389 1.370 1.364 1.413 1.349 1.301 1.369 
1992 1.512 1.510 1.509 1.544 1.479 1.401 1.504 
1993 1.576 1.583 1.632 1.572 1.528 1.517 1.548 
1994 1.719 1.726 1.801 1.692 1.672 1.643 1.696 
1995 1.856 1.909 2.030 1.823 1.751 1.854 1.752 
1996 1.969 2.089 2.230 1.978 1.823 1.925 1.829 
1997 2.043 2.211 2.417 2.043 1.847 1.969 1.845 
1998 2.122 2.336 2.610 2.102 1.879 2.034 1.871 
1999 2.179 2.439 2.748 2.143 1.900 2.072 1.890 
Source: National Accounts Statistics (var. issues) and Statistical Abstract India (var. issues); own calculations 
 
The real stock of capital component k at constant 1988 prices is generated by applying 
the deflators in Table B-6 to eq. (B-3) 
(B-6) kit1988,k1t,ki1988,kkit1988,k IpKp)1(Kp ⋅+⋅⋅δ−=⋅ − .  
In eq. (B-6) the initial year stock of capital component k at replacement enters 
“revalued“ (see sub-section (i)) if either the firm’s year of incorporation is before it 
entered the sample, and/or if the firm’s record has holes. In the latter case Hgfa  in the 
first year after the gap has to be revalued.  
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(iii) From real capital components to real stock of capital 
The three capital component series are summed to give the firm’s real capital stock 
series at constant 1988 prices  
(B-7) )Kp(Kp
3
1k
kit1988,kit1988 ∑ ⋅= = . 
This is the relevant capital stock measure that belongs to the analyses in chapters 3 and 
4. 
 
(iv) Remarks on the economic rate of depreciation 
Where the economic rate of depreciation is concerned, Srivastava (1996) assumes a 
uniform rate of iδ = 7.1 percent.139 Hasan (2002) assumes the economic rate of 
depreciation to be at six percent, also uniformly across sectors and type of capital. In 
principle, the uniformity-assumption could be relaxed: depreciation rates could be 
endogenously determined from the data, if wear and tear of gross fixed assets were 
accurately provided for.  
(B-8) ∑ −=δ
= −
iT
1t
H
it1t,iit
i
i gfa/)ADAD(T
1
, 
where itAD  gives accumulated depreciation, as shown in the balance sheet.140 The 
problem with endogenously derived depreciation rates from book values is that they 
are more likely to reflect accounting acrobatics than actual economic depreciation. In 
particular, quite a number of sick firms were found to not provide for depreciation at all, 
probably in an attempt to report lower losses than actually realized. If at all, then, 
endogenously derived depreciation rates would have to be calculated as the sectoral 
unweighted average of eq. (B-8) using data from sound firms only. We decided against 
proceeding this way, not least because the data collecting agency, the CMIE, put a 
big questionmark on the depreciation data.141  
                                                     
139) Srivastava (1996), p. 143. 
140) A breakdown of accumulated depreciation for different capital components is not available. 
141) See PROWESS User’s Manual, Vol. II, section on depreciation. 
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B.2.3.1 Construction of the Revaluation Factors142 
The year a firm enters the sample is referred to as the base year (year b). In year b, 
gross fixed assets as reported in the balance sheet are the sum of past and current 
(physical) investment valued at historical prices 
(B-9) b-τb2b-2b1b-1bbb
H
b Ip...IpIpIpgfa τ−−− ++++= .143 
Gross fixed assets at replacement cost are simply defined as the sum of past and 
current (physical) investment valued at the prices ruling in period b: 
(B-10) b-τb2b-b1b-bbb
R
b Ip...IpIpIpgfa ++++= )I...II(p b-τ1b-bb +++= . 
In eqs. (B-9) and (B-10), the earliest vintage of a firms’s capital mix is τ  years old. 
Technically, revaluation factors are calculated as the ratio between replacement cost 
of gross fixed assets and historical cost of gross fixed assets at the time the firm enters 
the sample, or re-enters the sample after a ‘hole’. To make this definition applicable for 
empirical purposes, some simplifying assumptions are needed: 
1) No firm has any capital of a vintage earlier than 1980 when it enters the sample in 
year b. This implies 
  
 ≤=
otherwise,     s-b
 1980ion incorporat ofyear  if1980-b
τ  
where s is the year of incorporation, and bs ≤ .  
2) Physical investment (I) is assumed to grow at a constant rate 1)I/I(g 1tt −= −  
from 1980 or the date of incorporation (whichever is later) onwards up to the firm’s 
initial year in the sample:  
(1+g) = 
τ−
+τ−
−
−
−
===
t
1t
2t
1t
1t
t
I
I
I
I
I
I K .  
For the empirical analysis, (1+g) is approximated by the growth rate of real gross 
fixed capital formation rGFCF between years b and s (or 1980, whichever is later):  
 




−
−=+
sb
)GFCFlog()GFCFlog(
exp)g1(
r
s
r
b  (s < t). 
While g is not firm-specific, ownership of the investing firms matters, as do the year of 
incorporation, s, (provided the firm has been founded after 1980) and the year of 
                                                     
142) The exposition closely follows Srivastava (1996, p. 141 ff). 
143) The subscript k is left out to simplify the exposition. 
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entry (“base year”), b. Furthermore, the composition of the capital stock is 
accounted for by referring to different types of GFCF within ownership classes (see 
Table B-7, next page).  
 3) Annual growth rates of capital prices ( π ) are assumed to be constant over the 
respective time period between s and b:  
 1)/p(pπ 1tt −= −  → (1+ π ) = 
τ−
+τ−
−
−
−
===
t
1t
2t
1t
1t
t
p
p
p
p
p
p K . 
 The growth rate of capital prices is simply the growth rate of the implicit deflator 
(from Table B-6) between year b and s (or 1980, whichever comes later).  
Table B-7: Gross fixed capital formation at constant 1988-89 prices (in Rs. crore) 
 economy- Public sector Private corporate sector 
year Wide Total construc-
tion 
machinery& 
equipment 
Total construc-
tion 
machinery& 
equipment 
1980 52631.25 23857.57 16592.33 8204.78 6214.26 1277.48 5032.32 
1981 56242.69 26834.41 18088.04 9637.57 9420.54 1898.62 7653.84 
1982 58680.36 31108.90 18434.31 12977.34 11522.96 1775.40 9722.85 
1983 59353.38 31729.17 19199.00 12953.38 9406.50 1682.35 7783.26 
1984 61710.93 33512.41 18999.42 14591.59 10852.57 1760.31 9099.00 
1985 66047.45 34848.83 20189.73 14865.49 11993.29 1898.62 10086.21 
1986 72102.57 39237.58 22534.30 16878.59 13720.15 2200.38 11519.76 
1987 80030.51 38072.55 21168.44 16873.46 11501.90 1704.98 9749.40 
1988 85669 39866 22277 17589 12246 1964 10282 
1989 93106.20 40094.52 19766.51 19567.87 14181.70 1828.21 12201.68 
1990 102336.10 42032.83 21283.86 20113.94 17609.11 2507.18 14994.10 
1991 98239.93 42871.41 22065.38 20261.16 25943.34 3543.25 22190.01 
1992 105080.20 39802.75 21074.66 18340.49 28380.96 3940.57 24232.47 
1993 116934.40 43494.71 22418.38 20535.40 33630.75 4848.72 28448.94 
1994 129214.60 51482.60 25138.25 25757.53 35504.43 4658.22 30485.43 
1995 155940.50 47975.38 25570.32 21776.19 55444.13 8504.37 46400.73 
1996 158400.50 45152.30 24683.51 19853.28 64815.82 8218.95 55932.60 
1997 161879.40 43904.68 22734.01 20620.66 66435.58 10572.78 55224.48 
1998 175860.70 47211.02 24163.81 22466.58 61868.84 9792.35 51481.00 
1999 190990.40 51084.63 27348.83 23061.52 61056.02 9600.53 50866.56 
Source: Report on Currency and Finance, Vol. 2 (var. issues) and Statistical Abstract India (var. issues); own 
calculations 
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Under assumptions 1-3 we have 
(B-11)   ∑τ
=




π++⋅= 0t
t
b
H
b )1)(g1(
1(pI)gfa  and 
(B-12)   ∑τ
=




+⋅= 0t
t
b
R
b )g1(
1(pI)gfa .  
For programming, it is more convenient to re-write eq. (B-11) and (B-12) without the 
sigma sign. Since both are geometric series, we have 
(B-11.a) 







++−⋅++
++⋅=
+ )1(τ
b
H
t π)1g)(1(
11
1π)-1g)(1(
π)1g)(1((pI)gfa , 
and  
(B-12.a) 







+−⋅
+⋅=
+ )1(τ
b
R
b g1
11
g
g)1((pI)gfa . 
The revaluation factor is then obtained as the ratio between (B-12.a) and (B-11.a) 
(B-13) H
b
R
b
gfa
gfa
R =  = 














π++−




+−⋅+⋅
−++
+τ
+τ
1
1
)1)(g1(
11
)g1(
11
)π1(g
]1)π1)(g1[(
. 
 
Table B.8a to B-8g report the revaluation factors for initial year capital stocks for various 
types of gross fixed assets. 
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B.2.3.2 Revaluation Factors by Form of Ownership and Capital Component (1981-1999) 
Table B-8a: Revaluation factors for initial year capital stock (total economy)          
  Year of incorporation 
year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
1981 1.0547                    
1982 1.0973 1.0421                   
1983 1.1488 1.0926 1.0497                  
1984 1.1918 1.1353 1.0921 1.0415                 
1985 1.2480 1.1916 1.1481 1.0967 1.0546                
1986 1.2676 1.2121 1.1691 1.1181 1.0765 1.0222               
1987 1.2854 1.2311 1.1889 1.1386 1.0976 1.0440 1.0223              
1988 1.3337 1.2800 1.2379 1.1873 1.1462 1.0926 1.0713 1.0496             
1989 1.3775 1.3247 1.2832 1.2325 1.1917 1.1385 1.1178 1.0969 1.0472            
1990 1.4159 1.3644 1.3236 1.2733 1.2330 1.1806 1.1606 1.1406 1.0912 1.0443           
1991 1.4928 1.4406 1.3990 1.3469 1.3056 1.2520 1.2326 1.2134 1.1627 1.1147 1.0698          
1992 1.5287 1.4776 1.4367 1.3848 1.3440 1.2910 1.2725 1.2542 1.2039 1.1562 1.1113 1.0407         
1993 1.5359 1.4865 1.4467 1.3961 1.3563 1.3048 1.2870 1.2695 1.2203 1.1736 1.1295 1.0597 1.0197        
1994 1.5653 1.5175 1.4789 1.4292 1.3904 1.3402 1.3234 1.3071 1.2589 1.2132 1.1700 1.0998 1.0601 1.0410       
1995 1.5735 1.5287 1.4923 1.4448 1.4080 1.3604 1.3451 1.3302 1.2843 1.2407 1.1996 1.1309 1.0925 1.0744 1.0347      
1996 1.6006 1.5563 1.5200 1.4725 1.4358 1.3885 1.3737 1.3596 1.3137 1.2703 1.2293 1.1596 1.1211 1.1035 1.0638 1.0293     
1997 1.6163 1.5723 1.5364 1.4890 1.4525 1.4054 1.3911 1.3775 1.3319 1.2887 1.2479 1.1776 1.1392 1.1220 1.0823 1.0478 1.0184    
1998 1.6211 1.5784 1.5434 1.4970 1.4614 1.4155 1.4019 1.3890 1.3444 1.3022 1.2624 1.1927 1.1550 1.1384 1.0992 1.0656 1.0364 1.0181   
1999 1.6203 1.5787 1.5447 1.4993 1.4645 1.4198 1.4067 1.3945 1.3509 1.3096 1.2707 1.2019 1.1648 1.1487 1.1103 1.0774 1.0484 1.0304 1.0126 
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Table B-8b: Revaluation factors for initial year capital stock (public sector undertakings)        
  Year of incorporation 
year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
1981 1.0489                    
1982 1.0910 1.0432                   
1983 1.1286 1.0808 1.0375                  
1984 1.1668 1.1194 1.0768 1.0389                 
1985 1.2266 1.1798 1.1381 1.0993 1.0599                
1986 1.2556 1.2103 1.1701 1.1316 1.0927 1.0335               
1987 1.2941 1.2486 1.2084 1.1692 1.1297 1.0687 1.0350              
1988 1.3406 1.2960 1.2571 1.2175 1.1780 1.1164 1.0833 1.0470             
1989 1.3878 1.3437 1.3057 1.2655 1.2256 1.1629 1.1301 1.0927 1.0447            
1990 1.4293 1.3864 1.3498 1.3095 1.2698 1.2068 1.1747 1.1364 1.0880 1.0425           
1991 1.5004 1.4589 1.4243 1.3833 1.3436 1.2795 1.2483 1.2081 1.1588 1.1116 1.0681          
1992 1.5658 1.5242 1.4900 1.4476 1.4069 1.3404 1.3093 1.2671 1.2161 1.1669 1.1221 1.0506         
1993 1.5789 1.5389 1.5063 1.4647 1.4249 1.3595 1.3294 1.2875 1.2371 1.1883 1.1437 1.0727 1.0224        
1994 1.5981 1.5612 1.5319 1.4918 1.4539 1.3909 1.3630 1.3214 1.2726 1.2247 1.1813 1.1117 1.0613 1.0394       
1995 1.6657 1.6292 1.6008 1.5594 1.5208 1.4557 1.4282 1.3846 1.3343 1.2844 1.2396 1.1670 1.1133 1.0917 1.0523      
1996 1.7286 1.6924 1.6650 1.6225 1.5833 1.5163 1.4892 1.4437 1.3920 1.3403 1.2943 1.2189 1.1623 1.1409 1.1013 1.0463     
1997 1.7684 1.7325 1.7058 1.6627 1.6232 1.5552 1.5284 1.4818 1.4293 1.3766 1.3299 1.2528 1.1946 1.1732 1.1332 1.0766 1.0289    
1998 1.7846 1.7504 1.7255 1.6832 1.6446 1.5778 1.5523 1.5058 1.4542 1.4018 1.3557 1.2791 1.2206 1.1997 1.1606 1.1035 1.0556 1.0265   
1999 1.7918 1.7592 1.7358 1.6944 1.6570 1.5915 1.5672 1.5212 1.4705 1.4188 1.3735 1.2977 1.2393 1.2190 1.1808 1.1238 1.0759 1.0467 1.0206 
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Table B-8c: Revaluation factors for initial year capital stock (public sector undertakings - construction)      
  Year of incorporation 
year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
1981 1.0531                    
1982 1.1213 1.0674                   
1983 1.1698 1.1157 1.0470                  
1984 1.2343 1.1793 1.1083 1.0599                 
1985 1.3041 1.2494 1.1770 1.1279 1.0660                
1986 1.3417 1.2883 1.2165 1.1678 1.1059 1.0403               
1987 1.4047 1.3502 1.2756 1.2253 1.1607 1.0925 1.0516              
1988 1.4517 1.3979 1.3229 1.2725 1.2071 1.1385 1.0978 1.0447             
1989 1.5308 1.4751 1.3958 1.3431 1.2737 1.2015 1.1597 1.1029 1.0562            
1990 1.5651 1.5107 1.4320 1.3797 1.3102 1.2385 1.1973 1.1397 1.0928 1.0357           
1991 1.6379 1.5845 1.5048 1.4524 1.3812 1.3089 1.2685 1.2082 1.1607 1.0998 1.0639          
1992 1.7094 1.6555 1.5734 1.5197 1.4458 1.3716 1.3310 1.2676 1.2188 1.1543 1.1179 1.0515         
1993 1.7464 1.6940 1.6125 1.5594 1.4855 1.4118 1.3722 1.3079 1.2592 1.1933 1.1570 1.0902 1.0379        
1994 1.7825 1.7328 1.6532 1.6016 1.5286 1.4568 1.4190 1.3542 1.3064 1.2391 1.2036 1.1372 1.0842 1.0465       
1995 1.8518 1.8033 1.7230 1.6714 1.5970 1.5250 1.4884 1.4211 1.3729 1.3021 1.2668 1.1990 1.1438 1.1056 1.0591      
1996 1.9204 1.8721 1.7899 1.7376 1.6609 1.5877 1.5514 1.4812 1.4322 1.3578 1.3223 1.2526 1.1950 1.1563 1.1091 1.0478     
1997 1.9969 1.9478 1.8624 1.8084 1.7285 1.6528 1.6163 1.5425 1.4920 1.4134 1.3771 1.3047 1.2443 1.2046 1.1561 1.0922 1.0420    
1998 2.0294 1.9821 1.8979 1.8450 1.7654 1.6910 1.6560 1.5816 1.5317 1.4518 1.4162 1.3440 1.2829 1.2435 1.1956 1.1312 1.0802 1.0372   
1999 2.0250 1.9805 1.8995 1.8487 1.7716 1.7001 1.6672 1.5942 1.5460 1.4670 1.4328 1.3624 1.3023 1.2638 1.2173 1.1539 1.1035 1.0606 1.0241 
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Table B-8d: Revaluation factors for initial year capital stock (public sector undertakings – machinery & equipment)    
  Year of incorporation 
year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
1981 1.0433                    
1982 1.0616 1.0214                   
1983 1.0858 1.0450 1.0246                  
1984 1.1048 1.0652 1.0462 1.0218                 
1985 1.1506 1.1117 1.0957 1.0704 1.0494                
1986 1.1717 1.1344 1.1202 1.0952 1.0748 1.0262               
1987 1.1918 1.1547 1.1414 1.1162 1.0960 1.0467 1.0204              
1988 1.2366 1.2008 1.1908 1.1650 1.1458 1.0956 1.0703 1.0490             
1989 1.2817 1.2482 1.2422 1.2161 1.1983 1.1481 1.1241 1.1021 1.0528            
1990 1.3235 1.2914 1.2885 1.2621 1.2453 1.1944 1.1713 1.1489 1.0990 1.0458           
1991 1.3896 1.3596 1.3620 1.3347 1.3194 1.2672 1.2454 1.2221 1.1710 1.1174 1.0700          
1992 1.4454 1.4157 1.4214 1.3930 1.3784 1.3239 1.3025 1.2785 1.2254 1.1699 1.1207 1.0466         
1993 1.4418 1.4133 1.4196 1.3919 1.3780 1.3249 1.3041 1.2807 1.2288 1.1744 1.1259 1.0533 1.0083        
1994 1.4494 1.4241 1.4331 1.4066 1.3945 1.3440 1.3253 1.3026 1.2531 1.2017 1.1550 1.0851 1.0406 1.0325       
1995 1.5081 1.4825 1.4947 1.4667 1.4550 1.4014 1.3827 1.3588 1.3065 1.2526 1.2031 1.1285 1.0801 1.0734 1.0406      
1996 1.5633 1.5384 1.5543 1.5251 1.5142 1.4585 1.4403 1.4155 1.3613 1.3058 1.2543 1.1762 1.1247 1.1190 1.0865 1.0428     
1997 1.5750 1.5509 1.5681 1.5391 1.5288 1.4734 1.4558 1.4311 1.3771 1.3220 1.2707 1.1925 1.1407 1.1352 1.1027 1.0587 1.0159    
1998 1.5766 1.5538 1.5718 1.5434 1.5339 1.4796 1.4628 1.4385 1.3856 1.3317 1.2812 1.2041 1.1526 1.1474 1.1156 1.0717 1.0293 1.0136   
1999 1.5832 1.5608 1.5795 1.5513 1.5421 1.4880 1.4716 1.4475 1.3948 1.3411 1.2907 1.2136 1.1620 1.1569 1.1253 1.0813 1.0387 1.0231 1.0095 
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Table B-8e: Revaluation factors for initial year capital stock (private sector undertakings)        
  Year of incorporation 
year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
1981 1.0324                    
1982 1.0473 1.0164                   
1983 1.1023 1.0737 1.0604                  
1984 1.1233 1.0972 1.0839 1.0246                 
1985 1.1677 1.1463 1.1351 1.0727 1.0492                
1986 1.1893 1.1709 1.1609 1.0983 1.0759 1.0277               
1987 1.2008 1.1805 1.1697 1.1051 1.0818 1.0304 1.0000              
1988 1.2538 1.2392 1.2311 1.1624 1.1406 1.0898 1.0619 1.0569             
1989 1.2857 1.2759 1.2702 1.2002 1.1800 1.1308 1.1043 1.0968 1.0408            
1990 1.3071 1.3022 1.2987 1.2290 1.2107 1.1641 1.1395 1.1298 1.0758 1.0370           
1991 1.3276 1.3295 1.3293 1.2615 1.2464 1.2046 1.1832 1.1698 1.1198 1.0844 1.0509          
1992 1.3572 1.3634 1.3653 1.2960 1.2824 1.2419 1.2218 1.2069 1.1577 1.1238 1.0927 1.0438         
1993 1.3551 1.3623 1.3649 1.2977 1.2852 1.2466 1.2278 1.2133 1.1661 1.1340 1.1047 1.0573 1.0149        
1994 1.3850 1.3962 1.4009 1.3318 1.3207 1.2830 1.2655 1.2494 1.2027 1.1717 1.1441 1.0996 1.0571 1.0438       
1995 1.3574 1.3686 1.3735 1.3114 1.3020 1.2690 1.2539 1.2382 1.1968 1.1696 1.1457 1.1073 1.0693 1.0569 1.0178      
1996 1.3572 1.3693 1.3747 1.3143 1.3058 1.2743 1.2603 1.2447 1.2050 1.1793 1.1569 1.1209 1.0841 1.0728 1.0346 1.0186     
1997 1.3611 1.3734 1.3791 1.3188 1.3106 1.2794 1.2656 1.2505 1.2109 1.1855 1.1634 1.1273 1.0906 1.0797 1.0414 1.0253 1.0065    
1998 1.3754 1.3888 1.3951 1.3331 1.3250 1.2932 1.2794 1.2642 1.2237 1.1979 1.1755 1.1387 1.1010 1.0903 1.0507 1.0346 1.0155 1.0089   
1999 1.3821 1.3959 1.4025 1.3400 1.3321 1.3002 1.2865 1.2713 1.2306 1.2047 1.1823 1.1451 1.1072 1.0965 1.0565 1.0404 1.0213 1.0147 1.0057 
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Table B-8f: Revaluation factors for initial year capital stock (private sector undertakings - construction)      
  Year of incorporation 
year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
1981 1.0667                    
1982 1.1540 1.0900                   
1983 1.2168 1.1528 1.0577                  
1984 1.2731 1.2123 1.1145 1.0547                 
1985 1.3158 1.2430 1.1595 1.0987 1.0437                
1986 1.3565 1.3054 1.2067 1.1456 1.0913 1.0481               
1987 1.4322 1.3784 1.2698 1.2030 1.1442 1.0983 1.0465              
1988 1.4583 1.4101 1.3028 1.2365 1.1789 1.1339 1.0837 1.0356             
1989 1.5113 1.4645 1.3523 1.2831 1.2235 1.1773 1.1261 1.0745 1.0385            
1990 1.5054 1.4676 1.3627 1.2973 1.2419 1.1990 1.1518 1.1005 1.0671 1.0298           
1991 1.5137 1.4867 1.3887 1.3270 1.2759 1.2366 1.1944 1.1417 1.1114 1.0738 1.0483          
1992 1.5340 1.5114 1.4147 1.3535 1.3037 1.2655 1.2250 1.1709 1.1420 1.1045 1.0817 1.0348         
1993 1.5392 1.5222 1.4296 1.3707 1.3234 1.2876 1.2500 1.1956 1.1688 1.1319 1.1123 1.0692 1.0357        
1994 1.5830 1.5695 1.4740 1.4132 1.3652 1.3291 1.2918 1.2339 1.2076 1.1694 1.1518 1.1097 1.0760 1.0406       
1995 1.5352 1.5295 1.4483 1.3959 1.3555 1.3255 1.2954 1.2415 1.2201 1.1853 1.1732 1.1409 1.1115 1.0817 1.0420      
1996 1.5575 1.5532 1.4705 1.4171 1.3764 1.3462 1.3162 1.2609 1.2398 1.2046 1.1936 1.1615 1.1323 1.1030 1.0645 1.0192     
1997 1.5294 1.5258 1.4488 1.3991 1.3612 1.3332 1.3054 1.2533 1.2338 1.2008 1.1910 1.1614 1.1341 1.1067 1.0706 1.0281 1.0099    
1998 1.5552 1.5528 1.4734 1.4222 1.3835 1.3551 1.3270 1.2729 1.2534 1.2195 1.2105 1.1807 1.1531 1.1254 1.0883 1.0450 1.0261 1.0170   
1999 1.5675 1.5657 1.4854 1.4337 1.3948 1.3662 1.3381 1.2833 1.2639 1.2298 1.2211 1.1913 1.1636 1.1358 1.0983 1.0547 1.0355 1.0265 1.0094 
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Table B-8g: Revaluation factors for initial year capital stock (private sector undertakings – machinery & equipment)    
  Year of incorporation 
year 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
1981 1.0265                    
1982 1.0345 1.0091                   
1983 1.0848 1.0620 1.0574                  
1984 1.1026 1.0819 1.0771 1.0212                 
1985 1.1483 1.1327 1.1305 1.0709 1.0511                
1986 1.1665 1.1533 1.1521 1.0927 1.0738 1.0238               
1987 1.1715 1.1563 1.1546 1.0939 1.0742 1.0208 0.9945              
1988 1.2253 1.2159 1.2176 1.1523 1.1344 1.0816 1.0578 1.0584             
1989 1.2623 1.2584 1.2630 1.1959 1.1799 1.1291 1.1070 1.1042 1.0467            
1990 1.2838 1.2841 1.2909 1.2237 1.2096 1.1613 1.1408 1.1359 1.0805 1.0359           
1991 1.3068 1.3135 1.3233 1.2574 1.2463 1.2031 1.1855 1.1764 1.1250 1.0849 1.0522          
1992 1.3371 1.3480 1.3603 1.2925 1.2831 1.2412 1.2250 1.2145 1.1637 1.1252 1.0949 1.0448         
1993 1.3350 1.3466 1.3592 1.2934 1.2848 1.2448 1.2295 1.2196 1.1708 1.1341 1.1055 1.0565 1.0131        
1994 1.3637 1.3792 1.3941 1.3265 1.3195 1.2806 1.2667 1.2552 1.2070 1.1718 1.1450 1.0991 1.0558 1.0442       
1995 1.3365 1.3511 1.3650 1.3039 1.2980 1.2636 1.2515 1.2403 1.1973 1.1661 1.1424 1.1021 1.0630 1.0521 1.0128      
1996 1.3352 1.3503 1.3644 1.3054 1.3003 1.2679 1.2568 1.2456 1.2046 1.1753 1.1534 1.1160 1.0784 1.0685 1.0302 1.0196     
1997 1.3409 1.3564 1.3709 1.3115 1.3066 1.2740 1.2631 1.2523 1.2111 1.1817 1.1597 1.1217 1.0838 1.0742 1.0353 1.0244 1.0042    
1998 1.3536 1.3701 1.3853 1.3244 1.3197 1.2865 1.2756 1.2649 1.2228 1.1928 1.1705 1.1314 1.0926 1.0831 1.0430 1.0322 1.0116 1.0073   
1999 1.3595 1.3764 1.3920 1.3307 1.3262 1.2927 1.2819 1.2715 1.2290 1.1989 1.1766 1.1372 1.0980 1.0886 1.0480 1.0373 1.0167 1.0124 1.0050 
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